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SUSTAINING GEOGRAPHIES OF HOPE:
CULTURAL RESOURCES ON
PUBLIC LANDS
SANDRA B. ZELLMER*
Then I was standing on the highest mountain of them all,
and round about beneath me was the whole hoop of the
world.... [T]he sacred hoop of my people was one of many
hoops that made one circle, wide as daylight and as star-
light, and in the center grew one mighty flowering tree to
shelter all the children of one mother and one father.
And I saw that it was holy.
-John G. Neihardt1
I gave my heart to the mountains the minute I stood beside
this river with its spray in my face .... By such a river it is
impossible to believe that one will ever be tired or old ... it
is purity absolute. Watch its racing current, its steady re-
newal of force:
it is transient and eternal.
-Wallace Stegner2
* Visiting Associate Professor, Tulane University Law School (2001), and Asso-
ciate Professor, University of Toledo College of Law (1998-present). I thank Profes-
sors Phil Closius, Oliver Houck, Susan Martyn, Joseph Slater, and Dean Suagee, as
well as Wayne Brewster, Courtney Coyle, James Dubois, Brian Ferrell, Roger Flynn,
Dr. Thomas King, Deb Liggett, Albert Lin, and Tom VanNorman for their contribu-
tions and encouragement. I am also grateful to the University of Toledo College of
Law for its summer research stipend and the American Law Institute for the opportu-
nity to speak about cultural resources at its 2001 Environment Course. A revised ver-
sion of my remarks is published at Sandra B. Zellmer, The Protection of Cultural
Rescources on Public Lands: Federal Statutes and Regulations, 31 E.L.R. 10689 (June
2001). The phrase "geography of hope" is from WALLACE STEGNER, THE SOUND OF
MOUNTAIN WATER 11, 153 (Penguin ed., 1997) (1969).
1. JOHN G. NEIHARDT, BLACK ELK SPEAKS: THE LIFE STORY OF A HOLY MAN
OF THE OGLALA SIOUX 36 (Pocket Books 1972) (1932).
2. WALLACE STEGNER, THE SOUND OF MOUNTAIN WATER 11, 42 (Penguin
ed., 1997) (1969).
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INTRODUCTION
The natural world has been a source of spiritual inspira-
tion for the nation, as well as a stimulant for political aspira-
tions and nationalism, throughout American history. Nature is
a recurring motif in the rich cultural tapestry that comprises
our national identity and heritage. Our federal public lands,
widely known for their physical resources-timber, range, min-
erals, water, and wildlife-are as notable for their cultural sig-
nificance as they are for their economic potential. Congress
has long recognized that the remarkable natural features on
our public lands are true American "antiquities," integral to
American culture. 3
As critical as the public lands are to the nation, certain
communities have especially deep associations with the land
and its resources. For many American Indian tribes, physical
features and objects on the public lands hold extraordinary po-
litical and spiritual significance. The land has represented an
unparalleled bulwark against the otherwise inevitable effects
of colonization-tribal eradication and assimilation. American
Indian cultural interests in the public lands deserve special
consideration, given their unique associations with the land
and its resources, and the political and legal obligations arising
from the historic treatment of tribes, their treaties, and their
continuing sovereign status.
Cultural resources, which include historic structures and
artifacts as well as natural landscapes, physical features, and
objects with spiritual or other intangible human associations,
are addressed by a panoply of federal laws.4 Congress has ex-
3. See, e.g., The Antiquities Act of 1906, 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994). The first
parcel to be withdrawn from the public domain and designated as a National
Monument under the Antiquities Act, Devils Tower National Monument, was de-
scribed as a "such an extraordinary example of the effect of erosion in the higher
mountains as to be a natural wonder and an object of historic and great scientific
interest.... ." See Proclamation No. 658, 34 Stat. 3236 (Sept. 24, 1906). The
Tower has been a prominent landmark and meeting place for American Indians
for centuries, and it is revered by northern plains tribes as a site of great impor-
tance in tribal culture and spirituality. See Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v.
Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 816 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000),
discussed infra at Part III.A.
4. I have culled this description of "cultural resources" from anthropological
works, as there is no single definition of the term in federal law. THOMAS F. KING
ET AL., ANTHROPOLOGY IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION: CARING FOR CULTURE'S
CLUTTER 8-9 (1977), was especially helpful; see also E.V. WALTER, PLACEWAYS: A
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pressed broad secular objectives in preserving cultural re-
sources on public lands, particularly those of interest to Ameri-
can Indian tribes. It has prioritized tribal cultural interests by
requiring the repatriation of cultural items and human re-
mains,5 and by directing federal agencies to consult with tribes
regarding the effects of their undertakings on traditional cul-
tural properties, and in some cases to mitigate adverse impacts
on those properties. 6
The land management laws applicable to national parks,
forests, and other public lands provide additional authority to
protect cultural resources by requiring sustainable use and the
prevention of long-term degradation of the land and resources.7
These laws also require that cultural values be considered
through decision-making processes for land use planning and
other activities.8 Meanwhile, however, the public lands laws
grant extensive discretion to the land management agency, dis-
cretion that has been used most frequently to favor economic
and recreational activities over cultural practices.9
The First Amendment of the Constitution is often asserted
as a barrier to accommodating tribal cultural interests. The re-
ligion clauses of the First Amendment-protecting free exercise
while prohibiting governmental establishment of religion-
have not afforded meaningful protection for cultural re-
sources. 10 While the Free Exercise Clause forbids the govern-
THEORY OF THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT (1988) (concluding the holistic experience
of place and space is essential to understanding human cultures). The term "cul-
ture" is itself a deeply complex term. For purposes of this Article, I use it with
reference to a particular way of life by and through which a group of people
brought together by common characteristics, such as ethnicity, religion, language,
or history, express shared behaviors and values. See Patty Gerstenblith, Identity
and Cultural Property: The Protection of Cultural Property in the United States,
73 B.U. L. REV. 559, 561-62 (1995). For insightful expositions on the concept of
culture over time and across disciplines, and its relationship with law, see
CLIFFORD GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER ESSAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY (1983); Sally Engle Merry, Law, Culture, and Cultural Appro-
priation, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN 575 (1998); Naomi Mezey, Law as Culture, 13
YALE J.L. & HUMAN 35 (2001).
5. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (1994).
6. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470f, 470h-2(f) (1994).
7. See generally 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600, 1604 (1994); 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1732 (1994).
8. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1702(a), 1712(c)(3) (1994); see also 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(8)
(1994) (declaraing policy of managing lands to protect various environmental and
social values).
9. See, e.g., infra note 320 (citing cases).
10. See id.
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ment from penalizing individuals for their religious beliefs, fa-
cially neutral laws that incidentally burden or even destroy the
religions associated with a particular site or resource have sur-
vived judicial scrutiny." Nonetheless, there are many compel-
ling reasons for land managers to facilitate the interests of
American Indian tribes in sacred sites and cultural resources.
Protecting cultural resources and allowing tribal access to
them advance numerous secular objectives, including the po-
litical and legal obligations inherent in the federal trust re-
sponsibility toward tribes, as expressed in treaties and stat-
utes.
Decisions that support American Indian cultural interests
do not establish or endorse religion. Many governmental deci-
sions that protect cultural resources or provide access to them
have cultural, historical, or political, rather than religious, ob-
jectives and effects. These decisions satisfy traditional Estab-
lishment Clause analysis, even if they result in incidental
benefits to religious interests. Moreover, decisions that provide
preferences or exemptions for tribal spiritual needs by alleviat-
ing burdens to ceremonial practices or otherwise dispelling the
lingering effects of religious suppression are an appropriate
form of accommodation. Absent extraordinary measures, such
as outright delegation of veto power over other lawful activities
to tribal religious leaders, preserving cultural resources and
providing access for affiliated tribes do not excessively entangle
the government with religious affairs or otherwise establish re-
ligion.
The First Amendment is not the only constitutional con-
sideration implicated by governmental management of tribal
cultural resources. Accommodations may trigger equal protec-
tion concerns by providing preferences for Indian tribes over
other groups with cultural, economic, or aesthetic interests in
the public lands. Indian tribes, however, are not similarly
situated to other groups, given the unique site-based, commu-
nal nature of their beliefs and practices and the history of gov-
ernmental relations with tribes and suppression of Indian re-
ligions. Although racially sensitive affirmative action
programs are losing ground in equal protection jurisprudence,
accommodations for federally recognized tribes are political,
not racial, and require only that the government have a ra-
11. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
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tional basis for adopting them, a threshold easily met in most
cases. Programs that alleviate government-imposed burdens
on tribal cultural practices promote vital remedial objectives
and result in non-discriminatory effects. Accommodations for
non-federally recognized tribes affiliated with a particular site
should also satisfy equal protection concerns in most cases, al-
though the level of scrutiny will be higher absent a formal po-
litical relationship with the United States.
This Article integrates constitutional principles, statutory
requirements, and federal policy governing the use and preser-
vation of cultural resources to sketch out a decision-making
framework for public land managers. Specific examples of
cases where American Indian interests have been pitted
against competing demands at Devils Tower National Monu-
ment, the Indian Pass area of the California Desert, and the
Medicine Wheel are examined to illustrate optimal solutions-
solutions allowing the greatest possible accommodation of cul-
tural, even spiritual, interests, while protecting the resources
from degradation. The conflicts at these sites, and the oppor-
tunities presented by these conflicts, show that federal agen-
cies can adopt reasonable accommodations without violating ei-
ther statutory or constitutional mandates.
Part I of the Article draws upon history, literature, and art
to demonstrate the cultural and spiritual importance of public
lands and resources to our national heritage and to closely af-
filiated individuals and groups. These same sources serve as a
testament to the systematic displacement of American Indians
from their aboriginal lands, the destruction of tribal burial
grounds, and the overt suppression of cultural practices in a
concerted effort to assimilate tribes into Anglo-American cul-
ture. Part II examines contemporary congressional provisions
encouraging the accommodation of tribal cultural interests.
The governing statutory requirements for specific categories of
public lands, from the conservation objectives applicable to Na-
tional Park System lands to the multiple use requirements for
National Forests and Bureau of Land Management lands, are
reviewed in Part III. Finally, Part IV assesses the constitu-
tional implications of federal decisions regarding the manage-
ment and prioritization of tribal cultural resources.
The resolution of constitutional and statutory conflicts is
necessarily fact-specific, and there is no rigid prescription that
will determine the outcome of every case. Historic and cultural
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associations with the site or resource at issue are central to the
inquiry, along with the nature of any short- and long-term
physical effects on the resource and the overarching manage-
ment mission for the relevant category of public lands. If cul-
tural affiliation is shown by ethnological studies, written or
oral histories, or federal treaties, neither the First Amendment
nor equal protection considerations prevent reasonable accom-
modation, and the relevant statutory authorities can and
should be utilized to the fullest extent to preserve and allow ac-
cess to cultural resources.
I. THE CULTURAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUES OF PUBLIC LANDS
A. American Heritage and Nationalism
America's vast natural resources have been instrumental
in shaping the nation's cultural identity. The natural world
has been a prominent theme in much of our important litera-
ture and art, fostering religious, political, and social constructs
throughout American history. Nature was viewed by the New
England Puritans as "a hideous and desolate wilderness, full of
wild beasts and wild man," to be subdued and converted to
agrarian purposes. 2 The progress and triumph of civilization
went hand in hand with the perceived Christian role of man,
having fallen from grace, in recovering Eden from the wilder-
ness. 13 By the mid-1800s, however, the influences of Romantic
poets and philosophers contributed to a burgeoning apprecia-
tion for wild places, rare in Europe but abundant in the New
World.' 4 With the rise of a more affluent leisure class, the no-
tion of "community through nature" became a pervasive influ-
ence in American political and social life.' Nature, as por-
12. 1 AUBREY L. HAINES, THE YELLOWSTONE STORY 158 (rev. ed. 1996)
(quoting William Bradford (1620)); see also Genesis 1:28 ("replenish the earth, and
subdue it: and have dominion.., over every living thing that moveth upon the
earth").
13. See BARBARA NOVAK, NATURE AND CULTURE 158, 164-65 (1995).
14. See HAINES, supra note 12, at 159 (discussing influence of Rosseau,
Wordsworth, Coleridge and others).
15. See NOVAK, supra note 13, at 15; see also RODERICK NASH, AMERICAN
ENVIRONMENT: READINGS IN CONSERVATION HISTORY 9 (1976). One of the coun-
try's most beloved anthems, America The Beautiful, written by Katharine Lee
Bates in 1893 after a visit to Pike's Peak, extols the "purple mountain majesties"
and "amber waves of grain" as evidence that God shed his grace on America,
"crown[ing] thy good with brotherhood, from sea to shining sea." Lyrics and brief
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trayed in art, conveyed a powerful image of America as the
chosen land, giving rise to a sense of independence and oppor-
tunity, along with a duty to maximize the productivity of the
abundant natural riches flowing from God's blessings. 16
The beauty of the American landscape provided a surro-
gate for a "missing" national tradition. Lacking the great ca-
thedrals, castles, and paintings of Europe, the forests, water-
ways, and mountains became America's most significant
antiquity, crucial in establishing a sense of national identity.17
The depiction of dramatic natural features and landscapes by
nineteenth century American artists and authors promoted the
public's fascination with nature. 8 During the 1830's, George
Catlin's journals and paintings of Great Plains tribes were pub-
lished in eastern newspapers, capturing the public's imagina-
tion and sparking intrigue with the "wild" west and its native
inhabitants. 9 Catlin urged that the West be preserved so "the
world could see for ages to come, the native Indian in his clas-
sic attire, galloping his wild horse ... amid the fleeting herds of
history are available at http://www.library.utoronto.ca/utel/rp/poems/bateskl.html
(last visited Feb. 10, 2002).
16. See NOVAK, supra note 13, at 16, 53. A belief in the unity of God and na-
ture is reflected in a variety of artistic devices. Painters used water to symbolize
spiritual cleansing, id. at 40-41; sky and light as God's special means of commu-
nicating with man, id. at 41; and mountains as expressing the moment of crea-
tion, id. at 48-49. Remarkably, instead of resisting nature-worship, "most reli-
gious orthodoxies in America obligingly expanded to accommodate a kind of
Christianized pantheism.... The implications of this.., make the concept of na-
ture before the Civil War indispensable to an understanding of American culture."
Id. at 3-4.
17. See DAVID LOWENTHAL, THE PAST IS A FOREIGN COUNTRY 114-15 (1985);
NOVAK, supra note 13, at 20, 49; see also William A. Shutkin, The Concept of
Environmental Justice and a Reconception of Democracy, 14 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 579,
581 (1995) (stating that "[Ifor [Thomas] Jefferson, the environment (albeit culti-
vated) was the essential ingredient for a healthy democracy").
18. See, e.g., HENRY DAVID THOREAU, THE MAIN WOODS 88 (Penguin ed.,
1988) (1864); Henry David Thoreau, Walking, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE
AND PRACTICE: A READER 93, 95 (Lisa M. Benton & John Rennie Short eds., 2000)
[hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE]; see also NOVAK, supra note 13, at 4
(describing influence of painters Thomas Cole, Alfred Bierstadt, and Thomas
Moran).
19. George Catlin, North American Indians: Being Letters and Notes on their
Manners, Customs, and Conditions, 1832-1839, at 288-295, in ENVIRONMENTAL
DISCOURSE, supra note 18, at 35.
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elks and buffaloes."20 By the turn of the century, preservation
of natural "antiquities" was a recurring theme. 21
The law eventually reflected the sense that America's heri-
tage and cultural identity were inextricably bound with our na-
tion's natural attributes. John Muir, our country's most fa-
mous conservationist and founder of the Sierra Club, and
Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., another early visionary, subse-
quently championed Catlin's idea for a national park pre-
serve.22 They advocated for the preservation of open space to
promote public health and spiritual well-being. 23 Their efforts
finally spurred political action on Capitol Hill in 1864, when
United States Senator John Conness from California supported
legislation to protect the Giant Sequoias from encroachment. 24
Rather than extolling natural or spiritual virtues of the area in
terms of preservation per se, Conness's appeals to national
pride-and the desire to disprove popular British sentiment
that the giant trees were mere "Yankee hoax"--generated the
necessary support for withdrawing the Yosemite area from set-
tlement and timber harvest. 25
20. Joseph L. Sax, The Trampas File, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1389, 1389 n.2
(1986).
21. Peter Manus, One Hundred Years of Green: A Legal Perspective on Three
Twentieth Century Nature Philosophers, 59 U. PITT. L. REV. 557, 588-601 (1998)
(citing, inter alia, JOHN MUIR, A THOUSAND MILE WALK TO THE GULF (1916), MY
FIRST SUMMER IN THE SIERRA (1911), and THE MOUNTAINS OF CALIFORNIA
(1894)).
22. See Alfred Runte, Preservation Heritage: The Origins of the Park Idea in
the United States, in PERCEPTIONS OF THE LANDSCAPE AND ITS PRESERVATION 56-
64 (1983). See generally HAINES, supra note 12, at 156-63; RICHARD WEST
SELLARS, PRESERVING NATURE IN THE NATIONAL PARKS: A HISTORY 7 (1997).
23. Olmsted and Muir both believed that access to natural areas would
.stimulate healthy contemplation... and regenerate spirits dulled by the con-
stant labor of the ordinary citizen's life." Holly Doremus, Nature, Knowledge and
Profit: The Yellowstone Bioprospecting Controversy and the Core Purposes of
America's National Parks, 26 ECO. L.Q. 401, 441-42 (1999). Muir also relied on
the Bible to urge the credo of preservation. Manus, supra note 21, at 591 (citing
MUIR, A THOUSAND MILE WALK TO THE GULF, supra note 21, at 126) (describing
Muir's response to an adversary: "Christ says, 'Consider the lilies,'. . . Now,
whose advice am I to take, yours or Christ's?").
24. Runte, supra note 22, at 56. By this time, a few city parks and scenic
cemeteries had been set aside as public preserves, including New York's Central
Park in 1851, with Olmsted as its first superintendent. See HAINES, supra note
12, at 161-62.
25. HAINES, supra note 12, at 163. The administration ofthe area was ini-
tially left to the State. Yosemite became a National Park in 1890. Act of Sept. 25,
1890, 16 U.S.C. § 41 (1984).
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Muir and others were adept at using nationalism and the
perceived need to compensate for the lack of cultural antiqui-
ties in America to advocate a system of national parks.26
Shortly after Yosemite was withdrawn from settlement,
sketches and reports of the fantastic canyons and geysers near
the Yellowstone River prompted Congress to designate Yellow-
stone as the world's first National Park, providing "a public
park or pleasuring ground for the benefit and enjoyment of the
people."27 To mollify opponents' economic concerns, the initial
legislation provided no funds for Park management, but poach-
ing and the destruction of natural features and artifacts posed
chronic problems. 28 Congress ultimately enacted the Park Ser-
vice Organic Act of 1916 to coordinate the management of ex-
isting preserves and to officially recognize a dual mission of
conservation and public enjoyment in the National Park Sys-
tem.29 Nationalism played a persuasive role in the adoption of
26. JOHN MUIR, OUR NATIONAL PARKS 1 (1901) ("Thousands of tired, nerve-
shaken, over-civilized people are beginning to find out that... parks and reserva-
tions are useful not only as fountains of timber and irrigating rivers, but as foun-
tains of life."); see also NAVL PARK SERV., RETHINKING THE NATIONAL PARKS FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY (2001), available at http://www.nps.gov/policy/report.htm
("Inspiring us, uplifting our spirits, [National Parks] serve as powerful reminders
of our national origins and destiny.... Parks should become sanctuaries for ex-
pressing and reclaiming ancient feelings of place."). This theme was echoed by
Stephen Mather, the first director of the Park Service, "who envisioned parks as
places where people could renew their spirits and become better citizens through
clean living in the outdoors." Doremus, supra note 23, at 441.
27. Act of Mar. 1, 1872, 16 U.S.C. § 21 (1994). Reports from Dr. Ferdinand
Hayden's 1871 expedition and the drawings of artist Thomas Moran were instru-
mental in capturing the public's interest and generating congressional support.
See HAINES, supra note 12, at 140-55, 164-72. The Northern Pacific Railroad
was influential in moving the legislation along, in hopes of expanding and draw-
ing passengers to the area. Id. at 153-54, 163-66.
28. HAINES, supra note 12, at 171-72 (noting that Hayden promised Con-
gress that no moneys would be requested for several years); id. at 242 (reporting
that the first appropriation for Yellowstone National Park was authorized in
1878, in the amount of $10,000). The primary opposition came from California
Senator Cornelius Cole, chairman of the appropriations committee, who stated
"grave doubts" about precluding settlers from the Yellowstone area. Id. at 169-
70.
29. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-4 (1994) (popularly known as the "National Park Service
Organic Act"). Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., was instrumental in the passage of
the Organic Act and played a key role in crafting the language of section 1. See
Robin W. Winks, The National Park Service Act of 1916: "A Contradictory Man-
date"?, 74 DENV. U. L. REV. 575, 596-97 (1997). For further discussion of Na-
tional Park System management, see infra Part III.A.
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the Act: "great parks are, in the highest degree ... a sheer ex-
pression of democracy."30
Even before the Organic Act was adopted, Congress had
declared its intent to preserve archeologically important public
lands and artifacts from destruction. The Antiquities Act of
1906 authorizes the President "to declare.., historic land-
marks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of
historic or scientific interest ... to be national monuments." 31
The executive branch has exercised this power aggressively
ever since the Act's inception, citing archeological, scientific,
and cultural objectives in preserving millions of acres of land
from mining, logging, and grazing. 32
Preservation was not the only by-product of America's
interest in the west. Nineteenth century laws also encouraged
rapid settlement and exploitation of western natural resources.
30. Winks, supra note 29, at 596 (citing CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS OF 1916,
H.R. 8668, at 53). Forest preserves were also being set aside, beginning in the
late 1800s, for the utilitarian purposes of preserving timber and watersheds. See
CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN 122-24 (1992); Federico
Cheever, The United States Forest Service and National Park Service: Paradoxical
Mandates, Powerful Founders, and the Rise and Fall of Agency Discretion, 74
DENV. U. L. REV. 625, 648 (1997).
31. 16 U.S.C. § 431 (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Reports of the destruction of
southwestern pueblos by pothunters had reached Congress by the 1890s, generat-
ing proposals for the withdrawal of specific sites, including Pueblo Bonito in the
Chaco Canyon area; see KING, supra note 4, at 17-18. Several bills were initiated
in Congress in 1900, ranging from the fairly narrow House version, forbidding the
unauthorized disturbance of antiquities, to a more sweeping version proposed by
Interior, advocating withdrawals for broad protective purposes. Id. at 18-19. The
final bill was a compromise between the two extremes. Id.
32. See 146 CONG. REC. S7030-32 (daily ed. July 17, 2000) (statement of
Sen. Nickles) (listing monuments by president and total acreage); Richard M.
Johnannsen, Public Land Withdrawal Policy and the Antiquities Act, 56 WASH. L.
REV. 439, 453-56 (1981) (discussing President Carter's withdrawal of fifty-six mil-
lion acres for seventeen monuments in Alaska). In United States v. Cameron, 252
U.S. 450, 455-56 (1920), the Supreme Court upheld one of the earliest withdraw-
als, citing presidential findings that the Grand Canyon was appropriate for desig-
nation as "an object of unusual scientific interest" and "one of the great natural
wonders." More recently, the Clinton administration promoted a strategy of pro-
tecting landscapes and "anthropological ecosystem[s]" by designating millions of
acres of land as national monuments. James R. Rasband, The Rise of Urban Ar-
chipelagoes in the American West: A New Reservation Policy?, 31 ENV'L L. 1, 85
(2001) (citing Bruce Babbitt, From Grand Staircase to Grand Canyon Parashant:
Is There a Monumental Future for the BLM?, Remarks at Univ. of Denver (Feb.
17, 2000)). Examples include Grand Staircase-Escalante, Proclamation No. 6920,
61 Fed. Reg. 50,223 (Sept. 18, 1996) (1.7 million acres), and Grand Canyon-
Parashant, Proclamation No. 7265, 65 Fed. Reg. 2825 (Jan. 11, 2000) (one million
acres).
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The Homestead Act of 1862 encouraged agrarian activity by
giving settlers title to the land if they occupied and cultivated it
for a prescribed period of time 3 The General Mining Law of
1872 provides that the discovery of a valuable mineral deposit
entitles a miner to develop a claim and to take title to the
land.34 Shortly after the turn of the century, Congress enacted
the Reclamation Act of 1902 to assist farmers who settled the
arid West by providing for the construction of dams, reservoirs,
and irrigation systems to supply water for the production of
crops.35 Federal policies also allowed customary use of the pub-
lic range to continue, largely unabated and unregulated. 36
During this "Great Barbecue"3 7 of the public lands and re-
sources, the government encouraged the expansion of trade in
western agricultural and mineral products by allocating lands
for railroads to support national transportation systems. 38 The
government commissioned landscape artists to assist in the
railroad surveys, and their portrayals of the expansive western
lands helped convince entrepreneurs to "go west young man,"39
33. 43 U.S.C. §§ 161-64 (1994) (allowing for entry and patent for 160 acres
of land) (partially repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976, Title VII, § 702, 90 Stat. 2744, 2787); see also The Desert Lands Act of 1877,
43 U.S.C. §§ 321-39 (1994) (expanding opportunities for settlement in the arid
areas of the west by providing for entry on 640 acres with patent to the land to be
issued upon proof that the land had been irrigated).
34. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994). The General Mining Law of 1872 codified the
Lode Mining Act of July 26, 1866, 30 U.S.C. §§ 43, 46, 51, 53 (1982), and the
Placer Mining Act of July 9, 1870, 30 U.S.C. §§ 35-36, 38, 47, 52 (1982).
35. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-431 (1994), amended by 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa-390zz-
1 (1994).
36. See WILKINSON, supra note 30, at 82-94 (discussing the development of
the range); see also Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911) (upholding Forest
Service's authority to regulate the "use and occupancy" of the range by requiring
permits, and rejecting argument that ranchers had developed a vested right to
continue their "implied license" to graze on public lands without regulation).
37. See STEWART L. UDALL, THE QUIET CRISIS 96 (1963) (quoting historian
Vernon Parrington).
38. See STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NOTHING LIKE IT IN THE WORLD: THE MEN
WHO BUILT THE TRANSCONTINENTAL RAILROAD 1863-1869 (2000) (describing
westward expansion by rail, encouraged by government land grants and low-
interest loans).
39. See NOVAK, supra note 13, at 140-44 (noting that various artists had
assisted with the railroad surveys, and that their work was widely disseminated);
Thomas Patin, Exhibitions and Empire: National Parks and the Performance of
Manifest Destiny, 22 J. OF AM. CULTURE 41 (1999), available at 1999 WL
32980506 (describing the Northern Pacific Railroad's use of Thomas Moran's
painting, The Grand Canyon of the Yellowstone, in promotional brochures).
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as urged by journalist Horace Greeley. 40 The seemingly inno-
cent nationalism invoked by the works of Thomas Moran and
others of this era promoted "imperial iconography" as a moral
and religious imperative. 41 Many landscape paintings, along
with common design features of the National Parks, convey a
palpable expansionist message by projecting a "magisterial
gaze" across verdant valleys stretching out below the viewer. 42
Conquest over nature and its native human inhabitants
appeared as a recurring theme in much of the literature of the
nineteenth century as well. Even while portraying the beauty
and serenity of the natural world, writers promoted its exploi-
tation by deifying loggers and trappers.43 Meanwhile, popular
dime novels glorified the cowboys and military agents who
fended off "barbaric savages" to clear the way west for "civi-
lized" settlers. 44
40. See COY F. CROSS, Go WEST YOUNG MAN!: HORACE GREELEY'S VISION
FOR AMERICA (1995). Whether Greeley himself wrote the exact phrase, "Go West
Young Man," is in dispute, but there is no question that Greeley was a proponent
of western settlement, and that his widely circulated articles were influential in
westward expansion. See http://www.honors.unr.edu/-fenimore/greeley.html (last
visited Mar. 11, 2002); see also Hanaba Munn Noack, At the Millenium: Looking
Back as We Move Forward, Times Record News, at http://www.trnonline.com/mil-
lenium/forwardlarticles/setting-sun.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2002) ("Do not
lounge in the cities! There is room and health in the country, away from the
crowds of idlers and imbeciles. Go west, before you are fitted for no life but that of
the factory.") (quoting Greeley, N.Y. TRIBUNE (1841)).
41. Novak, supra note 13, at 7.
42. See Patin, supra note 39 at *5 (citing ALBERT BOIME, THE MAGISTERIAL
GAZE: MANIFEST DESTINY AND AMERICAN LANDSCAPE PAINTING c. 1830-1865, 20-
21, 138 (1991)). For examples of paintings that utilize this technique, see Jasper
F. Cropsey, Starrucca Viaduct (1865), in NOVAK, supra note 13, at 170; Thomas
Cole, River in the Catskills, in NOVAK, supra note 13, at 163; Albert Bierstadt, Yo-
semite Valley, Glacier Point Trail, in NOVAK, supra note 13, at 155; Thomas
Moran, The Chasm of the Colorado, in NOVAK, supra note 13, at 148.
43. See James Fenimore Cooper, The Pioneers, in THE LEATHERSTOCKING
SAGA 662-63 (Modern Library ed., 1966) (depicting professional logger's work as
Herculean and deliberate).
44. See Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893, 906
(2000) (describing popular "dime novels" that portrayed "the treacherous, unscru-
pulous red-devil who raped white women for pleasure and burned wagon trains
for entertainment"). Earlier works of fiction depicted Indians in a more romantic
but equally distorted manner. Stories like Cooper's The Last of the Mohicans,
which portrayed the Mohican Uncas as "graceful and unrestrained in the atti-
tudes and movement of nature," perpetuated the notion of a "noble savage," yet
one who, as a "precious relic," was doomed to extinction. FERGUS M. BORDEWICH,
KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 48 (1996) (citing JAMES FENIMORE COOPER,
THE LAST OF THE MOHICANS (1826)).
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While westward expansion allowed multitudes of Ameri-
cans to escape the confines of eastern urban centers and to ac-
cess and enjoy the natural features of the vast public lands, it
had grave consequences for American Indian peoples. It was
widely believed that, like the beasts of the wilderness, Indians
must be tamed or eradicated to make way for the march of civi-
lization. 45 Early in the nation's history, George Washington
proclaimed that "the gradual extension of our Settlements will
as certainly cause the Savage as the Wolf to retire; both being
beasts of prey tho' they differ in shape."4 6 The nation's mani-
fest destiny, calling as it did for the consumption of land and
resources on an unprecedented scale, was on a collision course
not only with wolves and other wildlife, but also with its First
Nations. The most expedient solution, from the government's
standpoint, was preserving a few remote fragments of land for
tribes, while setting aside other areas for wildlife species and
public pleasuring grounds.
B. The Importance of "Place" to Individuals and
Communities
A sense of connectivity with a physical place has been vital
to the well-being of individuals and communities throughout
human history. Ancient societies experienced the landscape in
a holistic way through the senses, the imagination, and the in-
tellect, dramatizing features of their surrounding environment
through mythology and art to develop and express collective
knowledge of important people and events linked to specific lo-
cales. This sense of place has provided people with an under-
standing and appreciation of themselves, their past, and their
relationship with the natural elements of their community.47
45. Horace Greeley's justification for westward expansion and Indian re-
moval was that "[tihese [Indian] people must die out-there is no help for them.
God has given the earth to those who will subdue and cultivate it and it is vain to
struggle against his righteous decree." BORDEWICH, supra note 44, at 49.
46. George Anastaplo, Law, Education, and Legal Education: Explorations,
37 BRANDEIS L.J. 585, 713 (1998-1999) (citing RALPH LERNER, THE THINKING
REVOLUTIONARY: PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC 158 (1987)).
Washington's remarks, issued in 1783, expressed his belief in the inevitable con-
sequences of settlement. Subsequently, President Andrew Jackson conveyed an
explicit edict for the removal of Indian tribes to lands west of the Mississippi
River in his 1830 message to Congress. Id. at 720.
47. See WALTER, supra note 4, at 193-94. To demonstrate the importance of
place in human communities, Walter draws on an eclectic range of philosophy and
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The force of personal associations with a particular plot of
land or geographic region is evident in essays by Wallace
Stegner, Mark Spragg, and other contemporary writers.
48
Stegner movingly portrays the importance of wilderness-a
"geography of hope"-in shaping human character in The
Sound of Mountain Water and other works. 49 Mark Spragg il-
lustrates the point in Where Rivers Change Direction, with a
poignant description of his experiences growing up on a Wyo-
ming ranch:
It is easiest for me to remember the land. [When] I close my
eyes ... I see tar-black butterflies at work in the meadows
along the Shoshone River .... I smell... the weedy scent
of the bloodred Indian paintbrush, the overpowering tang of
the banks of low-growing sage. I can step my memory onto
the backs of the big boulders and hear my boots scuff
against the black and rust and corn-yellow lichens that cov-
ered them .... As a boy I knew only that I was free on the
land.5
0
Although human inhabitants of both urban and rural envi-
ronments develop a sense of belonging through a familiarity
with their physical setting, those who make a living on the land
literature, including Plato and the Old Testament, ethnological studies of aborigi-
nal Australians, and the works of environmentalist David Brower and modern
playwright Peter Shaffer. See, e.g., id. at 121-23, 146-50 (citing PLATO, THE
TIMAEUS AND THE CRITIAS, and PHAEDRUS); id. at 209 ("Life is only comprehensi-
ble through a thousand local Gods... living Geniuses of Place and Person ....
Spirits of certain trees, certain curves of brick wall .. ") (citing PETER SHAFFER,
EQUUS 71 (1975)).
48. See, e.g., STEGNER, supra note 2, ANGLE OF REPOSE (1971), WHERE THE
BLUEBIRD SINGS TO THE LEMONADE SPRINGS (1992); MARK SPRAGG, WHEN
RIVERS CHANGE DIRECTION (1999); see also GRETEL EHRLICH, THE SOLACE OF
OPEN SPACES (1985); NORMAN MACLEAN, A RIVER RUNS THROUGH IT (1976);
TERRY TEMPEST WILLIAMS, REFUGE: AN UNNATURAL HISTORY OF FAMILY AND
PLACE (1992); cf. Charles Wilkinson, Land Use, Science and Spirituality: The
Search for a True and Lasting Relationship with the Land, 21 PUB. LAND. & RES.
L. REV. 1, 2 (2000) (describing western landscapes as "entwined with daily life" of
westerners).
49. See STEGNER, supra note 2, at 11, 153.
50. SPRAGG, supra note 48, at 1-2. As an adult, Spragg comes to realize:
Everything that means home to me is a by-product of the North Fork of
the Shoshone.... If the North Fork were somehow withdrawn, ex-
cised, . . . that small part of me that exists without fear would wither. I
cling to the sound of water to be brave in the world. I go to the sound of
water to remember that God is not mute.
Id. at 239-40.
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experience unique associations by developing an intimate
knowledge of the natural elements and adjusting daily habits
and long-term plans according to season and weather. 51 Farm-
ing, ranching, and fishing are among the lifestyles that most
obviously lend themselves to place-based associations. The
physical and emotional health and the very identity of farmers
and their families are indelibly shaped by the influences of the
land-its natural bounty along with its occasional harshness. 52
Ranchers and fishermen surely cherish similar associational
ties. 53
Certain groups have especially strong communal ties to the
land. Some Hispanic communities can trace their presence in
the American Southwest back centuries. 54  Mexican citizens
owned millions of acres of land, sometimes held in common
ownership by multiple families or villages, when the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo was signed in 1848.55 Although the inter-
51. For insights into the role of urban settings in shaping human communi-
ties, see WALTER, supra note 4, at 10-15, 108-11, 150-51 (assessing ancient and
modern cities as places of shared experiences and identity); Lois Gibbs, Toxic
Struggles, in ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE, supra note 18, at 222-23; see also
SANDRA CISNEROS, THE HOUSE ON MANGO STREET (1991) (fictional account of
young woman's development growing up in a Latino neighborhood in Chicago);
RICHARD WRIGHT, NATIVE SON xxxi (1940) (depicting the main character as "an
American product, a native son of this land").
52. My family has raised livestock and crops on the same half-section of land
in western Iowa, initially a homestead under the 1862 Act, for four generations.
Counting my great-grandfather's original farm, Zellmers have been connected
with the land in this area for over a hundred years, and I am certain that I would
not be the same person had I grown up anywhere else. For further reflections on
farmers' relationships with the land, see Wendell Berry, The Boundary, in ERIC
FREYFOGLE, THE NEW AGRARIANISM 239 (2001); John Cougar Mellencamp, Rain
on the Scarecrow, on SCARECROW (Warner 1985).
53. See generally LINDA GREENLAW, THE HUNGRY OCEAN: A SWORDBOAT
CAPTAIN'S JOURNEY (1999) (depicting Gloucester, Massachusetts fishermen);
ERNEST HEMINGWAY, THE OLD MAN AND THE SEA (1952) (portraying a Cuban
fisherman's life).
54. Christine A. Klein, Treaties of Conquest: Property Rights, Indian Trea-
ties, and the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 26 N.M. L. REV. 201, 238 (1996) (de-
scribing struggles of a Hispanic community in Colorado for recognition of its
rights to an area used in common for nearly 150 years); Sax, supra note 20 (de-
scribing proposal to purchase and preserve the village of Las Trampas, settled in
1751, as a National Historic Site; the village and its church were ultimately des-
ignated as National Historic Landmarks); see also JOHN NICHOLS, THE MILAGRO
BEAN FIELD WAR (1994) (depicting Joe Mondragon, who diverted water allocated
to a development company into his parents' long-fallow bean field, and the strug-
gle of Hispanic villagers attempting to reclaim lost water rights).
55. Guadalupe T. Luna, "Agricultural Underdogs" and International Agree-
ments: The Legal Context of Agricultural Workers Within the Rural Economy, 26
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ests of Mexicans living in the area were to be protected under
the Treaty, linguistic barriers and restrictive standards for de-
fining property rights resulted in the loss of title for many
farmers, along with the loss of communal grazing rights and
water rights. 56
The affiliation with the land experienced by these Hispanic
communities and by individual farmers, ranchers, and fisher-
men are, without doubt, quite powerful. They are qualitatively
different, however, on cultural, spiritual, and political levels
than those experienced by many American Indian people. Al-
though small town diners, shops, schools, and churches serve
as gathering places and community centers for rural people,
most Americans choose a life on the land to promote individual-
ism and independence, not communal living.57 Their connec-
tion-with the land sometimes takes on religious overtones, 58 but
the religious practices of Anglo-Americans and the Hispanic
communities in the Southwest generally take place in built
N.M. L. REV. 9, 11, 18 (1996). The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, Feb. 2, 1848, 9
Stat. 922, ended the Mexican-American War, allowing the United States to pur-
chase the territories which became Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico,
Nevada, Texas, Utah, and Wyoming. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, 'Friends'
or 'Enemies?' The Status of Mexican-Americans in The United States on the Ses-
quicentennial of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 5, 5-6
(1998).
56. Luna, supra note 55, at 20-21. See United States v. Sandoval, 167 U.S.
278 (1897) (holding that under Spanish and Mexican law, the sovereign retained
fee title to all communal lands granted to the villages); Richard Griswold del Cas-
tillo, Manifest Destiny: The Mexican-American War and the Treaty of Guadalupe
Hidalgo, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 31, 43 (1998) (noting that treaty rights of Mexi-
can descendents "proved to be fragile" and they became a disenfranchised and
poverty-stricken minority).
57. See Frederick Jackson Turner, The Significance of the Frontier in Ameri-
can History (1894), in ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE, supra note 18, at 76 (noting
that the American frontier produces individualism, not community); id. at 16 ("the
frontier is productive of individualism... The tendency is anti-social."); WALLACE
STEGNER, THE BIG ROCK CANDY MOUNTAIN 83 (Penguin Books 1991) (1943) (de-
scribing protagonist's life-long travels across the west to find a "Big Rock Candy
Mountain where life was effortless and rich and unrestricted and full of adventure
and action, where something could be had for nothing"). Cf Joseph L. Sax, Do
Communities have Rights? The National Parks as a Laboratory of New Ideas, 45
U. PITT. L. REV. 499, 501 (1984) (noting that "our identity as Americans carries
more weight than does our identity as citizens of any state or region").
58. See Myrl L. Duncan, High Noon on the Ogallala Aquifer: Agriculture
Does Not Live by Farmland Preservation Alone, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 16, 32 n.71
(1987) (quoting the Hawaiian State Motto: "the life of the land is perpetuated in
righteousness").
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structures.59 In contrast, the land itself serves as the lifeblood
of spiritual integrity, as well as community identity and politi-
cal sovereignty, for land-based Indian tribes and many of their
members. 60
The legal distinctions are equally pronounced. As a result
of government policies favoring homesteading, mining, and
grazing, Anglo-American settlers benefited from manifest des-
tiny and the giveaway of lands taken from Indian tribes, many
of whom were forcibly removed from their homelands.61 The
agricultural industry continues to enjoy an array of federal
subsidies that contribute to its stability and growth.62 Federal
aid supports mining, grazing, and logging on public lands as
well.
63
Of course, dislocation from the land is not unique to Indian
tribes. Farmers have suffered economic displacement through-
out American history, with extremely painful consequences. 64
59. See Sax, supra note 20, at 1392, 1411-12 (describing San Jose de Gracia
Church, the preeminent architectural feature and community center in Las
Trampas).
60. See infra Part I.C.
61. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text (discussing Mining,
Homestead and Reclamation Acts).
62. See Michael R. Taylor, The Emerging Merger of Agriculture and Envi-
ronmental Policy: Building a New Vision for the Future of American Agriculture,
20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 169, 174 (2001) (noting that, on average, $13.5 billion has been
spent annually on economic aid to farmers over the past decade).
63. See Rasband, supra note 32, at 54-55. Miners pay no royalties for the
hard-rock minerals they extract from public lands, and they can obtain title to the
land itself by paying a maximum fee of five dollars an acre. See 30 U.S.C. § 29
(1994). Grazing fees on public lands hold steady at less than two dollars per ani-
mal unit month, well below the cost of grazing on private range lands. See gener-
ally Dale A. Oesterle, Public Land: How Much is Enough?, 23 ECO. L.Q. 521, 526-
27 (1996). The cost of logging on public lands does not reflect the cost of building
roads or administrative expenses arising from the sale and removal of timber.
Michael Axline, Forest Health and the Politics of Expediency, 26 ENVTL. L. 613,
619 (1996).
64. Farmers have experienced such hardships from the earliest pioneering
days. See O.E. ROLVAAG, GIANTS IN THE EARTH (1927) (depicting hardships of
"sod-busters" on the Dakota prairie); FRED A. SHANNON, THE FARMER'S LAST
FRONTIER: AGRICULTURE 1860-1897 (1945) (describing economic conditions of
farming during late 1800s). These hardships continued through the Great De-
pression. See BRUCE I. BUSTARD, PICTURING THE CENTURY 80-83 (1999) (display-
ing Dorothea Lange's photographs of impoverished farm workers); JOHN
STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH (1939) (depicting plight of Oklahoma farm
family displaced by the Dust Bowl); Jim Chen, Of Agriculture's First Disobedience
and Its Fruit, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1261, 1303 (1995) (attributing the loss of farms
during 1920-1930 to boll weevil infestation and encroachment by cities and min-
eral development). More recently, economic displacement resulted from the bank
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Rural communities throughout the west are experiencing rapid
change as the modern economy shifts from extractive indus-
tries to recreation and service-oriented pursuits, pushing
ranchers, loggers, and miners aside to make way for the "new
west."65 Fishermen have experienced similar losses due to
market forces, technological advances, and pollution of the wa-
terways.66
Political removal sanctioned by official governmental pol-
icy, however, has entirely different implications and conse-
quences than economic displacement. Colonization and west-
ward expansion have had significant, in some cases
debilitating, impacts on the cultural integrity and the very sur-
vival of American Indian tribes. For those tribes that survived
the initial onslaught, the government entered into treaties rec-
ognizing their right to self-governance. Federal policies that
effectuate treaty provisions, while attempting to rectify the ef-
fects of imperialism and to support tribal sovereignty, address
constitutional and political concerns in a way that policies fa-
voring other land-based communities and individuals do not.67
foreclosures of the 1980s. See THOMAS L. FREY & ROBERT H. BEHRENS, LENDING
TO AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES 3-4 (1981); Mellencamp, Rain on the Scarecrow,
supra note 52. See generally OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, RURAL
AMERICA AT THE CROSSROADS: NETWORKING FOR THE FUTURE (1991), available at
www.wws.princeton.edu/-ota/ns20/year-f html (describing national decline in
economic opportunities for rural communities).
65. Rasband, supra note 32, at 43-49, 52-61 (describing the changing face of
western culture and the resulting displacement of rural communities). See gener-
ally Jan G. Laitos & Thomas A. Carr, The Transformation of the Public Lands, 26
ECO. L.Q. 140 (1999) (describing the shift from extraction to preservation and rec-
reation and the demographic effects of the change).
66. See JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THE RIVERKEEPERS 62-
63 (1997) (describing loss of Hudson River fisheries due to pollution); Gregory
Maxim, Regulating California's Squid Fishing Industry-Heeding the Lessons of
Cannery Row, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 595-98 (1998) (describing collapse of
sardine fisheries in the 1940s and squid fisheries in the 1990s); Janet C. Neuman,
Run, River, Run: Mediation of a Water-Rights Dispute Keeps Fish and Farmers
Happy-For a Time, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 259, 264-70 (1996) (describing loss of
fisheries and effects on Indian tribes and farmers due to water diversion).
67. See infra Part IV (discussing constitutional implications of policies effec-
tuating tribal sovereignty and resources). For a comparison of property rights
under the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo and American Indian treaties, see Klein,
supra note 54, at 205-10, 247-53; Rebecca Tsosie, Sacred Obligations: Intercul-
tural Justice and the Discourse of Treaty Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1615 (2000)
[hereinafter Tsosie, Sacred Obligations].
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C. The Land's Significance to American Indian Tribes
Although generalizations can only be made with caution,
given the wide diversity of tribes and tribal interests, it is safe
to say that land has tremendous significance to many Indian
tribes.68 Members of land-based tribes describe the land as the
"mother" or "The Heart of Everything That Is."69 A close rela-
tionship with the land "permeates American Indian life,"70 sus-
taining the health and well-being of individual members and,
in turn, the integrity and sovereignty of the tribe itself. Steven
Emery, former general counsel of the Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe, describes the tribal traditions associated with the Black
Hills as "the root of the solution to all of our societal ills."'1
68. See Wildman v. United States, 827 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir. 1987) (cit-
ing FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 509 (1982)); see also
Winona LaDuke, Traditional Ecological Knowledge and Environmental Futures, 5
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 127, 146 (1994) ("[indigenous peoples] see them-
selves as belonging to [the land] rather than it to them"); Robert A. Williams, Jr.,
Large Binocular Telescopes, Red Squirrel Pifiatas, and Apache Sacred Mountains:
Decolonizing Environmental Law in a Multicultural World, 96 W. VA. L. REV.
1133, 1153 (1994) ("[w]ithout the land.., there is no tribe").
69. See Alexandra New Holy, The Heart of Everything That Is: Paha Sapa,
Treaties, and Lakota Identity, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 317, 317 (1998); N. Scott
Momaday, A First American Views His Land, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, July 1976, at
14; see also VINE DELORIA, JR., FOR THIS LAND 131 (1999) ("like a mother, [the
land] shapes our species and, according to the peculiarity of the area, produces
certain basic forms of personality and social identity which could not be produced
in any other way"); Frank Pommersheim, The Reservation as Place: A South Da-
kota Essay, 34 S.D. L. REV. 246, 250-51 (1989) (describing Sioux Indians' rela-
tionship with the land); Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of
Self-Determination: The Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological
Knowledge, 21 VT. L. REV. 225, 276 (1996) (concluding that traditional American
Indian world views have several common aspects, including "a perception of the
land as essential to the identity of the people") [hereinafter Tsosie, Tribal Envi-
ronmental Policy].
70. Allison M. Dussias, Science, Sovereignty, and the Sacred Text: Paleon-
tological Resources and Native American Rights, 5 MD. L. REV. 84, 100 (1996)
(quoting PAULA GUNN ALLEN, THE SACRED HOOP: RECOVERING THE FEMININE IN
AMERICAN INDIAN TRADITIONS 119 (1986)). "The earth is the source and the being
of the people, and we are equally the being of the earth .... The earth is not a
mere source of survival .... the earth is being, as all creatures are also being:
aware, palpable, intelligent, alive." Id. at 100-01 (quoting ALLEN, supra, at 119).
71. Statement of Steven C. Emery, Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Tribe,
Transcript of Hearing on the Merits, at 100, Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v.
Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998) (No. 96-CV-063-D) (discussing efforts
to address alcoholism, educational issues and political survival); see also Kevin J.
Worthen, One Small Step For Courts, One Giant Leap For Group Rights: Accom-
modating The Associational Role of "Intimate" Government Entities, 71 N.C. L.
REV. 595, 596-97 (1993) (providing statistics on the loss of "Native Sons," and not-
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American Indian religious beliefs, unlike western religious
traditions, are often site-specific in nature and intimately asso-
ciated with the land and its natural features. Viewed as a "sa-
cred, living being,"72 the land "embod[ies] a divinity that it
shares with everything that is part of nature, including human
beings, animals, plants, rocks... everything."73 In a famous
speech attributed to Chief Seal'th (anglicized as "Seattle"), a
stark distinction is drawn between the Eurocentric view of the
land and his own:
How can one buy or sell the air, the warmth of the land?...
Each pine tree shining in the sun, each sandy beach,...
each humming bee is holy in the thoughts and memory of
my people .... We are part of the earth and the earth is a
part of us .... So when the Great Chief in Washington
sends word that he wants to buy our land, he asks a great
deal of us. The earth is not his brother but his enemy and
when he has conquered it he moves on.74
ing that American Indians are twice as likely as other Americans to die from sui-
cide, homicide, or liver disease).
72. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 461
(1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also NEIHARDT, supra note 1, at 36 and ac-
companying text; FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS 35 (1995) (describ-
ing the land as a "sacred text" serving a "prophetic function in the life of the [La-
kota] community").
73. Dussias, supra note 70, at 101 (quoting JAMAKE HIGHWATER, THE
PRIMAL MIND 124 (1981)); see also Russel L. Barsh, Grounded Visions: Native
American Conceptions of Landscapes and Ceremony, 13 ST. TH. L. REV. 127, 128
(2000) (explaining that "'religions' of indigenous peoples... are empirical state-
ments about the dynamics of the biosphere, with an interwoven moral commen-
tary. Teaching and insight.., rely on experiencing particular places, where par-
ticular living processes can be observed.").
74. Chief Seattle, How Can One Sell the Air? A Manifesto for the Earth, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DISCOURSE, supra note 18, at 12. Chief Seal'th's speech was
given at the signing of The Treaty of Medicine Creek between the Suquamish-
Duwamish Indians and Governor Stevens in December 1854. See Harry Anstead,
Humanity and Humaneness: Communities Coming Together on Issues of Human
Relations to Achieve Social Justice for Indigenous Peoples, 10 ST. THOMAS L. REV.
25, 30 n.35 (1997). It was transcribed by physician Henry Smith, whose account
has been republished several times; great liberties have likely been taken with
the text. See Paul S. Wilson, What Chief Seattle Said, 22 ENVTL. L. 1451, 1457-
58 (1992). Heinmot Tooyalaket (Chief Joseph) of the Nez Perce made a similar
observation when told to leave his native lands: "The earth and myself are of one
mind. The measure of the land and the measure of our bodies are the same.... I
never said the land was mine to do with it as I chose." DEE BROWN, BURY MY
HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 316 (1970). In contrast, the Eurocentric view of the
land is epitomized by Blackstone: "There is nothing which so generally strikes the
imagination... as the right of property; or that sole and despotic dominion which
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Both the tribes' cultural and spiritual relationships to spe-
cific sites and natural resources and their relationship with the
federal government are unique. In dealing with Indian Na-
tions, the United States "has charged itself with moral obliga-
tions of the highest responsibility and trust."75 The trust rela-
tionship places parameters on the discretion of federal
agencies, and in some cases requires prioritization of Indian in-
terests, particularly those that relate to treaty resources. 76
This unparalleled political and legal relationship is founded on
the tribes' natural rights as "distinct, independent political
communities" and "undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial,"77 and the United States' "conquest" and appro-
priation of tribal lands during westward expansion. 78
Although Indian tribes held legally recognized rights to oc-
cupy and use their aboriginal lands,7 9 government initiatives
dislocated Indian peoples from their historic homelands and
confined them on reservations, many of which were far away
one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclu-
sion of the right of any other individual in the universe." WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
2 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 2-11 (1766), reprinted in ROBERT C.
ELLICKSON ET AL., PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 37-38 (2d ed. 1995).
75. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
76. See Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673 (1979); see also Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra note 67,
at 1671 (describing treaties as "sacred text" representing "moral obligations ... to
racially and culturally distinct groups that have been treated unjustly by the
dominant society," and arguing that treaties should be used as "instruments of
intercultural justice" to redress the pervasive effects of imperialism). The trust
concept has not always worked in the tribes' favor, as it has been used to justify
Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs, operating as a paternalistic out-
growth of the legal theory of conquest. See Philip P. Frickey, Adjudication and its
Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian Law, 110 HARV. L.
REV. 1754, 1768 (1997).
77. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
78. Id.; Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831); Johnson v.
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). The assumption that Indians were
conquered is pure legal fiction with respect to most tribes. Milner S. Ball, Stories
of Origin and Constitutional Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2280, 2299 (1989).
Although the trust relationship is not made explicit in the Constitution, the
Commerce Clause recognizes three sovereigns: the federal government; state gov-
ernments; and Indian tribes. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
79. United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941) (recog-
nizing aboriginal title of ancestral lands occupied exclusively by the Indians);
M'Intosh, 21 U.S. at 574 (recognizing continued tribal use and occupancy rights);
cf. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955) (holding that abo-
riginal rights to possession and occupancy are not protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment against intrusions by the United States).
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from their sacred landscapes and burial grounds.80 The forced
migration of the Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and
Seminole Tribes from the Southeast to the Oklahoma Territory,
now widely known as the Trail of Tears, is but one example.8 1
Similar incidents took place across the nation, affecting the
Nez Perce, the Great Sioux Nation, and many others. Pursu-
ant to treaties, and in some cases outright seizure with no
treaty agreement, tribes ceded vast amounts of land to the
United States.8 2 Altogether, tribes retain only about three per-
cent of their aboriginal lands within the boundaries of reserva-
tions.83
The pressure for land provided the subtext, if not the ex-
plicit objective, of federal Indian relations throughout the nine-
teenth century.8 4 The treaty era effectuated the official gov-
ernment objective of isolating tribes by rupturing their ties to
80. See Robert N. Clinton, Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision
Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARK. L. REV. 77, 83-85 (1993).
81. See Pommersheim, supra note 69, at 252 n.26 (citing G. FOREMAN,
INDIAN REMOVAL (1932)); id. at 254; see also RENNARD STRICKLAND, FIRE AND
THE SPIRITS 65-67 (1975).
82. E.g., Treaty with the Sioux-Brule, Oglala, Miniconjou, Yanktonai,
Hunkpapa, Blackfeet, Cuthead, Two Kettle, Sans Arcs, and Santee and Arapaho,
1868, April 29, 1868, art. 2, 15 Stat. 635 [hereinafter Treaty of Fort Laramie] (set-
ting apart reservation for "undisturbed use and occupation" of Great Sioux Na-
tion, and providing that "no persons except those herein designated and author-
ized so to do... shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in the
territory described in this article"); see also United States v. Sioux Nation of Indi-
ans, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (holding that Sioux Nation was entitled to compensation
for abrogation of the Treaty of Fort Laramie); Pommersheim, supra note 69, at
254 (discussing importance of land base encompassed in Treaty of Fort Laramie).
83. Mary Christina Wood, Fulfilling the Executive's Trust Responsibility
Toward the Native Nations on Environmental Issues: A Partial Critique of the
Clinton Administration's Promises and Performance, 25 ENVTL. L. 733, 740
(1995); see also CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW 8
(1987) (describing loss of tribal lands during allotment); L. Scott Gould, The Con-
sent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 830
(1997) (describing tribal land loss).
84. See COHEN, supra note 68, at 132; FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, 1 THE GREAT
FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS 317
(1984). Early federal Indian policy cycled through four relatively distinct phases:
the neutrality and non-intercourse era, which sought to secure neutrality and
minimize hostilities with white settlers (1700s-early 1800s); the removal period,
which attempted to isolate Indian peoples by moving them west of the Mississippi
River (1830s-1861); the reservation era, which strived to contain tribes and pro-
vide them with lands for agricultural uses (1860s-late 1880s); and the allotment
and assimilation period, intended to dismantle the tribal system and divy up res-
ervation lands to individuals (1880s-1930s). See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL.,
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 137-52 (3d ed. 1991).
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the land and removing them to remote reservations. 5 By the
close of the century, assimilation had become the cornerstone of
federal Indian policy, effectuated largely through the General
Allotment Act of 1887,86 designed to "break up the tribal sys-
tem" by selling off communally held reservation lands.8 7 The
laws of the allotment era attempted to impose western real
property values on Indian people by allocating the land to indi-
vidual tribal members and allowing its sale.8 8 Allotment poli-
cies were infused with a paternalistic commitment to "civilize"
Indian people and inspire "a sense of responsibility" through
ownership of individual parcels of land, dissolving tribal cohe-
sion in the process.8 9
Allotment went far beyond the disbursement of Indian
lands. The allotment era featured a variety of programs in-
tended to force Indians to relinquish their own culture and be-
come assimilated into Anglo society. Relocation programs
placed Indians in jobs in urban centers away from their reser-
vations and tribal communities and took Indian children away
from their families to be educated at distant boarding schools.90
Many of these schools, and many schools on the reservations,
were operated by Christian ministries, with indoctrination in
Christian religion as an explicit goal.9 1 According to federal
85. See WILKINSON, supra note 83, at 16-18 (noting that "isolation of Indian
societies on the reservation was a common policy goal").
86. 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-359 (1887) (popularly known as the General Allotment
Act or "Dawes" Act).
87. See John Gibeaut, Another Broken Trust, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1999, at 40, 41
(discussing the General Allotment Act). The Act allotted land to tribal members
and provided them, after a twenty-five year trust period, with fee title and United
States citizenship. COHEN, supra note 68, at 130-32. Surplus lands which were
not allotted to individual Indians were ceded to the government in exchange for
federal compensation. Id. at 131.
88. See Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 13-
14 (1995).
89. CARL SCHURZ, 1880 SECRETARY OF INTERIOR ANN. REP., reprinted in
DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 152 (Francis Paul Prucha ed., 3d
ed. 1990).
90. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE 241 (1983) (describing schools); Cross, supra note 44, at 920
(describing job training programs). Professor Cross explains that separating chil-
dren from their parents and their homes was intended to advance the mission of
federal Indian education: "kill the Indian so as to save the man within." Raymond
Cross, American Indian Education: The Terror of History and the Nation's Debt to
the Indian Peoples, 21 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 941, 944 (1999).
91. Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Illusion of Religious Freedom for Indigenous
Americans, 65 OR. L. REV. 363, 371 (1986); see also Susan Power, Icarus, in STORY
12, 21 (1997) (describing experiences of Thomas Iron Star, a Dakota boy at the Car-
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
agents, Christian education "cuts the cord that binds [Indians]
to a Pagan life, places the Bible in their hands, substitutes the
true God for the false one, Christianity in place of idolatry...
cleanliness in place of filth, industry in place of idleness."92 By
the late 1880s, almost half of the government-supported Indian
schools were operated by religious groups, most of which were
Catholic. 93
Meanwhile, to ensure the reform of "barbaric and heathen"
tribal people, federal agents were directed to penalize those
who engaged in traditional ceremonial practices. 94  Pueblo
dances, viewed as sexually perverse and insidious, were to be
controlled "by educational processes as far as possible, but if
necessary, by punitive measures when its degrading tendencies
persist."95 Engaging in the Sun Dance, a Sioux Indian cere-
mony, was punishable by ten days' imprisonment or by with-
holding ten days' rations. 96
Assimilation and allotment policies can be described as
"cultural genocide."97 No other group in the United States has
lisle Indian School in Pennsylvania, through letters home to his sister in North Da-
kota: "He is their Shepard God and we are wild sheep who do not want to be caught
and gathered in."); Quick Bear v. Luepp, 210 U.S. 50, 79-82 (1908) (upholding appro-
priations for Catholic schools on Sioux Indian reservations).
92. ROBERT H. KELLER, JR., AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AND UNITED
STATES INDIAN POLICY 1869-82 207 (1983) (quoting 1887 SUPERINTENDENT OF
INDIAN EDUC. ANN. REP. 131) (alteration in original); see also Power, supra note
91, at 13 (describing school master's admonition to his pupil about idleness, "the
true Indian problem"); see generally Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy
Ghost: The Echoes of Nineteenth-Century Christianization Policy in Twentieth-
Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L. REV. 773, 776-90
(1997).
93. Dussias, supra note 92, at 784 (citing ROBERT H. KELLER, JR.,
AMERICAN PROTESTANTISM AND UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, 1869-82, at 208
(1983)). When asked why he did not want an agency school in the Wallowa Val-
ley, Chief Joseph replied, "They will teach us to quarrel about God .... We do not
want to learn that." BROWN, supra note 74, at 318.
94. Dussias, supra note 92, at 788-90; see Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred
Standards: Honoring The Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American
Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1291, 1310-11 (1996).
95. Dussias, supra note 92, at 802.
96. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 175 F.3d 814, 817 (1999) (cit-
ing H. ExEC. DOC. No. 1, pt. 5, at 28-31 (2d Sess. 1892), reprinted in FRANCIS
PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICANIZING THE AMERICAN INDIAN: WRITINGS BY THE
"FRIENDS OF THE INDIAN" (1973)).
97. Dean B. Suagee, Trust Funds and Trust Lands: The Stories Beneath The
Story, 15 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 51 (2000). See Draft U.N. Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Arts. 6-7, adopted by the U.N. Subcommission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by resolution of Aug.
26, 1994, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1995/2, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/56 (1994) (recognizing the
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survived such an extended course of officially sanctioned bru-
tality, and no other group has been recognized as a separate
sovereign, entitled to govern its own people and control its own
destiny. Tribal sovereignty and the protection of cultural in-
tegrity and land-based resources are critical aspects of the fed-
eral trust responsibility, given the extensive backdrop of gov-
ernment involvement in Indian culture, religion, and property
rights.
Many treaties explicitly recognize tribal governments as
sovereign nations entitled to certain political rights, including
the right to self-government. 98 Treaties also reflect the special
place that the land holds for the tribes, with provisions for ex-
clusive possession of tribal lands and non-exclusive use of off-
reservation lands for hunting, fishing, and other subsistence
practices. 99 To effectuate treaties, and to alleviate barriers to
political, economic, and cultural autonomy posed by religious
suppression, removal, and allotment, an array of twentieth
century federal statutes promotes tribal self-determination
with respect to land management, education, and other areas
of governance. 100 Congress has explicitly recognized that reli-
loss of land and resources, and suppression of cultural values, as "cultural geno-
cide").
98. See Tsosie, Sacred Obligations, supra note 67, at 1634. Tribal self-
governance includes the power to choose and define a form of government, to de-
fine conditions of membership and regulate domestic relations of members, to levy
taxes, and to regulate property and administer justice on matters within tribal
jurisdiction. See Sylvia F. Liu, American Indian Reserved Water Rights: The Fed-
eral Obligation to Protect Tribal Water Resources and Tribal Autonomy, 25
ENVTL. L. 425, 447 n.131 (1995); cf Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 459
(1997) (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981)) (agreeing with
general principle, but remarking that a tribe's inherent power does not reach "be-
yond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal re-
lations").
99. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 422-23
(1980); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658, 666-69 (1979); Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel the Summer in the
Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 WIS. L REV.
375, 383-89. Of course, non-treaty tribes may feel equally strong associations
with the land, even though the relationship is not reflected in official government
documents.
100. E.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 450a-450n (1994); Indian Financing Act of 1974, 25 U.S.C. § 1451
(1994); Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701(4)-(5) (1994); Indian
Forest Resource Management Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 3101, 3104 (1994); American In-
dian Religion Freedom Act (AIRFA), 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994). The executive branch
has also promoted a policy of American Indian self-determination since 1970. See
President's Memorandum on Government-to-Government Relations with Native
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gious practices are an integral part of tribal culture and iden-
tity and has agreed to protect tribal interests in their own dis-
tinctive culture and religion as a matter of national policy'01
and international law. 10 2 Along with tribal treaties, these stat-
utes provide an expression of the government's trust relation-
ship with tribes, as well as a recognition of international hu-
man rights norms.
II. CULTURAL RESOURCE PROTECTION STATUTES
Congress has recognized cultural resource protection as an
important, even compelling, federal objective:
[T]he historical and cultural foundations of the Nation
should be preserved as a living part of our community life
and development .... The preservation of this irreplaceable
heritage is in the public interest so that its vital legacy of
cultural, educational, aesthetic, inspirational, economic, and
energy benefits will be maintained and enriched for future
generations of Americans.10 3
American Tribal Governments, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 936 (Apr. 29, 1994);
PRESIDENT'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR INDIAN POLICY, H.R. Doc. No. 91-363
(1970); see also Cross, supra note 44, at 893 (critiquing tribal self-determination
as a contemporary legal concept).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994). AIRFA also represents an official acknowl-
edgement of the history of governmental intolerance toward American Indian relig-
ions; H.R. REP. NO. 95-1308, at 2-3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1262,
1263-64.
102. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR,
999 U.N.T.S. 171, 178-79, Multilateral Treaties Deposited With the Secretary-
General, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966) (providing that persons belonging to minority groups "shall not be denied
the right ... to enjoy their own culture, [and] to profess and practice their own
religion," art. 27, and proclaiming the right of indigenous peoples to maintain
their distinctive, spiritual relationship with traditional lands and resources, art.
25); see also id. art. 18 (providing a general right to freedom of religion "either in-
dividually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his
religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching.., subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of oth-
ers"); see also Draft U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra
note 97, Arts. 12-14, 25 (recognizing rights of indigenous peoples to maintain dis-
tinctive cultures, and providing for preservation of, and access to, cultural and re-
ligious sites).
103. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470(b)(2), (b)(4) (1994).
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This secular policy is effectuated through the Archeological
Resources Protection Act (ARPA),104 the Native American
Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), 10 5 and the
National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA).10 6 In addition,
federal decisions affecting cultural resources on public lands
require environmental analysis pursuant to the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act (NEPA). 1 7 Together, these laws evidence
Congress's goal of accommodating cultural resource use and
protection, and they provide a means of promoting tribal sover-
eignty and redressing the continuing effects of a long history of
suppression and displacement of Indian tribes.
A. Archeological Resources and Cultural Items
Between 1981 and 1984, an insurance salesman named
Jack Harelson excavated tons of dirt from an ancient burial
site on Bureau of Land Management (BLM) lands in Nevada,
unearthing two-thousand-year-old funerary artifacts and bas-
kets containing the mummified remains of two Indian chil-
dren.108 He subsequently buried the remains in his garden and
displayed the artifacts in his home.1 9 Harelson was arrested
by state authorities in 1995 after his ex-wife and former busi-
ness partners came forward with photographs of the dig. 10
The state charged Harelson with the abuse of a corpse, but
his conviction was ultimately reversed on statute of limitations
grounds."' Harelson also faced a federal administrative pen-
alty of $2.5 million for destroying and appropriating archeo-
logical resources under ARPA, which prohibits the excavation,
removal, alteration, or destruction of archaeological resources
104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470aa-47011 (1994).
105. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3013 (1994).
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470, 470a-470m, 470w (1994).
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331-35, 4341-47 (1994).
108. Sean Whaley, Man Fined $2.5 Million, LAS VEGAS REV.-J., Apr. 20,
1996, at lB.
109. Roberta Ulrich, Indian Artifacts, Two Bodies Turn up at Grants Pass
Home, OREGONIAN, Apr. 13,1995, at Al.
110. Roberta Ulrich & Erica Gorski, Jury Finds Man Guilty of Looting Arti-
facts, OREGONIAN, Jan. 11, 1996, at Al.
111. State v. Harelson, 938 P.2d 763 (1997) (reversing conviction for abuse
of a corpse on statute of limitations grounds, but upholding conviction for retain-
ing or disposing of stolen property).
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on federal or tribal lands.112 Archaeological resources are de-
fined as "any material remains of past human life or activities
which are of archaeological interest," including graves and hu-
man remains.1 3 As the Harelson case demonstrates, the fed-
eral land manager may assess civil penalties in an amount that
reflects restoration costs or the fair market value of lost or de-
stroyed resources." 4 Violators of ARPA may also be charged
with criminal penalties, but prosecution has been thwarted in
some cases by statutes of limitations and other defenses. 15
Jack Harelson's exploits were no isolated incident. Ameri-
can Indian remains and burial grounds on public and private
lands have been subject to abusive treatment throughout our
112. 16 U.S.C. § 470ee (1994); see Notice of Assessment from Ann J. Morgan,
BLM State Director, to Jack Lee Harelson (Sept. 3, 1996) (on file with author).
Under APRA, archeological resources may be excavated, but only pursuant to a
permit obtained under regulations issued jointly by the Secretaries of Interior,
Agriculture and Defense, and the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
TVA Protection of Archeological Resources: Uniform Regulations, 18 C.F.R. pt.
1312 (2001); Defense Protection of Archeological Resources: Uniform Regulations,
32 C.F.R. pt. 229 (2001); Forest Service, USDA Protection of Archeological Re-
sources: Uniform Regulations, 36 C.F.R. pt. 296 (2000); and Secretary of Interior
Protection of Archeological Resources: Uniform Regulations, 43 C.F.R. pt. 7
(2000). ARPA includes special provisions for notice and consultation with inter-
ested tribes before a permit may issue. 43 C.F.R. § 7.7.
113. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1) (1994); 43 C.F.R. § 7.3(a) (providing detailed regu-
latory definitions of terms). To be covered, items and remains must be at least
one hundred years of age. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(1). For the purposes of ARPA, public
lands include lands within the national park system, national wildlife refuges,
and the national forest system, as well as most other lands for which the United
States holds fee title. 16 U.S.C. § 470bb(3).
114. 16 U.S.C. § 470ff(a) (1994) (authorizing civil penalties); see also 43
C.F.R. §§ 8365.1-.5, 8360.0-.7 (2000) (BLM authority to assess penalties); 36
C.F.R. § 296.16 (2000) (Forest Service authority to assess penalties).
115. See 16 U.S.C. § 470dd(d) (1994) (providing that violators shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than one year for knowing viola-
tions). Harelson was not charged with violating ARPA because the federal statute
of limitations had run. Whaley, supra note 108, at lB. Prosecutors have also had
problems proving the requisite mens rea. United States v. Lynch, 233 F.3d 1139,
1140, 1143 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that, to be convicted under the ARPA, defen-
dant must have known, or have been in a position in which he reasonably should
have known, that a human skull he removed was an "archeological resource", i.e.,
that it was over one hundred years old or possessed value). Due process and other
constitutional challenges have been rejected, however. United States v. Austin,
902 F.2d 743, 744-45 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting arguments that ARPA was uncon-
stitutionally vague or overbroad in allegedly reaching activities rooted in aca-
demic freedom); United States v. Tidwell, 191 F.3d 976, 979-80 (9th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting vagueness defense and upholding conviction for trafficking in archaeo-
logical resources under ARPA and for trafficking in cultural items and theft of
tribal property in violation of NAGPRA).
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nation's history.116 Although the sanctity of the dead is a uni-
versal principal among human societies, state cemetery laws
did not recognize unmarked graves or burial sites outside of
consecrated graveyards until the 1980s, allowing looting and
trade in Indian remains and funerary artifacts to go un-
checked.117 NAGPRA was enacted in 1990 to address some of
the more egregious acts118 and to ensure the repatriation of re-
mains and cultural items to lineal descendants or appropriate
tribes. 119 The Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe has demanded repa-
triation of the remains appropriated by Harelson, but reburial
may not be possible because the skulls of the children are miss-
ing.120
NAGPRA establishes rights of federally recognized tribes,
Alaskan Native villages and Native Hawaiian organizations to
116. Jack F. Trope & Walter R. Echo-Hawk, The Native American Graves
Protection and Repatriation Act: Background and Legislative History, 24 ARiZ. ST.
L.J. 35, 39-45 (1992) (describing grave robbery and factors that supported it, in-
cluding lucrative nature of trade in Indian artifacts and official policies calling for
phrenologic study of Indian skulls). Ironically, Thomas Jefferson was one of the
first to order archeological digs at Indian burial mounds in Virginia, and the
Smithsonian Institution, established in 1846, supported its first excavation of In-
dian mounds that same year. Gerstenblith, supra note 4, at 573, 575 (citing Ed-
ward Friedman, Antecedents to Cultural Resource Management, in PROTECTING
THE PAST 27-28 (George S. Smith & John E. Ehrenhard eds., 1991)).
117. Sherry Hutt & C. Timothy McKeown, Control of Cultural Property as
Human Rights Law, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 363, 366-69 (1999); see also Wana the Bear
v. Cmty. Constr., Inc., 180 Cal. Rptr. 423, 426 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982) (concluding
that California cemetery law did not protect a burial ground that was in disuse at
the time the statute was enacted, allowing the developer to bulldoze a Miwok bur-
ial ground and obliterate over two hundred graves); Newman v. State, 174 So. 2d
479 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (reversing conviction for maliciously disturbing a
grave for lack of evidence that a Seminole Indian skull had been taken wantonly
or maliciously, noting the "unfamiliar... tribal burial customs involving as the
setting a scene of disarray in a wild sawgrass and cypress swamp"); Town of Sud-
bury v. Dep't of Pub. Utils., 218 N.E.2d 415, 424 (Mass. 1966) (holding that skele-
ton found at former Indian settlement was not at a "burial ground" and thus not
protected under state statute).
118. H.R. REP. No. 101-877, at 8-9 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4367, 4368; Wendy Crowther, Native American Graves Protection and Repatria-
tion Act: How Kennewick Man Uncovered the Problems in NAGPRA, 20 J. LAND
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 269, 270 (2000).
119. 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (1994); see also 43 C.F.R. pt. 10 (2000); 62 Fed. Reg.
41,292 (Aug. 1, 1997) (correcting amendments to final regulations). NAGPRA also
requires federal agencies and museums, including federal, state, and local gov-
ernments and educational institutions that receive federal funds, 25 U.S.C. §
3001(8) (1994), to inventory their collections and repatriate all remains and cul-
tural items covered by the Act. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3003-05 (1994).
120. Grave Looter Chooses Jail Sentence Over Service, OREGONIAN, Jan. 23,
1998, at D02.
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cultural items embedded in federal and tribal lands. 121 As de-
fined in NAGPRA, "cultural items" include funerary objects,
sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony, as well as
human remains. 122 Sacred objects are "specific ceremonial ob-
jects which are needed by traditional Native American reli-
gious leaders for the practice of traditional Native American re-
ligions by their present day adherents." 23 Objects of cultural
patrimony include objects with "ongoing historical, traditional,
or cultural importance central to the Native American group or
culture itself... which, therefore, cannot be alienated, appro-
priated, or conveyed by any individual." 24
If cultural items are discovered on federal or tribal lands,
the person making the discovery must provide notice to the re-
sponsible federal official and to interested tribes. 125  Mean-
while, the activity that led to the discovery must cease. 126 It
may be resumed thirty days after certification that notice has
been received, but an ARPA permit is required if the activity
would result in the excavation or removal of archeological re-
sources. 127 The federal agency may be required to consult with
tribes and develop a written plan of action in the course of issu-
ing a permit. 28 Although tribal consent is not required for the
121. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3002-03 (1994). Section 3002 applies to discoveries made
after November 16, 1990, the effective date of the Act. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a) (1994).
Federal lands include most lands controlled or owned by the United States. 25
U.S.C. § 3001(5) (1994); 43 C.F.R. § 10.2(f)(1) (2001). NAGPRA uses the term
"Native American" to include "a tribe, people, or culture that is indigenous to the
United States." 25 U.S.C. § 3001(9). An "Indian Tribe" includes "any tribe, band,
nation, or other organized group or community of Indians, including any Alaska
Native village... which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and ser-
vices provided by the United States to Indians because of their status as Indians."
§ 3001(7). "Native Hawaiian" means "any individual who is a descendant of the
aboriginal people who, prior to 1778, occupied and exercised sovereignty in the
area that now constitutes the State of Hawaii." § 3001(10).
122. 25 U.S.C. § 3001(3) (1994).
123. § 3001(3)(C). NAGPRA defines funerary objects as those that "are rea-
sonably believed to have been placed with individual human remains either at the
time of death or later" as part of a death rite or ceremony. § 3001(3)(A)-(B).
124. § 3001(3)(D) (1994).
125. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(d) (1994); 43 C.F.R. § 10.4(b) (2001).
126. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(d).
127. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(c)-(d); 16 U.S.C. § 470cc (1994).
128. 43 C.F.R. § 10.4(d)(v), (e)(iii) (2001) (requiring notice and consultation
with culturally affiliated tribes); see also Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 83 F. Supp. 2d 1047, 1058-60 (D.S.D. 2000) (ruling that the
discovery of remains exposed by the draw-down of water pursuant to the Lake
Francis Case Annual Operating Plan subjected the Corps of Engineers to ongoing
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issuance of a permit, lineal descendents and culturally affili-
ated tribes have the right to determine the disposition of exca-
vated human remains or cultural items.129
NAGPRA's preferential treatment for Native American
cultural items has raised equal protection concerns.13 ° When
ancient human remains, believed to be over nine thousand
years old, were discovered in the bank of the Columbia River
near Kennewick, Washington, a group of scientists seeking to
study the remains challenged the Corps of Engineers' decision
to transfer the remains to Pacific Northwest Indian tribes for
reburial. 131 In the course of resolving a pre-trial motion, the
court determined that the plaintiffs were unlikely to prevail on
their equal protection claim. It found that "Congress reasona-
bly could have concluded that state and local laws against
abusing a corpse, vandalism, and grave-robbing were adequate
to protect most modern cemeteries, but that special measures
were required to address the unique problem of the theft and
desecration of Native American cultural objects and re-
mains."132 Therefore, according to the court, NAGPRA's provi-
sions were justified by Congress's special obligation toward In-
duties with respect to the proper removal of the remains and the protection of
embedded remains that could not be safely removed).
129. See 25 U.S.C. § 3002 (1994); 43 C.F.R. §§ 10.3, 10.5-10.6 (2001). If the
Indian Claims Commission or Court of Claims has determined that the federal
lands on which the discovery is made are the aboriginal lands of a tribe, that tribe
has a presumptive right of ownership or control. 25 U.S.C. § 3002(a)(2)(C) (pro-
viding that the presumption can be overcome if another tribe shows a stronger
cultural relationship). The term "cultural affiliation" is defined as "a relationship
of shared group identity which can be reasonably traced historically or prehistori-
cally between a present day Indian tribe or Native Hawaiian organization and an
identifiable earlier group." § 3001(2).
130. Bonnichsen v. United States Dep't of Army, 969 F. Supp. 628, 648-50
(D. Or. 1997).
131. Id. at 631. The Nez Perce Tribe and the Confederated Tribes of the
Umatilla Indian Reservation participated in the case as amicus curiae. Id. at 632.
Additional plaintiffs include a group describing themselves as representatives of
Asatru, "one of the major indigenous, pre-Christian, European religions." Id. at
631-32. The Asatru plaintiffs, who claim to be affiliated with the remains, seek to
study and reinter them "in accordance with native European belief." Id.
132. Id. at 649. The court indicated its belief that American Indians are not
similarly situated with other groups: "The court is not aware of any significant
market in cultural objects and remains stolen from predominantly Caucasian
graveyards in the United States, or of museums exhibiting and cataloguing thou-
sands of Caucasian skeletons, or of any parallel to the 'pot-hunters' who vandalize
and desecrate Indian graves." Id.
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dian tribes 133 and its direct interest in regulating the disposi-
tion of remains discovered on federal lands.134
The court remanded the Corps' decision to repatriate, find-
ing the agency had acted arbitrarily in concluding that the re-
mains were affiliated with the tribes. 135 The Corps was di-
rected to retain custody of the remains and store them in a
manner that would preserve their potential scientific value,
pending further investigation and the ultimate resolution of
the case. 36 The Department of Interior subsequently weighed
in with its conclusion that, based on geographic data and tribal
oral histories, the remains, which were found near the tribes'
aboriginal lands, are culturally affiliated with five Pacific
Northwest tribes. 37
133. Id. (citing Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 554-55 (1974)). The court
noted that it was addressing the equal protection issue at a preliminary stage of
the case, but cautioned that plaintiffs face an "uphill battle to convince me that
there is any merit to those contentions." Id.; see also Idrogo v. United States
Army, 18 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 1998) (dismissing equal protection claim brought
by non-Indians to compel repatriation of the remains of Geronimo for lack of
standing, finding that only direct descendants of Native American remains and
affiliated tribes stand to be injured by NAGPRA violations).
134. Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 ("Congress shall have Power to
dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
other Property belonging to the United States . .
135. Bonnichsen, 969 F. Supp. at 645.
136. Id. at 645, 654. At the time of NAGPRA's enactment, Congress was
well aware of the tension between the scientific desire for studying ancient re-
mains whose cultural affiliation could not be determined and the objectives of In-
dian tribes, but it failed to resolve the issue. See Crowther, supra note 118, at 275
(citing Hearings on S. 1980 before the Senate Select Comm'n on Indian Affairs,
101st Cong. 70 (1990) (statement of Professor Keith Kintigh)); Renee M. Kosslak,
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act: The Death Knell for
Scientific Study?, 24 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 129 (2000); see also Na Iwi 0 Na Kupuna
O Mokapu v. Dalton, 894 F. Supp. 1397, 1417 (D. Haw. 1995) (allowing examina-
tions to identify the cultural affiliation of remains pursuant to section 3005(b),
which requires an agency or museum to "expeditiously return ... items [in their
collections] unless such items are indispensable for completion of a specific scien-
tific study, the outcome of which would be of major benefit to the United States").
The NAGPRA Review Committee, established by the Secretary of Interior and
charged with overseeing implementation of certain portions of the NAGPRA, 25
U.S.C. § 3006 (1994), has proposed rules for the disposition of culturally unidenti-
fiable remains. 65 Fed. Reg. 36,462 (June 8, 2000). The Committee called for the
return, where appropriate, of remains recovered from tribal and aboriginal lands
and of remains "for which there is a relationship of shared group identity with a
non-[i ederally recognized Native American group." Id. at 36,463.
137. Aviva L. Brandt, Judge Reactivates 'Kennewick Man' Case, COLUMBIAN
(Vancouver, Wash.), Oct. 26, 2000, at C2. The court has taken the matter under
advisement, after hearing arguments in June 2001. See Andy Ogle, Court to Rule
on 9,000-year-old Kennewick Man, NAT'L POST (Edmonton), June 19, 2001 at A2.
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B. Federal Undertakings Affecting Historic Properties
The NHPA complements NAGPRA by requiring consulta-
tion for federal undertakings affecting historic properties, in-
cluding burial grounds and sacred sites. Although its prede-
cessor, the Historic Sites Act of 1935, only covered sites of
"exceptional value," the NHPA reflects much broader con-
cerns-the "preservation of an environment that truly repre-
sents the nation's social and historic diversity," not just struc-
tures built by the wealthy and powerful. 18 Public or private
property is eligible for listing on the National Register of His-
toric Places if it meets any of the following criteria: (1) it is "as-
sociated with events that have made a significant contribution
to the broad patterns of our history"; (2) it is "associated with
the lives of persons significant in our past"; (3) it possesses
high artistic values or distinctive characteristics of construc-
tion, or represents the work of a master; or (4) it may yield im-
portant historical information.1 39
Traditional cultural properties associated with the prac-
tices or beliefs of a community, rooted in community history
and important in maintaining cultural identity, may meet eli-
gibility criteria. 140 The 1992 NHPA amendments explicitly
provide that "properties of traditional religious and cultural
importance" to American Indian tribes may be eligible,141 even
though other religious properties are not covered unless they
are "integral parts" of eligible districts or derive their "primary
138. KING, supra note 4, at 56.
139. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2001). The Secretary of Interior, through the National
Park Service (NPS), is responsible for determining eligibility for the National Reg-
ister. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(1) (1994); 36 C.F.R. pt. 60 (2000).
140. PATRICIA L. PARKER & THOMAS E. KING, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR,
NATIONAL REGISTER BULLETIN 38, GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING AND
DOCUMENTING TRADITIONAL CULTURAL PROPERTIES 1 (1990) [hereinafter
BULLETIN 38], available at http://www2.cr.nps.gov/tribal/bull3803.html. Tradi-
tional Cultural Properties (TCPs) are not limited to properties of interest to In-
dian tribes. See id. at 1 (defining the term "culture" to include "the traditions, be-
liefs, practices, lifeways, arts, crafts, and social institutions of any community, be
it an Indian tribe, a local ethnic group, or the people of the nation as a whole").
141. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6) (1994). An Establishment Clause challenge to
regulations implementing this provision was rejected in Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Sla-
ter, 167 F. Supp. 2d 265, 296 (D.D.C. 2001). See generally infra Part IV (discuss-
ing Establishment Clause requirements).
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significance from architectural or artistic distinction or histori-
cal importance.1142
Relatively undisturbed, culturally significant areas of the
natural world, such as a mountain peak, butte, or valley, may
be considered traditional cultural properties. 14  The inclusion
of such properties within the Act's coverage has been contro-
versial because of their spiritual aspects as well as their poten-
tially sweeping geographic scope, as they may encompass large
areas of land with few discrete, distinguishing physical fea-
tures.14 4  Examples include Devils Tower, a remarkable butte
at the edge of the Black Hills, and Las Huertas Canyon in the
Cibola National Forest. 145 As a result, identifying and manag-
ing traditional cultural properties can pose challenging situa-
tions for federal land managers.
1. Consultation Requirements for Historic Properties
The NHPA's primary mechanism for the protection of his-
toric properties is procedural in nature. Section 106 of the Act
provides that agencies must consider the effect of federal un-
dertakings on districts, sites, structures, and objects eligible for
inclusion on the National Register through detailed consulta-
tion requirements. 146 A wide variety of projects, activities and
programs have been found to be "undertakings," including for-
est planning, rulemaking, land exchanges, construction of
142. 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2000). Likewise, properties that have achieved sig-
nificance within the past fifty years are generally not eligible for the National
Register. Id.
143. See BULLETIN 38, supra note 140, at 1; see also Dean Suagee, Tribal
Voices in Historic Preservation: Sacred Landscapes, Cross-Cultural Bridges, and
Common Ground, 21 VT. L. REV. 145, 172-74 (1996) (discussing Mount Shasta
and the Helkau Historic District of the Six Rivers National Forest).
144. Unlike other historic properties, "there may be nothing observable to
the outsider about a place regarded as sacred by a Native American group."
BULLETIN 38, supra note 140, at 11-12. In reaction to a controversy over a ski
resort on Mount Shasta, a TCP, California Representative Wally Herger spon-
sored H.R. 563, providing that no property can be determined eligible for the Na-
tional Register unless it contains physical evidence of human activity, such as ar-
tifacts. See Suagee, supra note 143, at 174. The Herger Bill, had it passed, would
have rendered Mount Shasta and many other TCPs ineligible for the National
Register. Id.
145. Litigation over the management of Devils Tower is discussed infra Part
III.A. Las Huertas Canyon was the subject of Pueblo of Sandia v. United States,
50 F.3d 856 (10th Cir. 1995).
146. 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1994). See 36 C.F.R. Part 800 (2000) (specifying con-
sultation requirements).
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dams, fences and other structures, and permits for activities on
federal, tribal, and private lands. 147 Agencies that fail to exe-
cute the NHPA's procedural responsibilities, along with their
permittees, may be enjoined from proceeding with the under-
taking in question. 148 Further, a permittee who has intention-
ally caused significant adverse effects to an historic property
may be barred from receiving loans, licenses, or other assis-
tance. 14
9
The federal action agency has responsibility for effectuat-
ing each step of consultation and ensuring that appropriate en-
tities are involved during the process. The Advisory Council on
Historic Preservation has issued detailed regulations prescrib-
ing each step of consultation. 15 0 From the outset, consultation
147. See 16 U.S.C. § 470w(7) (1994); Suagee, supra note 143, at 188 (collect-
ing cases). Consultation may not be required, however, if the federal action is
nondiscretionary, Sac and Fox Nation of Missouri v. Babbitt, 240 F.3d 1250,
1262-1263 (10th Cir. 2001), or authorizes "truly inconsequential activities" pur-
suant to a general or nationwide permit, Vieux Carre Property Owners, Inc. v.
Brown, 875 F.2d 453, 465 (5th Cir. 1989).
148. Pueblo of Sandia, 50 F.3d at 856, 862-63 (reversing summary judg-
ment for the Forest Service and reinstating claim for injunction of implementa-
tion of a forest management plan because Forest Service had failed to make a rea-
sonable effort to identify TCPs within planning area); Attakai v. United States,
746 F. Supp. 1395, 1408-09 (D. Ariz. 1990) (issuing preliminary injunction
against BIA for failing to consult with the SHPO and the Navajo tribe). But see
White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 20, 28 n.9 (1999) (cit-
ing Nat'l Trust for Historic Pres. v. Blanck, 938 F. Supp. 908, 925 (D.D.C. 1996),
and noting that "Congress did not intend the NHPA to create affirmative preser-
vationist responsibilities"), rev'd on other grounds, 249 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
149. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(k) (1994). However, the assistance may be granted
if it is "justified" under the circumstances. Id. The agency must "take into ac-
count the effects of the undertaking" on the property, and consider the Council's
opinion on the justification for granting assistance and the availability of mitiga-
tion measures. 36 C.F.R. § 800.9(c) (2000). Factors to be considered include the
'circumstances under which the adverse effects ... occurred and the degree of
damage.., to the property." Id.
150. See 16 U.S.C. § 470i(a) (1994) (directing the establishment of the Advi-
sory Council). For a step by step assessment of consultation requirements, see
Sandra B. Zellmer, The Protection of Cultural Rescources on Public Lands: Fed-
eral Statutes and Regulations, 31 E.L.R. 10689, 10691-93 (June 2001). The Advi-
sory Council has been in the process of amending its regulations for several years,
see 64 Fed. Reg. 27044 (May 18, 1999) (rule revising NHPA regulations); 65 Fed.
Reg. 42834 (July 11, 2000) (reissuing revisions as a proposed rule); and final re-
vised regulations became effective on January 11, 2001, 65 Fed. Reg. 77698 (Dec.
12, 2000) (codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 800). A district court has upheld most of the
new regulations against a variety of statutory and constitutional challenges.
Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Slater, 167 F. Supp. 2d 265 (D.D.C. 2001). However, the
court invalidated revised sections 800.4(d)(2) and 800.5(c)(3), which require an
agency to continue with consultation even if it has determined historic properties
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should be conducted in tandem with the preparation of NEPA
analyses, 151 as historic and cultural resources are expressly in-
cluded among the factors to be considered in environmental
impact statements (EISs).15 2 Action agencies must consult with
State Historic Preservation Officers (SHPO) on undertakings
that may affect historic properties, 153 and must include inter-
ested tribes when traditional cultural properties may be af-
fected, even if the property is outside reservation boundaries. 5 4
Disputes over the NHPA implementation typically center
on the identification of historic properties, particularly tradi-
tional cultural properties, and the mitigation of adverse ef-
fects. 1 55 Good faith efforts to identify historic properties are re-
quired, including background research, ethnographic studies,
interviews, and field surveys. 156  Tribal oral tradition should
also be considered to establish the location and significance of a
are not present or will not be affected, as imposing substantive requirements be-
yond the statutory authority granted to the Council. Id. at 288-89.
151. 36 C.F.R. § 800.8 (2001); NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1994) (requiring
consideration of the environmental effects and alternatives of major federal ac-
tions).
152. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16 (2000); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1502.25 (2000) (provid-
ing that agencies must prepare environmental impact statements (EISs) concur-
rently and in an integrated fashion with related studies required by other envi-
ronmental laws). For a detailed discussion of NEPA, see infra Part II.C.
153. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(b)(3)(I) (1994); see also 36 C.F.R. § 61.4(b) (2001).
Within reservation boundaries, tribal governments can assume the functions that
would otherwise be performed by SHPOs. 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(2) (1994) (providing
for Tribal Historic Preservation Officers). For detailed treatment of the NHPA's
provisions for tribal lands, see Suagee, supra note 143, at 181-85.
154. See 16 U.S.C. § 470a(d)(6)(B) (1994); see also Attakai v. United States,
746 F. Supp. 1395, 1408-09 (D. Ariz. 1990) (concluding that the Navajo tribe must
be afforded an opportunity to participate as interested persons for sites on Hopi
lands).
155. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(a)(4) & (b) (2001). For the role of the Advisory Coun-
cil in the resolution of these issues, see 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.4(c)(2), (d)(1) (2001)
(specifying the role of the Council in identification); § 800.6(a)(1) (requiring that
the Council receive notification of adverse effects, and, in some cases, be invited to
participate in resolution of adverse effects).
156. 36 C.F.R. § 800.4(b)(1); BULLETIN 38, supra note 140, at 10-12. In
Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, the court found that the Forest Service had ig-
nored the BULLETIN 38 guidelines and sent only written inquiries to tribal repre-
sentatives, in spite of receiving information that TCPs may be present in the af-
fected area. 50 F.3d 856, 860-63 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Friends of the Atglen-
Susquehanna Trail, Inc. v. Surface Transp. Bd., 252 F.3d 246, 263-67 (3d Cir.
2001) (finding that the agency failed to properly consider views of the Advisory
Council, Keeper of the National Register, and SHPO regarding eligibility of an
historic railroad line).
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place. 157 If an eligible property is identified, the action agency
must then consult to determine whether the undertaking will
have adverse effects on the property by "diminish[ing] the in-
tegrity of the property's location,.. . setting,... feeling, or as-
sociation."' 58 Examples of adverse effects include physical de-
struction, the introduction of visual, audible, or atmospheric
elements that are out of character with the property, the al-
teration of the property's setting, and the transfer of the prop-
erty without adequate restrictions to ensure its long-term pres-
ervation.159
If the agency proposes a finding of no adverse effect, it
must consult with the parties in an attempt to resolve any dis-
agreements with that finding. 160 If adverse effects are found,
the selection of alternatives to avoid or mitigate those effects
will be the subject of continuing consultations, typically culmi-
nating in a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA). 161 The action
agency may terminate consultation and go forward with the
undertaking even if a MOA cannot be agreed upon, but it does
so at its own peril. 162 In Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. United
States Forest Service, the Ninth Circuit enjoined a land ex-
change after the parties had failed to reach agreement, finding
that the Forest Service erred in concluding that photographing
157. Pueblo of Sandia, 50 F.3d at 860-61; see also Hoonah Indian Ass'n v.
Morrison, 170 F.3d 1223, 1231-32 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming the agency's deter-
mination that routes taken by survivors of an 1804 battle was not eligible; al-
though some tribal oral evidence supported eligibility of paths for inclusion in the
National Register, there was "no physical marking, no documentation, and no well
established tribal consensus, to establish exactly what ... paths the retreating
Kiks.adi had taken"). Information on the property's location, character or owner-
ship may not be disclosed if disclosure may cause a significant invasion of privacy,
risk harm to the historic property, or inhibit practitioners' use of a traditional re-
ligious site. 16 U.S.C. § 470w-3(a) (1994). Agencies are required to seek the views
of Indian tribes regarding their confidentiality concerns and provide these views
to the Council. 36 C.F.R. § 800.11(c)(2) (2001).
158. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(1) (2001).
159. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(2); see Friends of Atglen-Susquehanna, 252 F.3d at
256; Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. United States Forest Service, 177 F.3d 800,
807-08 (9th Cir. 1999).
160. 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(c)-(d) (2001).
161. See 36 C.F.R. § 800.6 (2001). If the Advisory Council participates, it
must also be a signatory to any resulting MOA. § 800.6(c)(1). Concerned tribes
and other interested parties may be invited to be signatories. § 800.6(c)(2).
162. Friends of the Altgen-Susquehanna, 252 F.3d at 266-67 (finding that
the agency had erred in terminating consultations and implementing a mitigation
plan contained in an unexecuted MOA); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, 177 F.3d at
808-09, 815.
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and mapping a historic trail prior to transferring it to a private
party would mitigate adverse effects to the site's significant
features. 163 If the agency does proceed in the absence of an
MOA, it must ask the Advisory Council to comment on the un-
dertaking, 64 and the decision must be made by the head of the
agency. 165
2. National Historic Landmarks
Section 110 goes beyond § 106 by providing substantive
protection for properties designated by the Secretary of the In-
terior as National Historic Landmarks. 166 Landmarks include
public or private properties of national historic significance
that "possess exceptional value or quality in illustrating or in-
terpreting the heritage of the United States in history, archi-
tecture, archeology, engineering and culture and.., a high de-
gree of integrity of location, design, setting, materials,
workmanship, feeling and association."1 67  Agencies must take
steps to avoid harm to landmarks "to the maximum extent pos-
sible" and must provide the Advisory Council an opportunity to
comment on federal undertakings affecting landmarks. 168
163. 177 F.3d at 808-09. The site was likely to be logged, and its historic fea-
tures destroyed, if transferred without adequate restrictions. Id. Notably, the
SHPO had concurred in the agency's proposal to document the trail, but the court
indicated that there were other viable options, including imposing restrictive cove-
nants or retaining the trail in federal ownership. Id.; 36 C.F.R. § 800.5(a)(2)(vii)
(providing examples of adverse effects, including "[t]ransfer... of property out of
Federal ownership or control without adequate and legally enforceable restrictions
or conditions to ensure long-term preservation of the property's historic signifi-
cance").
164. 36 C.F.R. §§ 800.6, 800.7(a) (2001).
165. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(l) (1994); see 36 C.F.R. § 800.7(c)(4) (2000). The de-
cision must explain the rationale for proceeding with the undertaking and provide
evidence that the agency considered the Council's comments. 36 C.F.R. §
800.7(c)(4).
166. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(f) (1994). All landmarks are designated by the Sec-
retary of the Interior and listed in the National Register. See 16 U.S.C. §
470a(a)(1)(B) (1994); see also 36 C.F.R. pt. 85 (1995).
167. 36 C.F.R. 65.4(a) (2001). Sites "composed of integral parts of the
environment not sufficiently significant by reason of historical association or
artistic merit to warrant individual recognition but [that] ... outstandingly
commemorate or illustrate a way of life or culture" may be included. § 65.4(a)(5).
168. 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(f) (1994); see 36 C.F.R. § 800.10 (2000). A separate
provision of § 110 imposes programmatic responsibilities on federal agencies, di-
recting them to establish preservation programs to ensure that their properties
are managed in a manner that reflects "historic, archaeological, architectural, and
cultural values." 16 U.S.C. § 470h-2(a) (1994). Secretary of the Interior's Stan-
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The Medicine Wheel, an historic landmark in the Bighorn
National Forest of Wyoming, is the subject of a Programmatic
Agreement and Historic Preservation Plan executed by the
Forest Service, interested tribes, and other consulting par-
ties. 169 The wheel is constructed of limestone rocks and is
roughly eighty feet in diameter with twenty-eight spokes radi-
ating from a center cairn. It is visited by numerous tribes for
traditional prayer offerings and vision quests. 170 The Historic
Preservation Plan, one of the first of its kind, emphasizes tradi-
tional cultural values as the management directive for the
area, and it closes a nearby road and requires consultation be-
fore timber harvest or other potentially disruptive activities
may go forward. 7 ' A Wyoming logging association has chal-
lenged the Plan as inhibiting its economic opportunities in vio-
lation of constitutional and statutory requirements. 7 2 The His-
toric Preservation Plan is a suitable means of avoiding harm to
a significant archeological and cultural landmark as directed
by the NHPA, 7 3 but the crux of the association's claims will
dards and Guidelines for Federal Agency Historic Preservation Programs Pursu-
ant to the National Historic Preservation Act, 63 Fed. Reg. 20,496 (Apr. 24, 1998).
However, this provision may be satisfied when the agency prepares a manage-
ment plan and commits substantial resources to preservation activities, even
though deterioration of historic properties continues. Nat'l Trust for Historic
Pres. v. Blanck, 938 F. Supp. 908, 924-25 (D.D.C. 1996).
169. U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE REGION 2, HISTORIC PRESERVATION PLAN
FOR THE MEDICINE WHEEL NATIONAL HISTORIC LANDMARK AND VICINITY, signed
by Forest Supervisor Larry Keown, the Advisory Council, the SHPO, the Medicine
Wheel Alliance, the Medicine Wheel Coalition for Sacred Sites, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration and Big Horn County Commissioners (Sept. 28, 1996) [here-
inafter HISTORIC PRESERVATION PLAN] (on file with author). Members of the
Medicine Wheel Coalition include Northern Cheyenne, Northern Arapaho, and
Fort Peck Tribes. Id.
170. Id. At 10,000 feet elevation, the Medicine Wheel "is where Earth meets
sky, where the secular and the ethereal converge." Pauline Arrillaga, Sacred
Sites Become Battlegrounds, DENV. POST, July 16, 2000, at B2. Legend has it that
Chief Joseph fasted at the Wheel after his people, the Nez Perce, fled the United
States Army. Id.
171. HISTORIC PRESERVATION PLAN, supra note 169, at 23-24, 29-31, 52.
The Plan is intended to promote continued traditional cultural uses and protect
the area from inconsistent uses. Id. at 5.
172. Complaint, Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. United States Forest Service,
No. 99-CV-31J (D. Wyo. Feb. 16, 1999). Plaintiffs allege violations of the Estab-
lishment Clause, NFMA, NEPA, and the Federal Advisory Committee Act, but
they did not assert an NHPA claim. Id.
173. For additional discussion of the Medicine Wheel Plan, see Suagee, su-
pra note 143, at 170.
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turn on federal laws governing National Forest lands, as well
as the First Amendment, discussed below. 174
C. NEPA and Executive Orders on Environmental Justice
and Sacred Sites
Like § 106 of the NHPA, NEPA imposes procedural re-
quirements, ensuring that agencies "look before they leap" by
considering the effects of major federal actions on the environ-
ment, along with a range of reasonably available alternatives
to the proposed action, through an environmental assessment
or a more detailed environmental impact statement (EIS).175
Although the statute does not require that the least environ-
mentally degrading alternative be chosen, 17 6 NEPA urges agen-
cies to use "all practicable means" to "preserve important his-
toric, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage,"
and to maintain "an environment which supports diversity and
variety of individual choice. '177
Effects which must be considered include "ecological...
aesthetic, historic, cultural, economic, social, or health,
whether direct, indirect, or cumulative." 178  Guidance docu-
ments issued by the Council on Environmental Quality provide
that NEPA analyses must also consider effects on minority and
low income populations in accordance with Executive Order
12,898 on Environmental Justice. 179 The Executive Order pro-
174. See infra Parts III.B.2 (discussing the NFMA) and IV.C. (assessing con-
stitutional claims).
175. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1994); Part II.B.1, supra (discussing require-
ments of NHPA § 106).
176. See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 351
(1989). The agency should, however, identify the environmentally preferable al-
ternative in its NEPA analysis, defined as the one that "[o]rdinarily... causes the
least damage to the biological and physical environment ... [and] best protects,
preserves, and enhances historic, cultural, and natural resources." Forty Most
Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regula-
tions, 46 Fed. Reg. 18026, 18028 (1981).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(4) (1994).
178. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (1977) (emphasis added); see § 1508.27 (specifying
that impacts on cultural resources may be considered "significant," triggering the
need for an EIS); Thomas F. King, What Should Be the "Cultural Resources" Ele-
ment of an EIA?, 20 ENVTL. IMPACT ASSESSMENT REV., 5-30 (2000) (explaining
that consideration of cultural resources must be included in the NEPA analysis).
179. COUNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: GUIDANCE
UNDER THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT (1997), available at
http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/regs/ej/ej.pdf. The CEQ Guidance states that "[algencies
should recognize the interrelated cultural.., factors that may amplify the natural
20021 CULTURAL RESOURCES ON PUBLIC LANDS 453
vides that each federal agency shall "to the greatest extent
practicable and permitted by law... make achieving environ-
mental justice part of its mission by identifying and address-
ing, as appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse hu-
man health or environmental effects of its programs, policies,
and activities on minority populations and low-income popula-
tions .... ",180 The Order explicitly includes American Indians
within its scope.181 Other guidance documents specify that im-
pacts to cultural resources of interest to populations covered by
the Order must be considered through NEPA.'
82
In addition, Executive Order 13,007 on Sacred Sites en-
courages agencies to accommodate "access to and ceremonial
use of sacred Indian sites [by avoiding actions that would] ad-
versely affect[] the physical integrity of such sacred sites."183
NEPA can serve as a useful tool for assessing impacts and con-
sidering alternatives to activities that may adversely affect sa-
cred sites. Although both the Sacred Sites Order and the Envi-
ronmental Justice Order expressly state that they create no
legal rights or remedies, 8 4 a failure to address cultural, his-
and physical environmental effects of the proposed agency action." Id. at 9. In addi-
tion, agencies should seek tribal representation during the NEPA process in a man-
ner consistent with the government-to-government relationship, the federal trust
responsibility, and treaty rights. Id.
180. Exec. Order No. 12,898, § 1-101, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994). The
Order further directs each federal agency to develop its own agency-wide envi-
ronmental justice strategy. Id. § 1-103.
181. Id. § 6-606 (requiring coordination with federally-recognized Indian
tribes).
182. OFFICE OF FED. ACTIVITIES, UNITED STATES ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
FINAL GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE CONCERNS IN
EPA'S NEPA COMPLIANCE ANALYSES § 2.2.2 (1998), available at
http://es.epa.gov/oeca/ejepa.html. The EPA Guidance explains that "potential ef-
fects to on- or off-reservation tribal resources (e.g., treaty-protected resources, cul-
tural resources and/or sacred sites) may disproportionately affect the local Native
American community and implicate the federal trust responsibility to tribes." Id.
§ 2.1.1.
183. Exec. Order No. 13,007, § 1(a)(1)-(2), 61 Fed. Reg. 26,771 (May 24,
1996). The Order defines "sacred site" rather narrowly, as "any specific, discrete,
narrowly delineated location on Federal land that is identified by an Indian tribe,
or Indian individual determined to be an appropriately authoritative representa-
tive of an Indian religion, as sacred by virtue of its established religious signifi-
cance to, or ceremonial use by, an Indian religion.... ." Id. § 1(b)(iii).
184. Id. § 4 (stating that the Order does not "create any right.., enforceable
at law or equity by any party against the United States ... ."); Exec. Order No.
12,898, § 6-609 ("[t]his order shall not be construed to create any right to judicial
review.... ."). The Sacred Sites Order adds that it may not "be construed to im-
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toric, and social effects, as directed by NEPA regulations, could
be set aside as arbitrary and capricious. 185
III. ACCOMMODATING CULTURAL INTERESTS THROUGH PUBLIC
LANDS STATUTES
The specific directives of the governing land management
statutes are key to the resolution of controversies over cultural
resources on public lands. Each of the relevant statutory
schemes provides for cultural resource protection and access as
appropriate components of the agency's mission, and each re-
quires integration with the cultural objectives of the NHPA,
NAGPRA, and NEPA.186 The National Park Service Organic
Act, in particular, emphasizes the conservation of park re-
sources and values, including cultural values.187 The BLM and
National Forest System lands are governed by multiple-use
sustained-yield principles pursuant to the Federal Land Policy
pair enforceable rights to use of Federal lands that have been granted to third
parties through final agency action." Exec. Order No. 13,007, § 3.
185. Courts may set aside "arbitrary" and "capricious" agency decisions un-
der the APA. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2000). Decisions are arbitrary if relevant fac-
tors are not considered and explained. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm
Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 50-57 (1983) (holding that agency had failed to consider
relevant safety factors in deciding to rescind seatbelt requirements and was there-
fore arbitrary). Environmental justice and cultural concerns are relevant factors
for consideration in the NEPA analysis. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.8, 1508.27 (2001); see
also Ross v. Federal Highway Admin., 972 F. Supp. 552, 562-63 (D. Kan. 1997)
(finding that plaintiffs who alleged that a trafficway would interfere with spiri-
tual, educational and aesthetic uses of the area came within the zone of interests
protected by NEPA, and enjoining the project pending completion of a supplemen-
tal EIS), affd, 162 F.3d 1046 (10th Cir. 1998). But cf. Citizens Concerned About
Jet Noise, Inc. v. Dalton, 48 F. Supp. 2d 582, 604 (E.D. Va. 1999) (rejecting envi-
ronmental justice challenge to the NEPA analysis on the grounds that the Execu-
tive Order precluded review), affd, 217 F.3d 838 (4th Cir. 2000).
186. Culturally important resources are also found in wildlife refuges and
other federal lands. See, e.g., National Wildlife Refuge System Improvement Act
of 1998, 16 U.S.C. § 668dd-ee (1994 & Supp. V 1999); Alaska National Interest
Lands Conservation Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(E) (1994) (requiring consid-
eration of the potential impacts on Native culture and lifestyle resulting from the
study of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge); 10 U.S.C. § 2694 (2000) (calling for
natural and cultural resource programs on Department of Defense lands). This
Article focuses on three categories of public lands-the National Park System, the
National Forest System, and public lands managed under FLPMA-managed by
the principal federal land managers, the Park Service, Forest Service, and the
BLM. Special provisions govern wilderness areas within these land categories.
Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1994).
187. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
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and Management Act (FLPMA)188 and the National Forest
Management Act (NFMA),18 9 respectively, each of which calls
for conservation while allowing more intensive uses, such as
mining, logging, and grazing.
Due to the great diversity of the public lands and resources
and the wide range of interests that may be asserted, there can
be no single, formulaic prescription for managing cultural re-
sources. Each inquiry must be agency-specific as well as fact-
specific. Although outcomes will vary among agencies in view
of their statutory missions, with the Park Service tending more
toward conservation and the BLM and Forest Service having
an access-oriented bias, each agency possesses the necessary
legal tools for reaching reasonable accommodations of cultural
interests.
A. The Conservation Mandate of the National Park
Service Organic Act
The National Park system plays a highly visible and criti-
cal role in providing recreational opportunities for people and
habitat for wildlife species, but it is equally important in pro-
moting cultural pluralism. By some estimates, over half of all
units within the system commemorate historic events, persons,
and places. 190 In many ways, the Park system serves as a na-
tional classroom for environmental and social studies, charting
the course for our culturally diverse society by providing infor-
mation about the natural and human history of each Park. Yet
the National Park Service (NPS) also faces relentless pressure
to provide access to rock climbers, rafters, mountain bikers,
and hikers, often at the very same sites where cultural prac-
tices requiring an undisturbed setting occur. As a result, the
NPS is forced to establish priorities and make highly contro-
versial decisions in the management of culturally important
sites.
National Park properties are managed pursuant to the
Park Service Organic Act of 1916 "to conserve the scenery and
the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to
provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by
188. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-02, 1711-23, 1731-48, 1751-53, 1761-71, 1781-84
(1994).
189. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1604 (1994).
190. See Winks, supra note 29, at 579.
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such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of
future generations."191 Congress's purpose in establishing the
National Park system, as clarified in subsequent amendments,
emphasizes the cultural importance of the system: "[Tihese ar-
eas, though distinct in character, are united through their in-
ter-related purposes and resources into one national park sys-
tem as cumulative expressions of a single national
heritage .... "192
Individual units of the National Park system each have
their own legislative directive, which supplements the general
provisions of the Organic Act. For example, Yellowstone's ena-
bling act requires that regulations be adopted as necessary for
the management of the park and "for the protection of the
property therein, especially for the preservation from injury or
spoliation of all ... natural curiosities, or wonderful objects."1 93
Several park enabling acts explicitly provide for the protection
and maintenance of cultural properties, including historic sites
and structures, and even Christian churches. 194 Some specifi-
cally acknowledge the importance of the individual park unit to
American Indians, and direct that the integrity of, and access
to, traditional cultural properties be protected. 95
191. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
192. Id. § la-1. For a discussion of the history of the National Park System,
see supra notes 22-30 and accompanying text.
193. 16 U.S.C. § 26 (1994).
194. The National Park System includes San Antonio Missions National
Historical Park, 16 U.S.C. § 410ee (1994) (establishing the Park and authorizing
cooperative management agreements with the Catholic Archdiocese), as well as
Christ Church, an Episcopal Church in Boston, and St. Joseph's Catholic Church
in Philadelphia. See Winslow, supra note 94, at 1317. In addition, there are
chapels in numerous parks, including the Grand Canyon, Yellowstone, and Yo-
semite. Id.
195. See, e.g., Zuni-Cibola National Historic Park Establishment Act of
1988, 16 U.S.C. § 410pp-4, pp- 6 (1994) (establishing a Zuni-Cibola advisory com-
mittee to guide Park management and authorizing the Secretary, upon request, to
temporarily close areas "to protect the privacy of religious activities by Indian
people."); 16 U.S.C. § 460uu-47(c) (1994) (authorizing temporary closure "to pro-
tect the privacy of religious activities in such areas by Indian people" in the El
Malpais National Monument and Conservation Area); California Desert Protec-
tion Act of 1994, 16 U.S.C. § 410aaa-75(a) (1994) (recognizing that the Timbisha
Shoshone people have long utilized areas of the desert for "traditional cultural
and religious purposes" and directing the Secretary to ensure access by authoriz-
ing temporary closures upon request); 16 U.S.C. § 460jjj-1 (1994) (requiring the
Secretary to ensure protection of Indian "religious and cultural sites" and provide
access to sites for traditional uses in Jemez National Recreational Area); Tim-
bisha Shoshone Homeland Act, Pub. L. No. 106-423, 114 Stat 1875, § 5(e) (Nov. 1,
2000) (providing for specified lands within Death Valley National Park to be
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NPS regulations and policies require the conservation of
park resources and values, 196 including, among other things,
archeological resources, cultural landscapes, ethnographic re-
sources, and historic and prehistoric sites, structures, and ob-
jects. 197 Activities that impair the integrity of park resources or
values are generally prohibited.198 An adverse impact is likely
to constitute an impairment if it affects "the integrity of park
resources or values ... whose conservation is ... [k]ey to the
natural or cultural integrity of the park or to opportunities for
enjoyment of the park... -199 Management policies specify
that the NPS plays a stewardship role and therefore must not
only avoid impairment but must also take affirmative steps to
protect the integrity of park resources. 200
Meanwhile, the Organic Act's directive for enjoyment of
park resources, along with more specific NPS policies, recog-
nizes that providing access to culturally important resources is
an appropriate objective as well.20 1 Accommodations for reli-
taken into trust for the tribe, and establishing special use areas within parklands
for traditional practices).
196. 36 C.F.R. § 1.5(a) (2001) (listing protection of cultural values, subsis-
tence uses and species conservation as factors to consider in issuing closures or
use restrictions); § 2.1(a) (prohibiting the possession, destruction or disturbance of
various natural resources, including cultural or archeological resources); see also
NAT'L PARK SERV., 2001 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, available at http://www.nps.gov
/refdesklmp/index.html; NAT'L PARK SERV., DIRECTOR'S ORDER #28: CULTURAL
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT (1998), available at http://www.nps.gov/refdesk/DOrders
/DOrder28.html.
197. NAT'L PARK SERV., 2001 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 196, §
1.4.6; see also id. ch. 5 (cultural resource management); NAT'L PARK SERV.,
DIRECTOR'S ORDER #28, supra note 196.
198. See NAT'L PARK SERv., 2001 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 196, §
1.4.4; see also id. § 5.3.5 (committing to "the long-term preservation of, public ac-
cess to, and appreciation of, the features, materials, and qualities contributing to
the significance of cultural resources."); id. § 1.4.3 (providing "[tihe 'fundamental
purpose' of the national park system... begins with a mandate to conserve park
resources and values").
199. Id. § 1.4.5; see also id. at 47 (stating that the NPS "will preserve and
foster appreciation of the cultural resources in its custody, and will demonstrate
its respect for the peoples traditionally associated with those resources, through
appropriate programs of research, planning, and stewardship"); 36 C.F.R. § 2.1
(2001) (providing for the preservation of cultural and archeological resources).
200. NAT'L PARK SERV., 2001 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 196, §
5.3.1 (stating that the NPS "will employ the most effective concepts, techniques,
and equipment to protect cultural resources against theft, fire, vandalism, over-
use, deterioration, environmental impacts, and other threats, without compromis-
ing the integrity of the resources").
201. Id. § 8.2 (noting that "[elnjoyment of park resources and values ... is
part of the fundamental purpose of all parks"); id. § 8.5 (stating that requests for
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gious groups in parks are commonplace and have not resulted
in serious disruptions of the federal management agenda. The
NPS has long supported Christian Ministries in the parks by
allowing their use of park structures and other facilities, 20 2 and
religious activities regularly take place on the National Mall in
Washington, D.C., including an outdoor Mass conducted by
Pope John Paul 11.203 NPS policies specifically acknowledge:
"site-specific worship is vital to Native American religious
practices ... [thus NPSI will be as unrestrictive as possible in
permitting Native American tribes access to park areas to per-
form traditional religious, ceremonial, or other customary ac-
tivities at places that have been used historically for such pur-
poses .... "204 If necessary, however, the superintendent of an
individual park unit may restrict the use of an area to protect
natural and cultural resources. 20 5
Given the central role that the Park system plays in our
national heritage, it is no surprise that government actions af-
fecting American Indian cultural interests within National
Parks and Monuments have been highly controversial. Recent
decisions to protect cultural properties and accommodate tradi-
tional practices have triggered a variety of challenges from
non-Indian users of the public lands.
"religious access by [non-Indian] entities, including nonrecognized Indian groups,"
will be considered individually); id § 8.6.3 (authorizing the use of appropriate ar-
eas within parks for "religious activities, and other public expressions of views
protected under the First Amendment of the U. S. Constitution. ..").
202. Raymond Cross & Elizabeth Brenneman, Devils Tower at the Cross-
roads: The National Park Service and the Preservation of Native American Cul-
tural Resources in the 21st Century, 18 PUB. LAND & RES. L. REV. 5, 26 n.95
(1997).
203. O'Hair v. Andrus, 613 F.2d 931 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (rejecting Establish-
ment Clause claim, noting that Mall had traditionally been open for expressive
activities, and noting that expenditures for police, sanitation, and related services
served a legitimate governmental function).
204. NAT'L PARK SERV., 2001 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 196, § 8.5;
see also NAT'L PARK SERV., RETHINKING THE NATIONAL PARKS FOR THE 21ST
CENTURY, supra note 26, at § V ("[NPS] should help conserve the irreplaceable
connections that.., indigenous people have with the parks .... Efforts should be
made to connect these peoples with parks ... to strengthen their living cul-
tures .... includ[ing] access ... to sacred sites and the use of ecologically sus-
tainable cultural practices and traditions.").
205. 36 C.F.R. §§ 1.5, 13.30 (2001); NAT'L PARK SERV., 2001 MANAGEMENT
POLICIES, supra note 196, § 5.3.1.6 (requiring superintendents to "set, enforce,
and monitor carrying capacities to limit public visitation to, or use of, cultural re-
sources that would be subject to adverse effects from unrestricted levels of visita-
tion or use").
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In Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, commercial
rock climbers challenged the Climbing Management Plan for
Devils Tower National Monument, which includes a variety of
measures to accommodate American Indian traditional prac-
tices at the site. 20 6 Devils Tower, also known as Mato Tipila or
Bear Lodge, is considered a traditional cultural property, based
on tribal oral history and ethnographic studies, and is pro-
tected under the NHPA.20 7 It has great significance to northern
plains tribes as a vital cultural resource and pilgrimage site for
sun dances and vision quests, practices which require solem-
nity and solitude.20 8 Romanus Bear Stops, a traditional leader
of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe, explained that his people
experience spiritual renewal at the Tower: "by going there, we
are nurturing ourselves and preserving our culture .... Our
traditional, cultural and spiritual use of Mato Tipila is vital to
the health of our nation and to our self-determination as a
Tribe ." 209
Devils Tower takes on even greater significance given its lo-
cation in the Black Hills, a highly important area in the history
and spirituality of northern plains tribes.210 The Great Sioux Na-
tion reserved the area in the Treaty of Fort Laramie of 1868.211
Just a few years later, in 1877, Congress abrogated that treaty,
206. 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998), affd, 175 F.3d 814 (10th Cir. 1999),
cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1037 (2000). I was counsel of record for the United States in
the Bear Lodge case. Of course, the observations that appear in this Article are
my own and do not represent the position of my former client.
207. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1450 n.1; see also Lloyd Burton & David
Ruppert, Bear's Lodge or Devils Tower: Inter-Cultural Relations, Legal Pluralism,
and the Management of Sacred Sites on Public Lands, 8 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 201, 206-08 (1999) (detailing ethnohistory of the area).
208. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 816. Vision quests are highly solitary activi-
ties, while a select group of practitioners participate in the Sun Dance. See
DELORIA, JR. & LYTLE, supra note 90, at 117, 282; Cross & Brenneman, supra
note 202, at 41.
209. Aff. of Romanus Bear Stops in Opp'n to Mot. for Prelim. Inj. IT 16, 20,
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, (D. Wyo. May 7, 1996) (No. 96-CV-063-
D); see also Raymond J. DeMallie, Foreward to MARY ALICE GUNDERSON, DEVILS
TOWER: STORIES IN STONE, at ix (1988) (explaining that the "soaring height of the
tower inevitably makes it, in human perception, a link between earth and sky").
210. See Richard Pemberton, Jr., '/Saw That It Was Holy': The Black Hills and
the Concept of Sacred Land, 3 LAW & INEQ. 287 (1985); see also BROWN, supra note
74, at 274 ("The ten nations of the Sioux are looking toward ... [the Black Hills]
as the center of their land." (quoting Tatoke Inyanke (Running Antelope));
NEIHARDT, supra note 1, at 230 ("I saw far off the Black Hills and the center of
the world where the spirits had taken me in my great vision." (quoting Black
Elk)).
211. See Treaty of Fort Laramie, supra note 82.
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after an expedition led by General George Armstrong Custer dis-
covered gold in the Black Hills, greatly increasing the pressure
for exploration and settlement of the area.212 The Supreme
Court subsequently concluded that the 1877 statute resulted in
a taking of the Black Hills for which the Sioux were entitled to
compensation, 213 but the tribes have refused to accept the
monetary award and continue to press for the return of the
land.2 14
The NPS crafted the Climbing Management Plan in re-
sponse to a dramatic increase in rock climbing in recent
years. 215 It specifies various restrictions on climbing routes and
equipment to protect the butte from erosion and other physical
effects of climbing.216 Reflecting tribal concerns, the initial ver-
sion of the Climbing Plan imposed a mandatory climbing clo-
sure on commercial guides during the month of June to ac-
commodate tribal practices during the summer solstice.21 7 In
addition, it provided for NPS interpretive programs to inform
visitors of the site's significance as well as signs advising visi-
tors of tribal values associated with the site.215
The district court granted a preliminary injunction against
the implementation of the commercial climbing closure, con-
cluding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits
of their constitutional claims as to that provision. 219 The NPS
212. Custer and his men entered the area in spite of language in the treaty
providing that "[n]o white person or persons shall be permitted to settle upon or
occupy any portion of the territory, or without the consent of the Indians to pass
through the same." Treaty of Fort Laramie, supra note 82, art. 16. See BROWN,
supra note 74, at 273-313 (describing the conflict over the Black Hills).
213. United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980).
214. Pemberton, Jr., supra note 210, at 292-93.
215. Climbing at Devils Tower increased from 312 climbers in 1973 to over
6,000 annually at the time the Plan was adopted in 1995. See Bear Lodge Multi-
ple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1450 n.1 (D. Wyo. 1998).
216. Id. Provisions to protect raptors during the nesting season were also
adopted. Id.
217. The initial Plan was adopted after extensive consultations with tribes
and other interested parties, and its closure provisions were viewed as an accept-
able compromise by most participants. Id.
218. Id. at 1450. The sign, posted at the base of the Tower, states: "The
Tower is sacred to American Indians. Please stay on the trail." See Bear Lodge,
175 F.3d at 820 n.9.
219. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, No. 96-CV-063-D, slip op. (D.
Wyo. June 8, 1996) (order granting preliminary injunction). Plaintiffs raised a
variety of statutory and constitutional theories in their lawsuit, but their motion
for preliminary injunction rested solely on the Establishment Clause. Id. at 4 n.5.
The Establishment Clause claim is discussed in detail, infra Part IV.C.4.
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subsequently amended the Climbing Plan, omitting the com-
mercial closure provision and replacing it with a voluntary
measure, requesting that all visitors avoid climbing during
June. A Wyoming federal district court upheld the amended
Plan as consistent with constitutional requirements as well as
NPS closure policies.120 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit dismissed
the complaint on the grounds that the climbers had suffered no
concrete injury due to either the voluntary closure or the inter-
pretive program and, therefore, lacked standing to challenge
the Plan.221 Although it did not reach the merits of the claims,
the Tenth Circuit clearly recognized the importance of the site
to American Indian culture and religion.222
Similar claims were asserted in Natural Bridge & Arch So-
ciety v. National Park Service, a challenge to the General Man-
agement Plan for Rainbow Bridge National Monument, located
in Utah.223 Rainbow Bridge is a 290-foot high sandstone arch
held sacred by the Navajo, Hopi, San Juan Southern Paiute,
Kaibab Paiute, and White Mesa Ute, who have long utilized
the area for traditional cultural practices, including prayer and
healing ceremonies.22 4 It is surrounded almost entirely by the
Navajo Reservation. Visitor access to Rainbow Bridge has in-
creased exponentially since Glen Canyon Dam was constructed
220. Bear Lodge, 2 F. Supp. 2d at 1456-57 (citing NPS management policies,
which provide "[p]erformance of traditional activities at a particular place will not
be a reason for prohibiting the use of that area by others except where temporary
closings are authorized by law.... ."). 36 C.F.R. § 13.30 (2001) (specifying closure
requirements); NAVL PARK SERV., 2001 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 196,
§§ 8.2, 8.5 (explaining current policies regarding closures and Native American
use). Although the NPS has broad discretion to control commercial activities in
the parks through special use permits and concession contracts, 16 U.S.C. § 20
(1994) (providing for concessions); 16 U.S.C. §§ 5951, 5966 (Supp. V 1999) (provid-
ing for commercial use authorizations), a closure applicable only to commercial
climbers must be a rational allocation of uses among visitors, reasonably neces-
sary to protect park resources. Wilderness Pub. Rights Fund v. Kleppe, 608 F.2d
1250, 1254 (9th Cir. 1979) (affirming NPS allocation of eighty percent of its raft-
ing permits to commercial guides).
221. Bear Lodge, 175 F.3d at 821-22.
222. See id. at 816-17 (describing American Indian interests in Devils
Tower and other sacred sites, and congressional efforts to recognize and accom-
modate cultural interests).
223. See Complaint, Natural Bridge and Arch Society v. Nat'l Park Service
(No. 2000CV-0191J) (D. Utah filed Mar. 3, 2000).
224. See Maryann Watkins, Rainbow Bridge-The Navajo Connection
(1997), at http://my.erinet.com/ghost/navajo.htm; NAT'L PARK SERV., RAINBOW
BRIDGE NATIONAL MONUMENT (2001), at www.nps.gov/rabr/home.htm.
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in 1963, creating Lake Powell and allowing access by boat to
areas previously undisturbed. 225
The Rainbow Bridge Plan asks visitors to respect the long-
standing beliefs of American Indian tribes by not approaching
or walking under the Bridge. In addition, visitors are directed
to stay on the marked trails to prevent erosion, which is a sig-
nificant problem in and around the Monument, and to avoid
visitor use conflicts that arise by virtue of the sheer number of
people at the site.226 The adverse effects of uncontrolled visitor
use on cultural resources, traditional uses by tribes closely af-
filiated with the site, and natural features of the area, are well-
documented. 2 7 The Rainbow Bridge Management Plan is a le-
gitimate exercise of authority to allocate use and protect park
resources under the Park Service Organic Act and the
NHPA. 228 Like the revised Climbing Plan for Devils Tower, the
Rainbow Bridge Management Plan is a reasonable means of
accommodating American Indian cultural interests. 229
Cultural disputes over park resources are not limited to
the access and use of sacred lands. Tribal hunting, gathering,
and fishing practices implicate cultural and religious interests
as well. 230 The NPS is currently engaged in a controversial de-
cision-making process regarding the collection of golden eagle
225. See Mem. Br. of Fed. Defs. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss and in Opp'n to
Pls.' Challenge at 10-11, Natural Bridge and Arch Society (No. 2000CV-0191J)
(Feb. 14, 2001) [hereinafter Mem. Br.].
226. See NATL PARK SERV., RAINBOW BRIDGE NATIONAL MONUMENT (2001),
at www.nps.gov/rabr/changes.htm; Mem. Br., supra note 225, at 6, 8-9. According
to the plaintiff in Natural Bridge and Arch Society, although signs surrounding the
site request "voluntary compliance," visitors who approach the Bridge are threat-
ened with arrest if they step off a trail; meanwhile, the trail itself has been con-
cealed with boulders. See id.; see also Jim Woolf, Lawsuit: Park Service Rules Pro-
mote Religion at Rainbow Bridge Monument, SALT LAKE TRIB., Mar. 7, 2000, at
A12. Dispositive motions are pending in the District of Utah. MOUNTAIN STATES
LEGAL FOUNDATION, Legal Cases: Natural Bridge and Arch Society v. Nat'l Park
Serv. (2001), at www.mountainstateslegal.org/legal-cases.cfm?legalcaseid=53.
227. See Mem. Br., supra note 225, at 8-11 (citing detailed findings from the
Management Plan EIS).
228. See Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. United States Forest Serv., 177 F.3d
800, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1999) (enjoining proposed land exchange due in part to
agency's failure to mitigate effects as specified in the NHPA regulations); NAT'L
PARK SERV., 2001 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 196, § 5.3.1.6 and ch. 5 at 47.
229. See infra Part IV.C (analyzing accommodation of the Establishment
Clause).
230. See generally Michelle L. LeBeau, Federal Land Management Agencies
and California Indians: A Proposal to Protect Native Plant Species, 21 ENVIRONS
ENVTL. L. & POLY J. 27 (1998) (discussing significance and effects of Indian gath-
ering practices and federal management approaches).
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chicks at Wupatki National Monument, an area historically
used by the Hopi Tribe. A proposed rule would allow Hopi to
gather eaglets, considered messengers between the physical
and spiritual worlds, so that they may be reared and sacrificed
for ceremonial purposes. 231 The environmental assessment for
the proposal recognizes that "[tihe collection of golden eaglets
from specific geographic areas is a fundamental part of Hopi re-
ligion, and there is an ancestral and historical connection be-
tween the Hopi Tribe and Wupatki National Monument. '232
The proposal has been criticized as opening the door to
hunting in the Parks, a practice generally prohibited. 2 3 NPS
regulations provide, however, that permits may be granted in
certain limited circumstances, including where Indian treaties
specify rights to take wildlife or fish.234 Further, NPS man-
agement policies proclaim that the agency "supports the lim-
ited and controlled consumption of natural resources for tradi-
tional religious and ceremonial purposes, and is moving toward
a goal of greater access and accommodation." 23
The Wupatki proposal illustrates one of the more difficult
aspects of accommodating cultural interests in public lands:
what approach should the agency take when access to cultural
resources may interfere with the preservation of those re-
231. Proposed Rule: Religious Ceremonial Collection of Golden Eaglets From
Wupatki National Monument, 66 Fed. Reg. 6516 (Jan. 22, 2001); Mark Shaffer,
Hopis Hopeful on Eagle Plan, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (Phoenix), Oct. 31, 2000, at B5.
232. NAT'L PARK SERV., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, PROPOSED RULE:
RELIGIOUS CEREMONIAL COLLECTION OF GOLDEN EAGLETS IN WUPATKI NATIONAL
MONUMENT at 4 (2001), available at http://www.nps.gov/wupa/pphtmllfacts.html.
233. THE HUMANE SOCIETY OF THE UNITED STATES, BABBITT WANTS TO
ALLOW EAGLE TAKING ON PARK LANDS (2001). NPS regulations prohibit "possess-
ing, destroying... or disturbing" wildlife, fish or plants, or the parts or products
of any of these items, with few exceptions. 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(a), (d) (2001).
234. 36 C.F.R. § 2.1(d) (2001) (allowing the "taking, use or possession of fish,
wildlife or plants for ceremonial or religious purposes ... where specifically au-
thorized by Federal statutory law, treaty rights, or in accordance with § 2.2 [wild-
life protection] or § 2.3 [fishing])." Hunting may occur "where such activity is spe-
cifically authorized as a discretionary activity under Federal statutory law if the
superintendent determines that such activity is consistent with public safety and
enjoyment, and sound resource management principles." § 2.2(b)(2); see also §
2.1(c) (allowing personal use of certain plants and items); § 2.5(b) (allowing a
specimen collection permit for the purpose of research).
235. See NAT'L PARK SERV., 2001 MANAGEMENT POLICIES, supra note 196, §
8.9. For a discussion of various proposals to allow traditional gathering practices
for members of tribes with "ancestral affiliations" to the federal lands, see Le-
Beau, supra note 230, at 35.
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sources? 236 The NPS's explicit statutory directive is to "con-
serve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the
wild life" but also to allow use and enjoyment of National Park
System properties.23 7 The conservation mandate appears to be
the first order of business, followed by "enjoyment"--not only
for present but also for future generations. 238
There is little question that the Park Service Organic Act
and its implementing regulations and guidance allow the pro-
tection, and even prioritization, of culturally important re-
sources in appropriate cases. Undoubtedly, difficult decisions
will have to be made in situations like the Hopi's request to col-
lect eaglets at Wupatki. These decisions will necessarily reflect
the provisions of any relevant treaties, the specific historic ties
and cultural needs of the tribes, and the long-term significance
and nature of effects to the resource.
Where tribes have cultural ties to the resources at issue,
reasonable and timely closures or other measures that allow
traditional ceremonies to take place undisturbed by other visi-
tors are apt management tools in the allocation and preserva-
tion of park resources. By the same token, sustaining re-
sources for the long-term may, at times, require that access be
curtailed if necessary to satisfy conservation needs. This is not
inconsistent with the philosophies of many tribes, who strive to
manage natural resources to ensure that the "seventh genera-
tion" can still enjoy them, and the NPS should be able to re-
solve conflicts through consultation with tribes in most cases. 239
Absent treaty rights, a well-documented, unequivocal need to
protect the resource from adverse impacts will likely be an ac-
236. Cf JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT 8 (1999) (not-
ing that inaccessibility is often a more pervasive problem than destruction, at
least with respect to cultural resources like fine art owned by private parties).
Although cultural practices generally do not cause the type of degradation attrib-
utable to mining, logging, and even rock climbing, they can contribute to the phe-
nomenon of "loving our parks to death." See generally Cheever, supra note 30, at
637 (observing that the "American people are 'loving their parks to death").
237. 16 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
238. See Winks, supra note 29, at 596-97; Cheever, supra note 30, at 646-
48.
239. See Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy, supra note 69, at 228 (citing
Oren Lyons, An Iroquois Perspective, in AMERICAN INDIAN ENVIRONMENTS:
ECOLOGICAL ISSUES IN NATIVE AMERICAN HISTORY 171, 173 (Christopher Vecsey
& Robert W. Venables eds., 1980)); Williams, Large Binocular Telescopes, supra
note 68, at 1153-54. The NHPA specifically requires consultation. See discussion
supra Part II.B.
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ceptable ground for denying access, especially if the land man-
ager has explored other alternatives in consultation with the
affected tribe and determined that no less restrictive options
are available. Tribes that have treaty rights to hunt, fish or
gather the resources in question, however, cannot be denied
those rights, unless Congress itself abrogates the treaty.2 40
The Wupatki proposal would allow the gathering of eaglets
under a special use permit, which would include specified gath-
ering times and collection limits. 241 The environmental as-
sessment for the proposal concluded that these conditions
would be sufficient to protect park resources from impairment,
and that golden eagle populations would experience only "neg-
ligible" long-term impacts.242 Although it does not appear that
treaty rights are implicated, the proposal would allow the Hopi
to engage in traditional religious ceremonies on ancestral
lands, with long-term beneficial effects for Hopi culture. 243 In
light of the Hopi's long-standing connection with the area, the
nature of the traditional cultural uses at stake, and the tai-
lored nature of the permit requirements, the proposal seems a
suitable exercise of statutory authority.
B. Cultural Resource Management on Multiple Use Lands
Mining, grazing, and logging are common practices on
BLM and Forest Service lands. These activities extract valu-
able resources, but they can also disrupt cultural activities and
degrade or even destroy associated resources.244 The BLM has
taken steps to protect cultural interests by restricting mining
in the California Desert Conservation Area (CDCA), while the
240. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739 (1986) (requiring a clear
and plain congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights); see also Sandra B. Zell-
mer, Indian Lands as Critical Habitat for Indian Nations and Endangered Spe-
cies: Tribal Survival and Sovereignty Come First, 43 S.D. L. REV. 381, 400-05
(1998) (discussing interplay between Endangered Species Act, wildlife conserva-
tion principles, and Indian treaty rights).
241. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 232, at 22. The Hopi have
obtained eagle collection permits pursuant to the Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 668a (1994). See ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 232, at 3.
242. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 232, at 3.
243. Id. at 22-23.
244. See, e.g., Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association v. Peter-
son, 565 F. Supp. 586, 596 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd in relevant part, 764 F.2d 581
(9th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective As-
sociation, 485 U.S. 439 (1988), discussed infra Part V.A.
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Forest Service has adopted a plan to restrict logging and other
disruptive activities near the Medicine Wheel. Both decisions
were a result, in part, of the NHPA, but both were informed by
the management requirements of FLPMA and the NFMA as
well.
1. The BLM
Glamis Corporation owns numerous mining claims within
the BLM's El Centro district in the CDCA.2 45 It has proposed to
develop these claims through its Imperial Mine Project, a cya-
nide heap-leach gold mine and associated facilities covering
nearly 1,600 acres of land. Up to 150 million tons of ore would
be mined and leached, with 300 million tons of waste rock to be
deposited on stockpiles. 46 The mine would adversely affect the
Indian Man-Running Pass area, a culturally important area
where members of three federally recognized tribes, the
Quechan Tribe, the Colorado River Indian Tribes, and the Ft.
Mojave Indian Tribe, come "to seek knowledge and spiritual
power. ' 247 Citing these concerns, the BLM, in January 2001,
issued a precedent-setting decision denying Glamis's plan to
proceed with mining under FLPMA and special provisions gov-
245. See Press Release-Final EIS/EIR for Imperial Project Gold Mine,
available at http://www.ca.blm.gov/news/glamis-imperial-finaleis.html (last vis-
ited Dec. 12, 2000).
246. See id.
247. U.S. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, IMPERIAL PROJECT, FINAL
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (Sept. 2000), at 3.6.2.4 [hereinafter
IMPERIAL FEISI, available at http://www5.ca.blm.gov/ads-cgi/viewer.pl/pdfdocs/
imperial/ Vol-lgw.pdf, see Council Seeks Halt to Proposed Imperial Mine Project,
at http://www.achp.gov/casearchive/newsimperialmine.html (last visited Mar. 11,
2002); Letter from Courtney Ann Coyle to Douglas Romoli, BLM, 5-8 (Apr. 12,
1998) (discussing Imperial project's impact on the Quechan's sacred landscapes
and pathways in the Indian Pass area, including the Trail of Dreams, used for "re-
ligious pilgrimages associated with the Keruk ceremony, the most important and
deeply religious" of ceremonies) (on file with author). The Indian Pass-Running
Man area, an area of traditional cultural concern, encompasses the project area
and beyond, extending 8.2 miles in length and 2.5 miles in width. Id. at 9. The
FEIS states, "The data are insufficient to determine whether the Indian Pass-
Running Man [Area] should stand alone as a potential TCP, or should be evalu-
ated as part of a larger complex .... Regardless, the evidence is clear that the
[Area] should be treated as a significant resource." IMPERIAL FEIS, supra, at
3.6.2.4. Fifty-five sites within and near the project area have been evaluated as
eligible for the National Register. Id. at 3.6.2.1.
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erning the CDCA, but the decision has since been called into
question by the Bush administration.248
FLPMA addresses mining claims and other activities on
BLM lands. Congress enacted FLPMA in 1976 to coordinate
over a century's worth of piecemeal, disjointed statutes and ex-
ecutive orders governing the public lands and resources, and to
declare that the public lands would be retained in federal own-
ership unless it was determined, after following extensive
planning procedures, that disposal would serve the national
public interest.249 The statute provides for land acquisition,
sale, and withdrawal, roads and rights-of-way, and the process-
ing of mining claims. 250  It also establishes a comprehensive
management scheme for public lands managed by the BLM. 251
Pursuant to FLPMA, the BLM must recognize and balance
a variety of "interests as diverse as the lands themselves ... in
a dynamic, evolving manner."252 The statute allows for the des-
ignation and management of "areas of critical environmental
concern" to protect important cultural and physical values.253
248. The BLM's decision represents the first time that the development of
mining claims has been denied under FLPMA absent a formal mineral contest to
determine whether claims have been perfected. See Record of Decision for the
Imperial Project Gold Mine Proposal (Jan. 17, 2001) [hereinafter Glamis ROD],
available at http://www5.ca.blm.gov/ads-cgi/viewer.pl/pdfdocs/glamis/GlamisROD
_final_1-01.pdf. Secretary Gale Norton has directed the BLM to revisit the deci-
sion. Tony Perry, Hot Spot in Battle Over Mining Environment, L.A. TIMES, Oct.
31, 2001, at B1.
249. 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1994).
250. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1713-21 (1994) (land acquisition and disposition); § 1744
(recordation of mining claims); §§ 1761-70 (rights-of-way).
251. 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1994) (defining "multiple use").
252. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734, 738 (10th Cir.
1983).
253. 43 U.S.C. 88 1702(a), 1712(c)(3) (1994). The Departmental Manual
provides that "The Federal Government has a statutory, administrative, and ethi-
cal responsibility to conserve and ensure the protection of nationally important
cultural and natural features. The BLM's long-term management mission is to
provide the opportunity for a diverse public to use, share, and appreciate these
significant cultural and natural resources while protecting and conserving them
for future generations." 135 D.M. 1, 1.3(D) (1999); see Strategic Paper on Cultural
Resources at Risk (2000), at http://www.blm.govfheritage/index.htm (describing
cultural resource and tribal consultation programs). The BLM's Manual on Na-
tive American Coordination directs the agency to avoid unnecessary interference
with religious practices and to consult with tribes to ensure that their concerns
about BLM programs are met. BLM MANUAL RELEASE No. 8-58, H-8160-1-
GENERAL PROCEDURAL GUIDANCE FOR NATIVE AMERICAN CONSULTATION (1990)
[hereinafter MANUAL H-8160-1], available at http://lm0005.blm.gov/nhp/efoia/wo/
handbook/h8160-1.html.
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FLPMA also provides that "[i]n managing the public lands, the
Secretary [of Interior] shall, by regulation or otherwise, take
any action necessary to prevent unnecessary or undue degrada-
tion of the lands."2 54 This provision is most frequently raised in
the context of disturbances to natural resources due to extrac-
tive activities like grazing and mining. BLM regulations gov-
erning surface disturbances during mining operations have
long defined "unnecessary or undue degradation" by focusing
only on the "unnecessary" prong: "surface disturbance[s]
greater than what would normally result when an activity is
being accomplished by a prudent operator in usual, customary,
and proficient operations of similar character."255 This narrow
interpretation reflects the historic federal policy of encouraging
hard-rock mining on public lands under the 1872 General Min-
ing Law, which allows citizens to locate mining claims by dis-
covering a valuable mineral deposit on federal lands "open to
location. '256
Signaling that change was afoot, a 1999 Solicitor's Opinion
on the Regulation of Hard Rock Mining noted that "the con-
junction 'or' between 'unnecessary' and 'undue' speaks of a Sec-
retarial authority to address separate types of degradation."251
Subsequently, in November 2000, the regulatory definition of
"unnecessary [or] undue degradation" was amended to clarify
that the term "undue" has independent meaning: "operators
must not cause substantial irreparable harm to significant re-
sources."258 Under the revised regulations, "conditions, activi-
ties, or practices" would be prohibited if they fail to comply
254. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(b) (1994) (emphasis added).
255. Surface Management, 43 C.F.R. § 380905(k) (2000).
256. 30 U.S.C. § 22-24, 26-28, 29, 30, 33-35, 37, 39-43, 47 (1994); see also
43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(12) (1994) (declaring congressional intent that "public lands
be managed in a manner which recognizes the Nation's need for domestic sources
of minerals"); § 1732(b) (stating FLPMA does not "in any way amend the Mining
Law of 1872" except as provided by the "unnecessary or undue degradation" stan-
dard and certain other specified provisions, including the CDCA Act). The Mining
Act expressly provides that mineral lands are open to occupation and purchase
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided," and then only "under regulations prescribed by
law." 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1994).
257. Memorandum from U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the So-
licitor to Secretary Babbitt and Acting Director, BLM, M-36999 (Dec. 27, 1999),
superseded by Memorandum from United States Department of the Interior, Of-
fice of the Solicitor to Secretary Gale Norton, M-37007 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter
Solicitor's Opinion].
258. Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws; Surface Management
65 Fed. Reg. 69998, 70001 (Nov. 21, 2000) (emphasis added).
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with performance standards or other laws related to environ-
mental protection or result in "substantial irreparable harm to
significant scientific, cultural, or environmental resource val-
ues of the public lands that cannot be effectively mitigated."259
The revised regulations, which were prospective in nature and
thus would not have applied to Glamis, have since been sus-
pended by Secretary of the Interior Gale Norton.260
Rather than relying on FLPMA, however, the Solicitor's
Opinion concluded that the agency has authority to deny ap-
proval for Glamis's plan of operations under the special "undue
impairment" standard of the CDCA Act.261 Under the BLM's
management plan for the CDCA, the affected area is desig-
nated for limited use, "giving priority to the protection of sensi-
tive natural, scenic, ecological and cultural resources." 262 The
Advisory Council for Historic Preservation reviewed the pro-
posal pursuant to the NHPA, concluding that the mine would
destroy the cultural resources of the project area and that miti-
gation measures proposed by Glamis would not compensate for
the devastating impacts on traditional cultural values of the af-
fected Indian tribes. 263 The Council recommended that the
259. Id. at 70115 (to be codified at 43 C.F.R § 3809.5) (emphasis added).
260. Id. at 69998 (providing an effective date of Jan. 20, 2001); id. at 70039
(stating that pre-existing performance standards would apply to plans of opera-
tions submitted prior to the rules' effective date). The Bush Administration sus-
pended the revised regulations and reinstated pre-existing 3809 regulations. Fi-
nal Rule: Mining Claims Under the General Mining Laws, 66 Fed. Reg. 54834
(Oct. 30, 2001). A variety of challenges to the 3809 regulations were lodged.
Christian Bourge, Court Allows Mining Changes to Take Effect, AM. METAL
MRKT., Jan. 23, 2001, at 2001 WL 8177009, at *6 (reporting denial of preliminary
injunction against revised regulations in suit brought by mining interests and the
state of Nevada); Christine Dorsey, Nevada Drops Mining Lawsuit, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., Nov. 30, 2001, at 1D (reporting that Nevada and other mining interests
have dismissed their claims, while the Mineral Policy Center has amended its
complaint to challenge the rules approved by Secretary Norton).
261. Solicitor's Opinion M-36999, supra note 257 (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1781(f)
(1994) (providing for regulations to protect scenic, scientific and environmental
values within the CDCA from "undue impairment")). A plan of operations is re-
quired by the 3809 regulations. Surface Management, 43 C.F.R. § 3809.1-4
(2000).
262. See Glamis ROD, supra note 248, at 13 (describing Limited Use cate-
gory (Class L) as "specifically intended for the protection of 'sensitive, natural,
scenic, ecological, and cultural resource values' [which] provides for 'generally
lower-intensity, carefully controlled multiple use of resources, while ensuring that
sensitive values are not significantly diminished'").
263. See Council Seeks Halt to Proposed Imperial Mine Project, ADVISORY
COUNCIL ON HISTORIC PRESERVATION, Oct. 19, 1999, available at
http://www.achp.gov/casearchive/newsimperialmine.html.
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BLM take whatever legal means available to deny approval for
the project.264
The final EIS for the project ultimately determined that
any option that allowed mining would fail to mitigate harm to
the site, and designated the "no action" alternative, i.e., denial
of the company's proposed plan of operations, as the preferred
alternative. 265 The record of decision, issued by former Secre-
tary of the Interior Bruce Babbitt in January 2001, denied
Glamis's plan on the grounds that the mine and associated fa-
cilities would cause unavoidable harm to cultural, historic, and
visual resources and that negative impacts would outweigh the
economic benefits of the project. 266  Glamis filed suit against
the Department of Interior and the BLM, asserting FLPMA,
CDCA Act, and Establishment Clause claims in an attempt to
have the decision set aside. 267  Subsequently, in keeping with
its reinstatement of the pre-existing regulations, the Depart-
ment of Interior issued a new solicitor's opinion, stating that
mining may go forward in spite of adverse impacts and direct-
ing the California office of the BLM to review Glamis's pro-
ject.268
The denial of Glamis's plan is based on a reasonable inter-
pretation of the CDCA Act's prohibition against undue impair-
ment and FLPMA's provisions requiring the Secretary to take
action, "by regulation or otherwise," to prevent undue degrada-
264. See id.
265. See Notice of Availability of FEIS, 65 Fed. Reg. 67396 (Nov. 7, 2000);
Press Release, supra note 245 (describing "no action" as the BLM's preferred al-
ternative "based on the finding that the company's proposed action, even with the
application of additional mitigation measures, would result in significant adverse
impacts to Native American archeological and cultural resources considered sa-
cred to the nearby Quechan Indian Tribe and other sensitive resources").
266. See Glamis ROD, supra note 248. Glamis claims the mine would yield
1.1 million ounces of gold worth $300 million. Babbitt Kills Bid to Dig Gold Mine
Near Indian Sacred Sites, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2001, at A16.
267. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Glamis Imperial Corp.
v. United States Dept. of Interior, No. 1:01CV00530 (D.D.C Mar. 12, 2001).
Glamis had previously filed a lawsuit challenging the Solicitor's Opinion, but it
was dismissed for lack of final agency action. Glamis Imperial Corp. v. Babbitt,
No. 00CV1934W, slip op. (S.D. Cal. Oct. 31, 2000).
268. Memorandum from United States Department of the Interior, Office of
the Solicitor to Secretary Gale Norton, M-37007 (Oct. 23, 2001). This opinion con-
cludes that Interior should not "deny a plan of operations unless and until it com-
pletes rulemaking to establish standards for the meaning of 'undue impairment.'"
Id. at 21.
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tion of the land.26 9 Further, the decision to protect the Tribes'
traditional cultural resources and accommodate their ability to
utilize the site is consistent with the area's limited use desig-
nation, the provisions of the Mining Act, and the congressional
objectives of the NHPA, as well as the executive orders on sa-
cred sites and environmental justice.2 70 As discussed below, it
is also a constitutionally appropriate accommodation of cul-
tural and religious interests.271
2. The National Forest System
The lands within the National Forest System are adminis-
tered pursuant to the NFMA and its predecessors, the Forest
Service Organic Act of 1897272 and the Multiple-Use Sustained-
Yield Act of 1960 (MUSYA).273 In comparison with the Park
Service Organic Act and FLPMA, the forest management stat-
utes say little about cultural resources. The statutes, however,
do grant discretion to consider intangible values in managing
forest resources.2 74  National Forest System lands are to be
managed for multiple uses of watersheds, timber, fish and
wildlife, range, recreation, and wilderness, with the resources
being maintained "in perpetuity" without impairment of pro-
ductivity. 275 The MUSYA directs the Forest Service to make
the "most judicious use of the land for some or all of the re-
269. Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see
also Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1 (1965) (deferring to agency interpretation of
regulations and secretarial orders).
270. See discussion supra note 34 (discussing hard rock mining require-
ments); supra notes 181-182, 184 (describing executive orders); see also MANUAL
H-8160-1, supra note 253, at Chapter IV.F (BLM Manual provisions acknowledge
that, under FLPMA, Indian tribes are not to be regarded as "'just another public'
whose interests ought to be considered. In their relations with Federal agencies,
Indian tribes have special rights as sovereign governments.").
271. See infra Part IV.C.3 (applying accommodation analysis).
272. 16 U.S.C. §§ 473-478, 479-482, 551 (1994).
273. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531 (1994).
274. 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a)(2) (1994) (requiring a Renewable Resource Assess-
ment that evaluates, inter alia, opportunities for improving the "yield of tangible
and intangible goods and services"); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1604(b) (requiring an "in-
terdisciplinary approach to achieve integrated consideration of physical, biologi-
cal, economic and other sciences").
275. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1994) (providing for establishment of National Forests
to secure water flows and timber supply); § 528 (providing for recreation, range,
timber, watershed, wildlife and fish, as well as for mineral resources); § 529 (pro-
viding for wilderness); § 1604(e) (incorporating uses specified in MUSYA, 16
U.S.C. §§ 528-529 (1994)).
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sources," in a manner that allows it to "conform to changing
needs and conditions."2 76 It further specifies that "some land
will be used for less than all of the resources" and calls for
"harmonious and coordinated management of the various re-
sources ... with consideration being given to the[ir relative
values."277  The NFMA provides for comprehensive planning
and public participation in the management of forest resources
and requires that forest uses be consistent with land and re-
source management plans.278
Regulations governing Forest Service activities provide
that cultural resources should play a vital role in the manage-
ment of the National Forests. Specifically, "physical, biological,
economic, and social effects," including cultural resource val-
ues, must be considered during the planning process. 27 9 Re-
gional plans and forest plans are to be based on multiple-use
sustained-yield principles, including "[p] reservation of impor-
tant historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heri-
tage... [and] protection and preservation of the inherent right
of freedom of American Indians to believe, express, and exer-
cise their traditional religions."2s0  The planning regulations
provide for the identification and protection of "significant cul-
tural resources" in National Forests. 28 1 The evaluation of man-
agement alternatives must satisfy NEPA and the NHPA and
276. 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1994).
277. Id.
278. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i) (1994).
279. 36 C.F.R. § 219.12(4)(h) (2000); see 7 C.F.R. § 3100.43(a) (2000) (stating
that the "Department of Agriculture is committed to the management-
identification, protection, preservation, interpretation, evaluation and nomina-
tion-of our prehistoric and historic cultural resources for the benefit of all people
of this and future generations"). Recent revisions to the Forest Service regula-
tions continue to recognize cultural values in planning, see 65 Fed. Reg. 67514,
67550-58 (Nov. 9, 2000), although they specify that "ecological sustainability"
takes first priority. 36 C.F.R. § 219.2(a) (2001). The new regulations are undergo-
ing review by the Bush Administration, and deadlines for forest plan revisions
have been extended pending review. See 66 Fed. Reg. 27555, 27556 (May 17,
2001).
280. 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b)(5)-(6) (2000); see NATIONAL FOREST SERVICE,
HERITAGE-IT'S ABOUT TIME (1999) (stating that "[hieritage resources are funda-
mentally linked" to sustainable forest management strategies), available at
http://www.fs.fed.us/recreation/heritage/heritage-strategy.shtml.
281. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.24 (2000) (requiring planning to protect significant
cultural resources from destruction); see also § 219.27(b)(1) (2000) (requiring
management measures so that vegetative manipulation shall be "best suited to
the multiple-use goals established for the area, considering potential environ-
mental, biological, [and] cultural resource ... impacts").
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must be coordinated with the SHPO. 2 2 The regulations direct
the planning officer to consult with tribes early on in the deci-
sion-making process to ensure that treaty and trust resources
are identified and that tribal information and concerns are con-
sidered.28 3
Although the Forest Service has not always prioritized
American Indian resources, 28 4 like its sister agencies, the For-
est Service has issued several controversial decisions in the
past few years protecting cultural resources. In one notable
example, the Bighorn National Forest adopted measures to re-
strict logging near the Medicine Wheel, a traditional cultural
property and National Historic Landmark, invoking its au-
thorities under the NHPA and the NFMA. The Forest Service's
Historic Preservation Plan requires consultation with affiliated
tribes before allowing activities that might harm the spiritual
value of the site, and closes a road within the viewshed of the
Medicine Wheel. 285
In Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. United States Forest Service,
a commercial logging company challenged the Historic Preser-
vation Plan,286 alleging that it inhibits economic opportunities
and gives the tribes "veto power over anything that happens"
within the 18,000-acre area of consultation. 28 7 Similar claims
282. 36 C.F.R. § 219.24 (2000); see also 36 C.F.R. § 219.21(a)(1) (2001) (di-
recting planning officers to "[diescribe and analyze, as appropriate.... cultural
and American Indian tribe and Alaska Native land settlement patterns;.., and
other appropriate social and cultural information").
283. See 36 C.F.R. § 219.1(b)(9) (2001) (requiring that forest plans be coordi-
nated with "other Federal agencies, State and local governments, and Indian
tribes"); 7 C.F.R. § 3100.43(d) (2000) (stating that the Department "is committed
to consideration of the needs of American Indians, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native
Hawaiians in the practice of their traditional religions"); see also 36 C.F.R. §
219.15 (2001) (directing planning officers to consult with tribes to assist in the
"early identification of treaty rights, treaty-protected resources, and American In-
dian tribe trust resources; ... and [tihe consideration of tribal concerns and sug-
gestions during decision-making").
284. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S.
439 (1988); Muckleshoot Indian Tribe v. United States Forest Service, 177 F.3d
800, 807-08 (9th Cir. 1999); Pueblo of Sandia v. United States, 50 F.3d 856 (10th
Cir. 1995).
285. See HISTORIC PRESERVATION PLAN, supra note 169; Part II.B.2, supra
(discussing the NHPA's provisions for National Historic Landmarks).
286. Complaint, Wyoming Sawmills, Inc. v. United States Forest Service,
No. 99-CV-31J (D. Wyo. Feb. 16, 1999); see also http://www.mountainstateslegal.
org (last visited Mar. 11, 2002).
287. Pauline Arrillaga, Sacred Indian Sites Pit Almighty Buck Against Al-
mighty Logging, L.A. TIMEs, July 23, 2000, at B1. Briefs have been filed in the
district of Wyoming. Id.
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have fared poorly in recent judicial opinions. In Independent
Petroleum Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, industry
groups challenged the Forest Service's decision to forego oil and
gas leasing on the Rocky Mountain Front Range in the Lewis
and Clark National Forest to protect the Blackfeet Tribe's sa-
cred sites and the aesthetic "value and spirituality of place."288
Their constitutional and statutory claims were rejected by the
district court, which found that the decision was based on valid
management criteria for protecting "the pristine scenery and
diverse resources" of the area. 28 9 The Ninth Circuit affirmed
the decision. 290
In both cases, the NFMA provides sufficient authority to
withdraw portions of the National Forest System lands or oth-
erwise restrict logging and mineral location and leasing in or-
der to protect cultural resources. 291 The NFMA specifically al-
lows that some land may be used for fewer than all permissible
activities in order to ensure "harmonious and coordinated
management" of the various resources, given their relative val-
ues.292 The traditional cultural values of the tribes deserve rec-
ognition and even prioritization in both cases. With respect to
the Medicine Wheel, the NHPA adds support for protecting
288. See http://www.mountainstateslegal.org/legal-cases-category-home.cfm
(last visited Mar. 11, 2002); Sherry Devlin, 429,000 Acres Closed to Hard Rock
Mining, MISSOULIAN, Feb. 4, 1999, at Al; Tom Laceky, Red Tape Seals Off Sacred
Lands, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 19, 1997, at B1.
289. Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. United States Forest Service, No.
98-22-H-CCL, opinion and order at 5-6 (D. Mont. Mar. 7, 2000), affd, No. 00-
35349, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. 20,617 (9th Cir. May 03, 2001), pet. for cert. pending,
No. 01-213 (Aug. 1, 2001).
290. See id.; see also infra Part IV.C (discussing resolution of Establishment
Clause claim).
291. See 16 U.S.C. § 531(a) (1994); 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.1(b), 219.27(b)(1) (2001);
see also FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1714(c),(d),(i) (1994) (providing for the withdrawal
of public lands).
292. 16 U.S.C. §§ 531(a) (1994); see also § 551 (requiring regulations to pre-
serve the forests from destruction due to mining). Forest Service efforts to pro-
hibit hard rock mining, however, raise more difficult issues. § 428 (requiring that
no rule or regulation prohibit "proper and lawful purposes, including that of pros-
pecting, locating and developing the mineral resources"); United States v. Weiss,
642 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Secretary may adopt reasonable rules and regula-
tions which do not impermissibly encroach upon the right to use and enjoyment
of... claims for mining purposes"); United States v. Shumway, 199 F.3d 1093,
1106 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing Weiss, and stating that use of National Forest lands
by miners may be regulated "only to the extent that the regulations are 'reason-
able' and do not impermissibly encroach on legitimate uses incident to mining and
mill site claims").
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Historic Landmarks and traditional cultural properties. 293 Like
the Front Range decision, as long as the Medicine Wheel Plan
is consistent with the land management plan for the Bighorn
Forest and is well-documented, rational, and based on a thor-
ough consideration of relevant data regarding the tribal inter-
ests at stake and effects on cultural and other natural re-
sources, it satisfies statutory requirements.294  Further, the
Medicine Wheel Plan's requirements will likely survive consti-
tutional scrutiny as a reasonable accommodation of American
Indian interests.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION OF CULTURAL
INTERESTS
Constitutional challenges to federal actions affecting sa-
cred sites and cultural practices at the Medicine Wheel, Devils
Tower, and other areas have been raised by tribes as well as
non-Indian users of the public lands. Many of these challenges
have been centered on the First Amendment's religion clauses:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... ,,295 Tribal
practitioners have asserted free exercise rights in seeking to
access or preserve cultural resources, while other interests al-
lege Establishment Clause and occasionally equal protection
violations when accommodations are made for tribal interests.
The two religion clauses are not mutually exclusive, nor
are they in perfect equipoise. Between them lies a realm of
discretionary activity-a "channel between the Scylla and
Charybdis"-where accommodations for the preservation and
use of cultural and spiritual properties are allowed, even if not
constitutionally mandated. 296  Accommodations for American
Indian traditional cultural practices involving federal public
lands and resources come well within this realm, and may, in
some cases, be required under treaties, constitutional require-
293. 16 U.S.C. §§ 470h-2(f), 470a(d)(6) (1994).
294. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
43 (1983).
295. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
296. Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 721
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461
(1971) ("[Dlespite a general harmony of purpose between the two religious clauses
of the First Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause no doubt has a reach of its
own." (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1963)).
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ments, or statutory provisions. Further, because American In-
dian tribes are not similarly situated to other groups, equal
protection principles are generally satisfied by tribal accommo-
dations.
A. What is Religion?
Neither the Free Exercise nor the Establishment Clause
apply unless the practice at issue is religious. Specifying a
definition of religion is both difficult and controversial, as re-
ligiosity is a highly complex and elusive concept with no clearly
settled parameters. Although "[nio specification of essential
conditions will capture all and only the beliefs, practices, and
organizations that are regarded as religious,"297 courts tend to
focus on two common features. One is whether the practice or
belief centers on a "Supreme Being" or "ultimate concern" 298
that represents "a sentience beyond the human and capable of
acting outside of the observed principles and limits of natural
science, and... that makes demands of some kind on its ad-
herents."299 Typically, this means that a belief will be seen as
religious if it "occupies a place in the life of its possessor paral-
297. Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL.
L. REV. 753, 763 (1984). See Wash. Ethical Soc'y v. District of Columbia, 249 F.2d
127, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957) ("Reference to standard sources of definitions discloses
that the terms 'religion' and 'religious' in ordinary usage are not rigid concepts"
and are "by no means free from ambiguity."); STEPHEN CARTER, THE CULTURE OF
DISBELIEF 17-18 (1994) (noting the danger in placing definitional parameters on
religion, but also the necessity of making such an attempt in order to have an in-
telligent conversation about the First Amendment); Michael A. Paulsen, Religion,
Equality and the Constitution: An Equal Protection Approach to Establishment
Clause Adjudication, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 311, 333 (1986) (arguing that dis-
tinguishing religious and non-religious effects is a "cosmological quagmire"); see
also Ira C. Lupu, To Control Faction and Protect Liberty: A General Theory of the
Religion Clauses, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 357, 358 (1996) (cautioning that
rigid definitions of religion "would ultimately themselves be a threat to religious
liberty... increas[ing] the probability of unreceptivity to new variants of relig-
ion").
298. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187 (1965) (citing PAUL TILLICH,
THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS 57 (1948)); Greenawalt, supra note 297, at
763; see also Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L.
REV. 1056, 1056 (1978) (suggesting that religion should embrace "whatever is for
the individual an 'ultimate concern").
299. CARTER, supra note 297, at 17; see also Jesse H. Choper, Defining "Re-
ligion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REV. 579, 594-97 (analyzing the
'ultimate concern" criterion). Professor Carter adds that this concept infers "a
tradition of group worship.., a religious community struggling together toward
the ultimate." CARTER, supra, at 17.
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lel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God." 300 In contrast,
philosophical views and personal moral codes are typically not
viewed as religious in nature. 30 1 The second consideration is
whether the practice or belief involves extra-temporal conse-
quences. It will likely be seen as religious if it reaches beyond
the actor's lifetime "in some meaningful way ... either by af-
fecting eternal existence or by producing a permanent and ev-
erlasting significance and place in reality."30 2
Under either definition, belief systems most similar to
traditional western religions, with regular and organized
patterns of worship directed at one God, are most likely to be
treated as religions for First Amendment purposes.30 3  Less
familiar, minority religions have received inadequate
protection. This is particularly true of American Indian prac-
tices and beliefs. Ceremonies that are closely associated with a
particular natural site "remain exotic and incomprehensible to
the courts" because they defy comparison to western belief
systems. 30 4 Practices and beliefs that appear salvation-oriented
to an outsider can have highly significant cultural and
communal purposes, and vice versa.30 5 Because these practices
and beliefs are not readily compartmentalized, but are viewed
by the practitioner as integral to all facets of individual and
tribal life, they cannot be pigeonholed as exclusively religious
or strictly secular.30 6
300. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165-66.
301. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (discussing statutory
exclusion from mandatory military service).
302. John H. Garvey, Is There a Principle of Religious Liberty?, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 1379, 1383 (1996); Choper, supra note 299, at 594-97.
303. Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Re-
ligion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 273 n.253 (1989); Lupu, supra note 297, at
358.
304. Cross & Brenneman, supra note 202, at 41 n.183 (citing DAVID H.
GETCHES ET AL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 740 (3d ed.
1993)). To an outsider, a healing ceremony, like the Navajo Blessing Way, would
seem to have little to do with either of the relevant criteria, but surely it has reli-
gious meaning to the practitioner.
305. See Cross & Brenneman, supra note 202, at 41 (noting that the Sun
Dance and related practices of northern plains tribes at Devils Tower are "funda-
mentally non-commemorative in character and non-salvation directed"); DELORIA,
JR. & LYTLE, supra note 90, at 117, 282 (explaining that, unlike the Christian re-
ligion, which focuses on individual salvation, tribal practices are group-oriented;
even solitary practices like vision quests are meant to strengthen the individual to
facilitate a greater contribution to the people).
306. See Pemberton, Jr., supra note 210, at 288-89 ("American Indians do
not separate religion from culture, the sacred from the secular, belief from prac-
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Judicial attempts to categorize American Indian beliefs
and practices have resulted in strained and artificial dichoto-
mies and inappropriate results. Some courts fail to recognize
that site-based practices are religious and therefore protected
under the Free Exercise Clause, while others harbor a mis-
taken perception that accommodations for Indian ceremonies
have a wholly religious purpose and effect, ignoring their cul-
tural, historic, and political dimensions in finding a violation of
the Establishment Clause 0 7 The multi-faceted nature of tra-
ditional cultural practices, and the contextual nuances of each
particular controversy, are key to the resolution of both free ex-
ercise claims and Establishment Clause challenges.
B. The Free Exercise of Religion
The Free Exercise Clause is at the heart of religious free-
dom, prohibiting the government from compelling the affirma-
tion of a religious belief or discriminating against individuals
or groups because of their religious views.308 Laws that facially
discriminate or exhibit hostility toward religion have long been
subject to strict scrutiny: they must be narrowly tailored to
serve compelling interests. 3 9 Even laws that appear neutral
can be subject to strict scrutiny if they are not, in fact, neutral
in both intent and application.310
tice, or spirituality from traditional sacred lands."). Pemberton explains that, for
Black Elk and his people:
[Tihe sacred and the secular, the divine and the material creation, are
joined. The Platonic dichotomy between soul and body informing Euro-
pean thought does not govern in Lakota belief. The eternal pervades the
temporal; the material world is of sacred character.
Id. at 291.
307. See Pemberton, Jr., supra note 210, at 288-89.
308. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); see also W. Va. Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding that state action compelling school
children to salute the flag was unconstitutional as to those students whose reli-
gious beliefs forbade saluting a flag).
309. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520
(1993); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) ("[Olnly those inter-
ests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion.").
310. See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 520 (invalidating ordinances that
prohibited the slaughter of animals within city limits, as the plain language and
legislative history of the ordinances demonstrated that the city's object was to
suppress the Santeria religion).
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Supreme Court jurisprudence has shifted over time with
regard to laws that are truly neutral toward religion. For
many years, the threshold inquiry was whether the impact of
the law on the objector's sincere religious beliefs was substan-
tial; if so, the law would be upheld only if it represented a com-
pelling governmental interest and the least burdensome means
of accomplishing that objective.311 An oft-cited example is Wis-
consin v. Yoder, where the Supreme Court applied strict scru-
tiny to strike down compulsory education requirements that
would "gravely endanger" the free exercise of Amish religious
beliefs and parental rights to raise and educate their children
in the faith of their choice. 312
In more recent years, the Court has departed from this po-
sition, applying a lenient form of scrutiny to neutral laws of
general applicability that incidentally burden the free exercise
of religion. In Bowen v. Roy, parents descended from the
Abenaki Tribe objected to the Social Security system, claiming
that to assign a number to their daughter would rob her of her
spirit and inhibit her spiritual growth.313 In rejecting their
claim, the Court concluded that religion-neutral requirements
need only be supported by a rational basis.314 Subsequently, in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith, Oregon laws that penalized sacramental peyote use by
denying unemployment benefits to practitioners terminated
from their jobs for using peyote were upheld.315 The practitio-
ners argued that strict scrutiny should be applied whenever a
law destroys the central tenets of a religion.316 The Court dis-
agreed, concluding that any inquiry into the degree of the bur-
311. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220; see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
480 U.S. 136, 141 (1987) (concluding that the denial of benefits to a woman who
became a Seventh-day Adventist, and consequently refused to work on Saturdays,
failed strict scrutiny); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450
U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (holding that denial of benefits to a claimant who quit his job
because his religious beliefs forbade participation in production of armaments
failed strict scrutiny); Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403, 406 (invalidating a law that dis-
qualified a Sabbatarian from receiving unemployment benefits because of her re-
fusal to work on Saturday, applying strict scrutiny even though her ability to en-
gage in religious practices was not directly prohibited but was effectively
discouraged).
312. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 220.
313. 476 U.S. 693, 696 (1986).
314. Id. at 707-08.
315. 494 U.S. 872, 883-85 (1990).
316. Id. at 883 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 402).
UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73
den is inappropriate: "courts must not presume to determine
the place of a particular belief in a religion."3 17 Although the
freedom to hold religious beliefs has been described as "abso-
lute,"318 conduct posing a threat to public safety, the Court
noted, has never been free from restriction, even when moti-
vated by religious concerns.3 19
Even before Smith was decided, federal actions that im-
paired sacred sites and inhibited access to the public lands for
traditional cultural practices had been regularly upheld. The
lower courts have almost uniformly rejected American Indians'
free exercise claims to access public lands, in many cases con-
cluding that the government action at issue did not affect prac-
tices that were truly religious in nature.32° The Ninth Circuit's
317. Smith, 494 U.S. at 887.
318. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
319. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 ("The mere possession of religious convictions
which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the
citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities." (quoting Minersville
School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-595 (1940))). The Smith
Court also cited Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878), which upheld big-
amy laws as applied to defendants whose religion commanded the practice of po-
lygamy. Id. The Reynolds Court, in turn, relied on Thomas Jefferson's reply to
the Danbury Baptist Association, in which he stated, "the legislative powers of the
government reach actions only, and not opinions .... [M]an... has no natural
right in opposition to his social duties." Id. at 164 (quoting 8 THE WORKS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (1858)); see also Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603,
607 (1961) (upholding Sunday closing laws even though such laws imposed hard-
ship on Orthodox Jewish shopkeepers and customers on grounds that laws impos-
ing indirect burdens on religious practices are valid if the state cannot otherwise
accomplish its secular goals); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944);
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04 ("[The] freedom to believe.., is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the ... [freedom to act] cannot be."); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters,
268 U.S. 510 (1925); Ala. and Coushatta Tribes v. Big Sandy Indep. School Dist.,
817 F. Supp. 1319, 1334 (E.D. Tex. 1993).
320. See, e.g., United States v. Means, 858 F.2d 404 (8th Cir. 1988); Wilson
v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th
Cir. 1980); see also Sequoyah v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980)
(rejecting Cherokees' claim that free exercise rights would be violated by the
flooding of the Little Tennessee River, finding that interests were more "cultural
and historic" than religious in nature); Inupiat Cmty. v. United States, 548 F.
Supp. 182 (D. Ark, 1982) (rejecting claim that religious interests were affected by
offshore mineral exploration and development). Post-Smith claimants have fared
no better. See W. Mohegan Tribe v. New York, 100 F. Supp. 2d 122 (N.D.N.Y.
2000) (finding that imposition of fees for access to state park did not violate rights
of non-federally recognized tribe); Miccosukee Tribe v. United States, 980 F. Supp.
448 (D. Fla. 1997) (holding that government's failure to alleviate flooding in areas
leased by Tribe near Everglades National Park did not impermissibly impact free
exercise rights); Havasupai Tribe v. United States, 752 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (D.
Ariz. 1990); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982) (rejecting Lakota Na-
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opinion in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n
represented a brief departure from this trend, but the Supreme
Court ultimately reversed the Court of Appeals, rejecting a free
exercise challenge to the Forest Service's decision to build a
timber road through a sacred site.321 Because the agency had a
legitimate reason to build the road and had not coerced reli-
gious practitioners to abandon their beliefs, its decision was
upheld in spite of its "devastating effects" on religious prac-
tices. 322 To hold otherwise, opined the Court, would impose a
"religious servitude" and "could easily require de facto owner-
ship of some rather spacious tracts of public property."323
Moreover, "government simply could not operate if it were re-
quired to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires ....
The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it
can give to none of them a veto over public programs that do
not prohibit the free exercise of religion."324
As the Court indicated in Lyng, and made resoundingly
clear in Smith, neutral decisions governing the management of
public lands need only have a rational basis, even when they
cause severe effects on religions. 325 In the wake of Smith, few
tion's challenge to state action that interfered with religious practices at Bear
Butte State Park).
321. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
586, 596 (N.D. Cal. 1983), affd in relevant part, 764 F.2d 581 (9th Cir. 1985), rev'd
sub nom. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988). The Ninth Circuit had found that the road would cause serious damage to
areas which were indispensable to the religious practices of the Yurok, Karuk,
Tolowa, and Hoopa Indian tribes, and that there was no compelling interest in
building the road. 764 F.2d at 586-87.
322. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 451.
323. Id. at 452-53.
324. Id. at 452. The Lyng Court also rejected the tribes' claims based on the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act of 1979 (AIRFA), which voices the federal
policy of protecting Indians' "inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and ex-
ercise... traditional religions.., including but not limited to access to sites, use
and possession of sacred objects .... " Id. at 454-55 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1996
(1994)). According to the Court, AIRFA creates no legally enforceable rights but
simply directs agencies to consider religious concerns. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 455
(citing statement of the bill's sponsor, Representative Udall: the Act "has no
teeth"); see also Conservation Law Found. v. FERC, 216 F.3d 41, 50 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (finding that Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) need not re-
quire minimum stream flows in relicensing a hydroelectric project even if in-
creased flows would inhibit access to religious sites; AIRFA calls upon federal
agencies to consider, but not to defer to, Indian religious values).
325. See Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990); see also Lyng, 485 U.S. at 450-51; Bowen v. Roy, 476
U.S. 693 (1986).
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free exercise challenges will trigger a more probing form of re-
view. Strict scrutiny will be invoked where the decision in
question coerces adherence to a religion or directly targets and
penalizes religious beliefs or practices; such actions are not re-
ligion-neutral and Smith simply does not apply.326 Likewise, a
decision or regulation that appears facially neutral will be sub-
ject to more rigorous review if it is not, in fact, neutral but is
intended to impact religions.327 Strict scrutiny may also be ap-
plied where individualized exemptions from generally applica-
ble regulations are available but have not been extended to re-
ligious proponents; the government cannot grant exemptions
for those who suffer secular hardship but not to "cases of 'reli-
gious hardship' without compelling reason. "328
As for neutral regulations, the Smith Court indicated that
strict scrutiny may be required for "hybrid" free exercise claims
coupled with another fundamental right, such as freedom of
speech or equal protection.32 9 The importance of communicat-
ing one's religious beliefs, rather than simply practicing one's
religion, was emphasized in the Smith opinion as a justification
for differentiating hybrid claims.330 Thus, religious groups that
disseminate information to persuade others to accept their be-
liefs and to gain converts could assert hybrid claims if their
communicative speech were restrained. 31 This scenario is not
likely to be raised by American Indian practitioners, who gen-
erally prefer to be left alone; the idea of proselytizing or at-
326. Smith, 494 U.S. at 877-78.
327. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
546 (1993) ("A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of gen-
eral application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny."); Bowen, 476 U.S. at
707-08 (noting that rational basis would apply to facially neutral regulations ab-
sent proof of an intent to discriminate against religious beliefs or practices).
328. Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 537 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884).
329. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. The Court indicated that cases involving
free speech may receive strict scrutiny because they "advert[] to the non-free-
exercise principle involved." Id. at 881 n.1. In other words, Smith deprives the
Free Exercise Clause of much of its independent meaning; only interests based on
other fundamental rights will be protected when impacted by a neutral law. See
CARTER, supra note 297, at 129-30.
330. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82.
331. See, e.g., ISKCON of Potomac, Inc. v. Kennedy, 61 F.3d 949 (D.C.Cir.
1995); United Christian Scientists v. Christian Science Bd. of Dirs., 829 F.2d 1152
(D.C. Cir. 1987).
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tempting to gain converts is foreign and unappealing. 32 Cases
involving spiritual activity on public lands, however, could re-
quire strict scrutiny by implicating the rights of association
and of parents to raise their children as they see fit.
333
A few years after Smith was handed down, Congress en-
acted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) in an at-
tempt to restore the compelling state interest test of Yoder "in
all cases where free exercise is substantially burdened."334 In
City of Boerne v. Flores, a church brought a RFRA challenge to
a zoning board's denial of its building permit pursuant to a city
ordinance restricting building in an historic district. 335 The
Court held that Congress's attempt to prescribe a legal stan-
dard for analyzing free exercise claims exceeded its authority to
enforce the law under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment:
3 36
The design of the Amendment and the text of § 5 are incon-
sistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to
decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's re-
strictions on the States. Legislation which alters the mean-
332. See DELORIA, JR. & LYTLE, supra note 90, at 114 (explaining that tribal
religious leaders hold their "religious secrets very firmly to themselves" out of
humility and a belief that the higher spirits would guide others as appropriate).
333. See Worthen, supra note 71, at 605-09 (proposing that free exercise
claims may invoke strict scrutiny when asserted in tandem with rights of associa-
tion). Notably, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219 (1972), applying strict scru-
tiny to invalidate laws that undermined the rights of Amish parents to educate
their children, has never been overruled; it was explained as a hybrid case in
Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82. Given the strong relation between traditional cultural
practices and tribal identity, American Indian practitioners would likely have
strong claims for associational and parental rights. See Alabama and Coushatta
Tribes of Texas v. Trustees of Big Sandy Independent School Dist., 817 F. Supp.
1319, 1334 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (holding that Indian families had stated a valid con-
stitutional claim that school's prohibition on long hair unduly burdened parental
rights to guide their children's education and upbringing, raising free exercise and
free speech concerns).
334. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1) (1994).
335. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
336. Id. at 536. Section 5 provides that "The Congress shall have power to
enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of [the Fourteenth Amend-
ment]." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Court concluded that the enforcement
power of Section 5, being remedial in nature, allows Congress to preserve rights
already protected by the Fourteenth Amendment but does not allow it to go be-
yond the Court's restrictive but authoritative interpretation of the Free Exercise
Clause, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
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ing of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforc-
ing the Clause.337
By its own terms, the Fourteenth Amendment applies only
to the states, leaving some question as to whether RFRA has
continuing force as applied to federal actions. 338 In Boerne, the
Court specifically noted that "the most far reaching and sub-
stantial of RFRA's provisions" were those which "impose[d] its
requirements on the States."339 Several circuit courts have held
or at least assumed that RFRA is constitutional as applied to
federal actions. 340 In addition, the Clinton Administration took
the position on at least one occasion that RFRA had continuing
force for federal actions.341 Although the Supreme Court has
337. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519. The Court found that RFRA was not a "reme-
dial" statute, because it lacked any "congruence" or "proportionality" to its pur-
ported remedial purpose; instead, Congress had impermissibly attempted "a sub-
stantive change in constitutional protections." Id. at 533. In contrast to the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the federal govern-
ment, has no explicit enforcement clause.
338. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional
Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 715,
728 (1998) ("The application of RFRA to federal law obviously does not rest on
Section 5 and could not have been intended to do so, since the Fourteenth
Amendment is only concerned with state action.").
339. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516.
340. See Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 832 (9th
Cir. 1999) (finding that the application of federal copyright laws did not violate
RFRA); In re Young, 141 F.3d 854, 856 (8th Cir. 1998) (holding that Congress had
the authority to compel strict scrutiny with regard to federal affairs and therefore
RFRA continues to apply to federal bankruptcy laws in spite of Boerne); see also
Adams v. Comm'r, 170 F.3d 173, 175 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that "courts that
have addressed the question... have found that RFRA is constitutional as ap-
plied to the federal government"), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1117 (2000); Alamo v.
Clay, 137 F.3d 1366, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (assuming that RFRA continues to ap-
ply to the federal government); Hartmann v. Stone, No. 97-5269, 1998 WL
415999, at *4 n.1 (6th Cir. July 7, 1998) (noting, without deciding, that RFRA may
still apply to federal actions).
341. See United States v. Sandia, 6 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1279 (D.N.M. 1997),
affd, 188 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir. 1999). In Sandia, a member of the Jemez Pueblo
was prosecuted under the Bald and Golden Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668
(1994), the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703-712 (1994), and the Lacey
Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3371 (1994), for the possession and sale of body parts from pro-
tected bird species. The government agreed that Congress had the power to re-
quire, through RFRA, that wildlife conservation laws be implemented in a man-
ner "respectful of religious exercise," but that the sale of eagle parts was not a
religious activity. Id. at 1279. The district court found that Boerne invalidated
RFRA in its entirety. Id. at 1281. The Tenth Circuit refused to reach the RFRA
issue, affirming the conviction on the grounds that the commercial sale of pro-
tected wildlife did not implicate any religious rights. 188 F.3d at 1218.
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not resolved the issue, it has on numerous occasions directed
that constitutionally flawed provisions be severed from the re-
maining provisions if, on balance, the statute remains capable
of functioning independently. 342 Thus, Boerne should not be
read as invalidating the law in its entirety.
Congress has since amended RFRA to limit its scope to
federal actions by striking references to state and local gov-
ernments.343 Even as limited to federal actions, RFRA's strict
scrutiny test raises constitutional concerns. Congress may
grant protection for individual liberties beyond the minimum
"floor" required by the Constitution as interpreted by the
courts, but it may do so only if it had the constitutional power
to act in the first place.3" The Treaty Power may be the most
plausible source of power to provide additional protection for
religious freedom, in order to implement the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights. 345 Yet RFRA, as ap-
342. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 931-32 (1983).
343. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2, amended by Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat 803, §
7, Sept. 22, 2000. The amendment was passed in conjunction with a new statute,
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, which forbids state and
local governments from imposing land use restrictions that substantially burden
the religious exercise of persons, assemblies or institutions, unless the restriction
is the "least restrictive means" to achieve a "compelling governmental interest."
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1). The Act also protects the rights of institutionalized per-
sons to practice their faith. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1. In an attempt to avoid the
strictures of Boerne, the Act relies in large part on the Commerce Clause and the
Spending Clause as its constitutional bases. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc(a)(2),
2000cc-l(b); see also S. 2869, 106th Cong. (2d Sess. 2000), 146 CONG. REC. 87774
(July 27, 2000) (Joint Statement of Senator Hatch and Senator Kennedy on the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000) ("[Tlhe bill applies
only to the extent that Congress has power to regulate under the Commerce
Clause, the Spending Clause, or Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."); id. at
S7775-76 (stating that the Act is a valid exercise of congressional power to en-
force the Fourteenth Amendment as a "prophylactic rule" to remedy "a wide-
spread practice of individualized decisions to grant or refuse permission to use
property for religious purposes," and asserting that strict scrutiny is consistent
with Smith because it affects "hybrid" rights of free speech and free exercise).
344. Young, 141 F.3d at 860 (citing, inter alia, the National Defense Au-
thorization Act for Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989, 10 U.S.C. § 774 (2000), which en-
titles members of the military to wear religious headgear, even though such a
right is not compelled by the Free Exercise Clause under Supreme Court prece-
dent; Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)).
345. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
102 (discussing Covenant's guarantees for religious freedom); see also Missouri v.
Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920) (upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty Act as valid
exercise of treaty power); Jeri Nazary Sute, Reviving RFRA: Congressional Use of
Treaty-Implementing Powers to Protect Religious Exercise Rights, 12 EMORY INT'L
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plied to federal action, arguably tramples separation of powers;
the judiciary, not Congress, has the power to "say what the law
is."346 Further, to the extent Congress can be viewed as revis-
ing the Free Exercise Clause through RFRA, it has utilized in-
appropriate means in contravention of Article V of the Consti-
tution, which prescribes specific procedures for constitutional
amendments. 347
If RFRA, as limited to federal actions, should survive con-
stitutional scrutiny, decisions that incidentally but substan-
tially affect religious beliefs by restricting access to public
lands, or by interfering with religious practices by altering the
landscape, would be subject to strict scrutiny. Decisions allow-
ing logging, grazing, road-building, and other discretionary ac-
tivities pale in comparison to American Indian religious inter-
ests and "fall far short of constituting the 'paramount interests'
necessary to justify infringement of plaintiffs' freedom of relig-
ion."348 Although there is some language in Lyng indicating
that the federal prerogative to control the public lands may be
viewed as a compelling governmental interest,349 the Court spe-
L. REV. 1535, 1570 (1998) (arguing that RFRA is an appropriate vehicle to fulfill
the United States' obligations under the Covenant); David Sloss, The Domestica-
tion of International Human Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human
Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129 (1999) (exploring means of implementing
the Covenant).
346. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803). In Boerne,
the Court remarked that RFRA "contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain
separation of powers and the federal balance." 521 U.S. at 536. "The judicial au-
thority to determine the constitutionality of the laws.., is based on the premise
that the 'powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits
may not be mistaken, or forgotten ..... "' City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,
516 (1997) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176).
347. See U.S. CONST. art. V; Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 ("If Congress could de-
fine its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer
would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary
means."') (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177). For a more in-depth
analysis of the validity of RFRA as applied to federal action, see Edward J.W.
Blatnik, No RFRAF Allowed: The Status of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act's Federal Application in the Wake of Boerne v. Flores, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1410
(1998) (concluding that RFRA, even as limited to federal action, circumvents Arti-
cle V's requirements for constitutional amendment).
348. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp.
586, 596 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)).
349. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. The federal government's power over its prop-
erty is often described as plenary in nature, subject to few limitations. See Kleppe
v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 541 (1976); United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S.
16, 29 (1940); Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897); see also U.S.
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cifically noted that the Forest Service had taken "many other
ameliorative measures" to alleviate the effects of the road on
sacred sites.310 If a federal agency did not take such measures,
the decision could be struck down under RFRA for failing to
adopt the least restrictive means of achieving the governmental
objective.
C. The Establishment Clause and Equal Protection
To the extent that governmental actions facilitate cultural
interests that are religious in nature, they may be vulnerable
under the Establishment Clause. Governmental actions that
relate to American Indian religious interests fall roughly into
two categories. Governmental actions that are protective of
cultural resources or allow access to public lands for cultural
practices should survive traditional Establishment Clause re-
view, as the purpose and effects of such actions are primarily
cultural, historical, or political rather than religious. On the
other hand, actions designed to accommodate religious inter-
ests by lifting burdens imposed by governmental practices or
ownership of sacred sites may be viewed as predominantly reli-
gious in nature. Such actions may run afoul of traditional Es-
tablishment Clause analysis, even though they pose little dan-
ger of establishing or endorsing an American Indian religion.
This second category of action should be reviewed under an ac-
commodation analysis that encourages sensitivity toward In-
dian interests in cultural resources while advancing religious
freedom and equality.
1. The Purposes of Anti-Establishment
By prohibiting the government from passing laws "respect-
ing the establishment of religion," the Establishment Clause of
the United States Constitution is unparalleled among the con-
stitutions of the nations of the world. It is unique among the
provisions of the Bill of Rights as well, in that it reaches be-
CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2 (authorizing the federal government to "make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting" federal lands).
350. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 454. The Court remarked that a contrary holding
might allow practitioners to "seek to exclude all human activity but their own
from sacred areas of the public lands," resulting in "de facto beneficial ownership"
and significantly diminishing the government's property rights. Id. at 452-53.
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yond individual freedoms to address group-related interests
and institutions. Naturally, a bar on the establishment of a
government sponsored religion safeguards individual religious
freedom, but it goes much further, ensuring against govern-
mental control over religion and religious groups and vice
versa.
The writings of Thomas Jefferson and Roger Williams, call-
ing for a "wall of separation" between church and state, were
influential in the formulation of the Establishment Clause. 35 1
Volumes have been written on the original intent underlying
the Establishment Clause,352 and the framers' understanding of
the Clause and their objectives in including it in the Bill of
Rights provide an important interpretive tool.35 3 Even so, strict
originalism is not a definitive response to constitutional con-
struction, as a rigid approach to constitutional interpretation
undermines its enduring nature as a living charter for govern-
ance. 354 Equal protection for all races, for example, could result
only through an evolutionary construction of the Fourteenth
Amendment-one rooted in the text of the Amendment but
sensitive to context and the overarching purposes of the Bill of
Rights-in that the framers, many of whom were slave owners,
could not have intended to extend full equality to all. As for
the Establishment Clause itself, it is by no means clear that,
collectively, the draftsmen had only one meaning or motivation
351. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947); see also MARK DEWOLFE
HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS (1954); Thomas Jefferson, Freedom of
Religion at the University of Virginia, in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 958 (Saul K.
Padover ed., 1943). Williams, a colonial Puritan leader, founded Providence,
Rhode Island in 1636, having been banished from Massachusetts for questioning
authorities. Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of Religious
Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455 (1991).
352. See CARTER, supra note 297, at 115-20; see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 26-32 (collecting and discussing scholarship).
353. See Harold J. Berman, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment in
Historical Perspective, in RELIGION AND POLITICS, 64-72 (W. Laswon Taitte ed.,
1989).
354. See CARTER, supra note 297, at 119; see generally Stephen Carter,
Originalism and the Bill of Rights, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 141 (1992). Jef-
ferson, a firm believer in the "sovereignty of the living generation," THE
POLITICAL WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 16 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1993)
[hereinafter THE POLITICAL WRITINGS), wrote "we have not yet so far perfected
our constitutions as to venture to make them unchangeable." Constitutions and
Change, Letter to Major John Cartwright, in THE POLITICAL WRITINGS, supra, at
210.
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when it came to the relationship of church and state.355 The in-
tent of even one of the framers, Thomas Jefferson, is extremely
difficult to pinpoint, as he appears to have been motivated by
multifarious concerns and a view of religion that was far too
nuanced to force into a conceptual box.35 6
To the extent that one can discern the original intent un-
derlying the Clause, the primary thrust appears to have been
protecting religion from government, given the colonists' ex-
periences with government oppression of religions that were
not state-approved.5 The framers voluntarily divested gov-
ernment of power over religions, providing religious groups
with an independence and vitality necessary to a democracy.
Organized religions were thought to impede the potential for
tyranny by the majoritarian government by acting as an inde-
pendent voice for civil liberty358 and an intermediary between
the citizen and the government. 359
355. James Madison, a sponsor of the Bill of Rights in the First Congress,
appears to have been primarily concerned about equality among religions and
non-religion, rather than a need for strict separation between church and state.
See James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance against Religious Assessments
(1785), in ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 104 (1990). Roger Williams, whose writings were influential
to the draftsmen of the First Amendment, advocated governmental neutrality to
express his ideals of religious tolerance-the individual believer's ability to wor-
ship without state interference. See HOWE, supra note 351, at 1-31. Ironically,
Williams employed a nature-based metaphor to express his desire for a wall be-
tween the "garden of the Church and the wilderness of the world," see ADAMS &
EMMERICH, supra, at 6, reflecting a common colonial sentiment-untamed wil-
derness, like the vices of society, was a corrupting influence.
356. See EUGENE R. SHERIDAN, JEFFERSON AND RELIGION 8-9, 35-38 (1998)
(noting that Jefferson was accused of being an infidel because he insisted that law
and virtue did not flow from supernatural revelations but from reason, intellect
and social obligation, a common theme of the Enlightenment).
357. See CARTER, supra note 297, at 115-20; Madison, supra note 355, at
104.
358. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342 (1987) (remarking that solicitude for churches
"often furthers individual religious freedom as well"). Notably, the civil rights
laws of the 1960s, which serve as a cornerstone of our modem, pluralistic democ-
racy and republican, representative government, grew out of the firestorm of pro-
test facilitated by religious leaders, particularly Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr.
359. See CARTER, supra note 297, at 35-37; Michael W. McConnell,
Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 685, 740-41 (1992). De Tocqueville was impressed with the
functioning of the young American republic because it provided both individual
liberty tempered by "virtuous standards of behavior" and a meaningful
replacement for European aristocracies by allowing churches to stand unimpeded
as a bulwark against government tyranny. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 290-95, 513-17 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969). "Despotism may be able to do
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Modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence recognizes
that the Clause serves the additional, equally important func-
tion of safeguarding against improper influence by organized
religions over government, reflecting the bipartite concern that
"a union of government and religion tends to destroy govern-
ment and to degrade religion."360 It inhibits, "as far as possible,
the intrusion of either [the church or the state] into the pre-
cincts of the other."3 61 Just as the government may not restrain
religion, neither may it promote any particular religion, or even
religion over non-religion.a62 To achieve its objectives, the Es-
tablishment Clause generally prohibits the government from
giving religious organizations a leg up through special treat-
ment, whether in the form of direct benefits or exemptions from
otherwise applicable requirements.3 63
As absolute as these principles may sound, in today's plu-
ralistic, interdependent society, there can be no such thing as
an impregnable "wall" between church and state. "'[T]otal
separation is not possible in an absolute sense. Some relation-
ship between government and religious organizations is inevi-
table.' 364 Although eighteenth century American society was
relatively homogenous, with religion almost uniformly equated
with Christianity, we now have a very different picture, with
diverse demographic dimensions and a commitment to plural-
ism beyond anything the framers could have envisioned. Strict
governmental neutrality may have been appropriate in early
513-17 (J.P. Mayer ed., 1969). "Despotism may be able to do without faith, but
freedom cannot." Id. at 294.
360. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
361. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 672 (1984) (citing Lemon v. Kurtz-
man, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
362. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687,
696 (1994) (plurality opinion) (the government may not favor "religious adherents
collectively over nonadherents"); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 216 (1963) ("[T]his Court has rejected unequivocally the contention that the
Establishment Clause forbids only governmental preference of one religion over
another.").
363. See Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 696; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
104 (1968).
364. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971)). Although the Court had initially embraced the "wall" metaphor in Ever-
son v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947), it has since backed away from
such an extreme view. See McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 247 (1948)
(Reed, J., dissenting) ("A rule of law should not be drawn from a figure of
speech."); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 ("No significant segment of our society and no
institution within it can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all
the other parts, much less from government.").
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American law, where the social order was largely determined
by private influences, but in the modern regulatory state, gov-
ernment plays such a pervasive role in the lives of its citizens
that complete neutrality cannot serve the objectives of the re-
ligion clauses. 365 Strict neutrality would, in many cases, re-
quire "callous indifference" 366 or even outright hostility toward
religious needs, thereby undermining the guarantees of the
Free Exercise Clause without promoting the objectives of the
Establishment Clause.
2. Determining Whether Governmental Benefits
Establish Religion
Given the complexities of religion in American life, the Su-
preme Court has admonished that Establishment Clause
analysis "cannot easily be reduced to a single test."367  The
three-pronged "Lemon test," however, has long been employed
as an aid in discerning whether government action satisfies the
Establishment Clause: (1) it must have a secular purpose; (2)
its effect must be primarily secular; and (3) it must not result
in an excessive entanglement with religion.368 In Lemon, the
Court applied this analytical framework to invalidate a state
program that reimbursed private schools for instructional ma-
terials and salaries used to teach secular subjects. 369
365. CARTER, supra note 297, at 133; see also Sandra Zellmer, The Devil, the
Details and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New
Deal, 32 AZ. ST. L. J. 941, 955-56 (2000) (discussing the rise of the modern admin-
istrative state after the New Deal).
366. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 673 (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314-15
(1952)).
367. Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 720 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor added, "It is always appealing to look for a single test, a Grand Unified
Theory that would resolve all the cases that may arise under a particular
Clause.... But the same constitutional principle may operate very differently in
different contexts." Id. at 718; see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971) (noting that constitutional analysis is not a "legalistic minuet in which pre-
cise rules and forms must govern. [Instead we must] examine the form of the re-
lationship for the light that it casts on the substance.").
368. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The second and third prongs of this test
have been further refined in subsequent cases, with entanglement being utilized
as a means of determining whether the effects of the action improperly advance or
endorse religion. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), discussed infra, note
383 and accompanying text.
369. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607.
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The program in question in Lemon required funds to be
used only for secular purposes, satisfying the first require-
ment.3 70  But the purpose of the law need not be exclusively
secular. So long as a plausible secular reason motivates the ac-
tion in question, it will survive this facet of the analysis even if
it is, in part, based on religious concerns or coincides with reli-
gious beliefs.371 For example, Sunday closing laws have been
upheld, even though they provide an unmistakable benefit to
Christian churches and churchgoers; according to the Court, a
uniform day of rest advances secular goals of promoting public
health, safety, and well-being.37 2 Likewise, programs that re-
flect historic interests 373 or allow religious groups open access
to public fora provide unobjectionable "incidental" benefits to
religion.374 In those rare cases where a government program
370. Id. at 620-24.
371. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 681 (1984) (stating that a violation
of the first prong of Lemon will be found "only when.., the statute or activity was
motivated wholly by religious considerations"); see also Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 603 (1988) (finding that the Adolescent Family Life Act served a permissible
purpose even though the goal of reducing problems associated with teenage sexuality
coincided with beliefs of certain religious organizations).
372. See McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1961).
373. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680 (concluding that a city's display of a creche
had a secular purpose of commemorating a "significant historical religious event long
celebrated in the Western World"); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983)
(upholding provision for legislative chaplain as advancing historic interests). In
ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board., 243 F.3d 289, 307 (6th Cir.
2001), the Sixth Circuit held that Ohio's seal, "In God all things are possible,"
used on state documents and prominently displayed at the capitol, "legitimately
serves a secular purpose in boosting morale, instilling confidence and optimism,
and exhorting the listener or reader not to give up." Like legislative prayer, the
national anthem, the motto "In God We Trust" on United States currency, and the
reference to God in the Pledge of Allegiance, it "reenforc[es] the citizen's sense of
membership in an identifiable state or nation." Id. "Judged by historical stan-
dards, adoption of the motto no more represents a step toward an establishment
of religion than does our own practice of opening each session of court with a
crier's recitation. . . . 'God save the United States and this Honorable Court.'" Id.
at 300 (citing Marsh, 463 U.S. at 786). Of course, historical usage alone will not
save an otherwise unconstitutional provision, as "no one acquires a vested or pro-
tected right in violation of the Constitution by long use." Walz v. Tax Comm., 397
U.S. 664, 678 (1970).
374. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1981); see Good News Club v.
Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (rejecting district's argument that it could not
allow church access to school premises to show a film with religious content with-
out violating the Establishment Clause, and holding that district violated free
speech by denying access); see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Board, 515
U.S. at 762-63 (holding that state did not violate Establishment Clause by per-
mitting Ku Klux Klan to display unattended cross on grounds of capitol; the activ-
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was invalidated for having a non-secular purpose, it was
plainly motivated by predominant or solely religious con-
cerns.
375
The second prong of the Lemon test requires that the gov-
ernment action have a primary effect that "neither advances nor
inhibits religion."376 This factor effectively recasts the subjective
inquiry of the first prong, requiring that the action have a secular
intent, as a more objective test focused on the outward manifes-
tation and impact of governmental action. Effects are deter-
mined with reference to the character of the institutions bene-
fited (are they predominantly religious?)377 and the nature of the
aid provided (is it ideological?).37 8 For example, a system of pro-
viding income tax benefits to parents of children attending paro-
chial schools violates the Establishment Clause unless it is suffi-
ciently restricted to assure that it will not advance the schools'
sectarian activities.37 9 Non-ideological programs that benefit en-
tities that are predominately non-religious in nature are not in-
valid, however, just because incidental benefits may also flow to
religious institutions, even if those benefits are substantial.
380 If
ity was protected by the Free Speech Clause, its expression was made on property
open to the public and permission was requested through the same process re-
quired of other groups).
375. See, e.g., Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 n.4 (1989) (invalidat-
ing tax exemptions for religious publications as "intended to benefit religion
alone"); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 (1963) (invalidating
program of Bible readings in schools where state admitted that readings were a
sectarian exercise); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (invalidating "moment
of silence" adopted for the purpose of encouraging school prayer); cf. Church of
Lukumi Babalu, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 534 (1993) (finding Free
Exercise violation where record was clear that ordinances prohibiting animal sac-
rifice were intended to suppress "the central element of the Santeria worship ser-
vice[s]," noting that the Court would look beyond facial neutrality to determine
the true motive under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses).
376. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). See Corp. of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335
(1987).
377. Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743-44 (1973).
378. Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 244 (1977); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
379. See Comm. for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 780-81 (1973) (finding establishment where tuition reimbursement section of
New York statute had direct and immediate effect of advancing religion by providing
financial support for sectarian institutions).
380. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 603, 604-05 (1988) (holding that Ado-
lescent Family Life Act did not have a "primary effect of advancing religion," even
though it directed grants to religious organizations providing counseling on teen-
age sexuality and did not expressly require that funds be used for only secular
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the Establishment Clause were construed so strictly as to for-
bid the extension of all governmental benefits to religious
groups, "a church could not be protected by the police and fire
departments, or have its public sidewalk kept in repair. '38 '
The Lemon Court did not squarely address whether the
school funding program at issue had secular effects, skipping
this step once it had determined that the program ran aground
on the shoals of the third prong-the surveillance needed to en-
sure that the parochial schools were properly using the funds
resulted in an excessive entanglement between church and
state.382 The "excessive entanglement" inquiry examines "the
character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the
nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting rela-
tionship between the government and the religious authority."383
Not all entanglements advance or inhibit religion. Because
some interaction between church and state is "inevitable," en-
tanglement will not be viewed as excessive simply because
there is some level of involvement between the two.384 Estab-
lishment entails "sponsorship, financial support, and active in-
volvement of the sovereign in religious activity."8 5 Thus, exces-
sive entanglement has only been found where a government aid
purposes; Act created a mechanism for policing grants to ensure that funds were
not used for impermissible purposes by requiring potential grantees to disclose
exactly what services they intended to provide and how they would be provided);
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 8, 12 (1992) (upholding pro-
gram providing interpretive services to deaf child in parochial school, implying
that it had permissible effects because it neutrally provided benefits to a broad
class of citizens; "[d]isabled children ... are the primary beneficiaries," thus,
there is no establishment "just because sectarian institutions may also receive an
attenuated financial benefit").
381. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1981) (quoting Comm. for
Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 658 n.6 (1980), and Roemer v. Maryland Pub.
Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736, 744 (1976)).
382. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613, 620-24 (1971).
383. Id. at 615; see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 233 (1997) (noting that the
first two factors overlap with those used to determine whether the effect is permis-
sible).
384. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 233.
385. Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). In Walz, the Court up-
held New York's exemption from real property taxes for realty owned by non-
profit associations, including religions, reasoning that it created "only a minimal
and remote involvement between church and state and far less than taxation of
churches. It restricts the fiscal relationship between church and state, and tends
to complement and reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the
other." Id. at 676; see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)
(Establishment Clause prevents State from "participat[ing] in the affairs of any reli-
gious organizations or groups and vice versa").
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program required "comprehensive, discriminating and continu-
ing state surveillance" by inspecting the content of a religious or-
ganization's programs,3 86 or resulted in a "fusion of governmen-
tal and religious functions" by delegating important,
discretionary powers to religious bodies.38 7
In the aftermath of Lemon, the three-pronged test has
been criticized as "extraordinarily unhelpful" to courts strug-
gling to resolve Establishment Clause challenges, resulting in
overly rigid yet unpredictable outcomes.388 No readily accepted
formula has come to the fore as a workable replacement, but
there have been refinements to the test in subsequent cases. 38 9
Absent an overt religious purpose, the emerging trend appears
to support a more general inquiry into the "practical details of
the [governmental] program's operation"390 in an attempt to re-
386. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
387. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982) (citing School Dist.
of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)). In Larkin, the Court
invalidated a Massachusetts statute because it delegated power to religious bodies
to veto applications for liquor licenses near churches, thereby "fusing" governmental
and religious interests, and it lacked an effective means of ensuring that the power
would be used for neutral purposes. Id. at 125-27; see also Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas
Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 702 (1994) (finding that a state's
creation of a special school district for a religious community unconstitutionally
delegated political power based on religious criterion, "resulting in a purposeful
and forbidden 'fusion of governmental and religious functions'") (citing Larkin,
459 U.S. at 126).
388. CARTER, supra note 297, at 110 (it is "a lemon indeed"). First Amend-
ment scholars have criticized the Lemon test from the moment it was issued. See
id. The popularity of Lemon has waned in Supreme Court jurisprudence as well,
and some of the more recent opinions fail to mention Lemon at all. See, e.g., Good
News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (assessing Establishment
Clause issue with no reference to Lemon); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 515
U.S. 819 (1995) (analyzing Establishment Clause issue with Lemon-like test, but
citing Lemon only in dissent); Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515
U.S. 753 (1995) (plurality opinion; Lemon mentioned only in concurrence); Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (Lemon discussed only in dissent); see also
Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 397 (1993)
(Scalia & Thomas, J.J., concurring) (criticizing Lemon).
389. Lemon continues to serve as guiding judicial precedent, as it has for the
past thirty years, see Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 710-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring),
and it was recently applied to strike a school's policy of allowing student-led
prayer before football games in Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290,
314 (2000), over-heavy criticism from dissenting Justices Rehnquist, Scalia and
Thomas, id. at 319-20. The lower courts continue to cite and apply the Lemon
test as a matter of course. See, e.g., Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assoc. v. Babbitt, 2
F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1454 (D. Wyo. 1998) (citing Bauchman v. West High Sch., 132
F.3d 542, 551 (10th Cir.1997)); ACLU v. Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd.,
243 F.3d 289, 305-06 (6th Cir. 2001).
390. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 839.
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solve the fundamental question whether the program, in real-
ity, establishes or endorses a religion or religious faith.391 In
keeping with this trend, in Agostini v. Felton, a school aid case,
the entanglement prong was subsumed into a broader inquiry
into the program's effect, which looked at the character of the
benefited groups, the nature of the aid, and the resulting rela-
tionship between the government and religious groups.392
These considerations help determine whether the program at
issue could be viewed, from an objective standpoint, as an en-
dorsement of religion via governmental indoctrination, entan-
glement, or non-neutral selection processes which define aid
recipients by reference to religion.3 93 In other words, if a chal-
lenged governmental benefit is "sufficiently likely to be perceived
by adherents of the controlling denominations as an endorse-
ment, and by the nonadherents as a disapproval, of their indi-
vidual religious choices," establishment may be found.3 94
391. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
392. 521 U.S. 233 (1997) (upholding a program that placed public employees
in religious schools to provide disadvantaged children with remedial instruction);
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 808 (2000) (noting that, at least for purposes of
evaluating school aid cases, Agostini recast the entanglement prong "as simply
one criterion relevant to determining a statute's effect"). Agostini overruled Agui-
lar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), which held that the use of government funds to
pay salaries of public employees who taught in parochial schools inevitably en-
tangled church and state, as it would require pervasive monitoring by authorities
to ensure that employees did not inculcate religion. The Court has been especially
willing to depart from Lemon in cases involving school funding and prayer. See
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 807 (citing Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 678 (1971)
("candor compels the acknowledgement that we can only dimly perceive the
boundaries of permissible government activity in this sensitive area")). However,
the endorsement approach has carried over to other contexts. See County of Alle-
gheny v., Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1988) (applying endorsement
test to invalidate government display of a creche).
393. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235; see also Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (advocating an endorsement test); County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601
(finding that a prominent display of a creche on the courthouse steps violated the Es-
tablishment Clause by improperly endorsing a patently Christian message).
394. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597 (citing School Dist. of Grand
Rapids v. Ball 473 U.S. 373, 390 (1985)); see also Capital Square Review & Advisory
Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding
that school's provision for "nonsectarian" graduation prayer to be given by a cler-
gyman constituted an improper endorsement of religion); Texas Monthly v. Bul-
lock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (finding that Texas's sales tax exemption for periodicals
promulgating the teaching of religious sects impermissibly endorsed religious be-
lief); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 711 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (finding that a statute unlawfully advanced religion by bestowing an advan-
tage on Sabbatarians "without according similar accommodation to ethical and
religious beliefs and practices of other private employees,... [tihe message con-
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Under both Agostini and Lemon, the context of a particular
case, including historic circumstances, special relationships,
the coercive impact of the government action, and the location
of the activity at issue is of critical importance.395 When con-
sidering challenges to governmental actions affecting American
Indian cultural resources, the complex nature of the relation-
ship with the land and resources at issue, as well as the signifi-
cance of the resources and practices to tribal culture and sover-
eignty, are highly relevant. The United States Code is replete
with provisions demonstrating the federal government's legiti-
mate political purposes with respect to tribal culture and sov-
ereignty.396 Some statutes, like the NHPA, specifically promote
historic, political, and cultural policies by protecting traditional
practices and sacred sites.397
Although legislative provisions cannot save an otherwise
unconstitutional governmental action, they demonstrate that
veyed is one of endorsement of a particular religious belief, to the detriment of
those who do not share it"); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 678.
395. See Agostini, 521 U.S. at 232; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971); see also Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228 (1982). Programs allowing school prayer seem especially susceptible to
invalidation, given the relatively malleable nature of children and the likelihood
that students feel coerced to participate in school activities for fear of being stig-
matized as an "outsider" if they do not. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 592.
396. 25 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994) (acknowledging federal responsibilities toward
tribal sovereignty in fulfilling the government to government relationship with
tribes, and noting the importance of culture and identity to tribal sovereignty); 25
U.S.C. § 2901 (1994) ("United States has the responsibility to act together with"
American Indians "to ensure the survival of these unique cultures"); 25 U.S.C. §
2001(c)(2) (1994) (educational standards must take into account "the specific cul-
tural heritage of each tribe"); 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1994) (the cultural and social
standards of Indian communities and families are important to tribal integrity).
See also Memorandum on Government to Government Relations with Native
American Tribal Governments, 59 Fed. Reg. 22951 (1994) (agency activities which
may affect tribal rights or resources must be "implemented in a knowledgeable,
sensitive manner respectful of tribal sovereignty").
397. See NHPA, 16 U.S.C. § 470-1 (1994); 36 C.F.R. § 60.4 (2001) (protecting
tribal interests in traditional cultural properties); Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Slater,
167 F. Supp. 2d 265, 296 (2001) (rejecting Establishment Clause challenge to
NHPA regulations regarding traditional cultural properties); see also AIRFA, 42
U.S.C. § 1996 (1994) (adopting policy "to protect and preserve for American Indi-
ans their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the tradi-
tional religions ... including but not limited to access to sites.., and the freedom
to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites"); Exec. Order 13007, 61 Fed.
Reg. 26771 (May 24, 1996) (agencies "shall, to the extent practicable,... (1) ac-
commodate access to and ceremonial use of Indian sacred sites by Indian religious
practitioners and (2) avoid adversely affecting the physical integrity of such sa-
cred sites").
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there are numerous reasons for recognizing and even prioritiz-
ing Indian interests.3 98 In many cases, including the Forest
Service's decisions to protect the Medicine Wheel and to pro-
hibit mineral leasing on the Front Range, actions that facilitate
cultural interests pursuant to the NHPA and other relevant
statutes will only incidentally implicate religion. The Medicine
Wheel Plan should be upheld, as was the Front Range decision
in Independent Petroleum Ass'n v. United States Forest Service,
where the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Establishment
Clause was satisfied under Lemon and the endorsement test.3 99
Specifically, the Ninth Circuit found that the primary purpose
and effect of the decision was to protect the area from impacts
to aesthetics, wildlife, and other surface resources, not to ad-
vance Indian religious beliefs, and that the government had
lawfully accommodated religious practices in its decision-
making processes without entangling itself with religion.400
Similarly, the Medicine Wheel Plan does not endorse In-
dian religions, nor does it entangle the Forest Service with re-
ligion; rather, it protects the unique, historic attributes of the
area.40 1 Members of the general public could not reasonably be-
lieve that their religious choices were somehow being disap-
proved or prejudiced, and non-adherents would not be induced
to "join up" as a result of this decision. Further, the Plan's con-
sultation requirements, crafted in response to the NHPA's re-
quirements, are a far cry from delegating absolute "veto power"
to religious practitioners or otherwise endorsing or entangling
the government with religion. To the extent that the decision
398. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439,
471 n.5 (1988) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the NHPA and other resource
protection statutes provide evidence of the government's legitimate interests in
recognizing and prioritizing tribal interests in public lands and resources).
399. See Rocky Mountain Oil & Gas Ass'n v. United States Forest Service,
No. 00-35349, 2001 WL 470022 (9th Cir. May 3, 2001), petition for cert. filed, No.
01-213 (Aug. 1, 2001). The court rejected the statutory claims for lack of standing,
concluding that plaintiffs could show no concrete injury as the Forest Service
maintained discretion to authorize the leasing of its lands for mineral exploration
under the NFMA and the mining laws. Id. at *1.
400. Id. (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485
U.S. 439, 453-54 (1988), and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Flor-
ida, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987)). It also concluded that, in light of "the many
secular considerations cited in the Forest Service's Record of Decision, a 'reason-
able observer' would not view the decision as an endorsement of religion." Id. at
*2 (citing Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 778-79
(1995) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
401. See HISTORIC PRESERVATION PLAN, supra note 169.
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facilitates Indian religions, it satisfies both Lemon and the en-
dorsement analysis of Agostini.
3. Accommodating Religion by Removing Burdens
Opponents may view governmental actions that accommo-
date religion by removing or diminishing burdens on cultural
practices as being primarily motivated by religious interests.
By reflecting sensitivity to cultural interests that have great
spiritual meaning to Indian practitioners, the Park Service's
actions at Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge, and Wupatki, as well
as the BLM's denial of Glamis's mining plan, are vulnerable
under Lemon, so the argument goes, because they have a reli-
gious purpose. Under a fair and reasoned application of Lemon
and Agostini, however, each of these decisions is motivated by
lawful cultural, historic, and political objectives. Even so,
courts lacking familiarity with tribal cultures might be likely to
find an Establishment Clause violation.40 2 To avoid unneces-
sary constraints that may flow from overly restrictive judicial
constructions of the "purpose" prong, courts should analyze
governmental decisions that remove religious burdens under
an alternative accommodation framework. Accommodations
tailored to alleviate obstacles to religions that experience gov-
ernment-imposed burdens promote both religious liberty and
governmental neutrality toward religion.
The Free Exercise Clause sometimes compels accommoda-
tions that remove burdens on religion, and the Establishment
Clause allows reasonable accommodations, even those that are
not mandated. The Constitution has never required govern-
mental action to be totally unrelated to religion--"that would
amount to a requirement 'that the government show a callous
indifference to religious groups.' 40 3 The First Amendment it-
402. See, e.g., Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980)
(speculating that restrictions on visitor use at Rainbow Bridge at the request of
Navajo members would establish religion); Bear Lodge Multiple Use Assoc. v.
Babbitt, No. 96-CV-063-D, slip op. (D. Wyo. June 8, 1996) (issuing preliminary in-
junction order against commercial climbing closure).
403. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987) (citing Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
314 (1952)). In Gillette v. United States, the Court noted that "'[nleutrality' in
matters of religion is not inconsistent with 'benevolence' by way of exemptions
from onerous duties... so long as an exemption is tailored broadly enough that it
reflects valid secular purposes." 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971).
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self explicitly singles out religion from other individual and
institutional concerns. In order to give weight to both clauses,
it is necessary in some cases to treat religion differently than
secular entities and activities.40 4 In other words, governments
"may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious prac-
tices ... without violating the Establishment Clause."40 5
The fact that accommodations are focused on, and advance,
religious interests does not require their invalidation. The Su-
preme Court has upheld numerous governmental programs
that provide significant aid to religious interests in the name of
removing burdens on those interests. Corporation of Presiding
Bishop v. Amos is a leading example, where an exemption for
religious organizations from Title VII's prohibition against em-
ployment discrimination was upheld as a reasonable accommo-
dation of religion.406 The Court found the exemption permissi-
ble "to alleviate significant governmental interference with the
ability of religious organizations to define and carry out their
religious missions."40 7 For similar reasons, conscientious objec-
tors may be exempted from the draft even though, by implica-
tion, those without such objections, many of which are
grounded on religious beliefs, would be more likely to be con-
scripted and perhaps even killed in military conflict. 408 Exemp-
404. See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling out Religion, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 11 (2000) ("The only constitutional regime that would not 'sin-
gle out' religion would be one that deconstitutionalized ... religion .. ").
405. Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (quoting Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987)); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (judicial exemption of Amish children from compulsory atten-
dance at high school); Walz v. Tax Comm'n., 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (tax exemption
for churches).
406. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 335. Although Title VII initially exempted only
religious activities of religious organizations from its anti-discrimination require-
ments, the 1972 amendment at issue in Amos extended the exemption to all ac-
tivities of religious organizations. See id. at 332 n.9.
407. Id. at 335. See Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313-14 (upholding school release
time program, and stating, "When the state encourages religious instruction or
cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public events to
sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For it then respects the reli-
gious nature of our people and accommodates the public service to their spiritual
needs.").
408. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971); see also Selec-
tive Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1918) (upholding exemptions for
clergy and theology students, and stating "we pass without anything but state-
ment the proposition that [the exemptions are] an establishment of a religion...
because we think its unsoundness is too apparent to require us to do more"). The
exemption at issue in Gillette provided that "Nothing contained in this title ...
shall be construed to require any person to be subject to combat training and ser-
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tions from military dress codes for religious head coverings are
acceptable, as were exemptions from general criminal laws for
the sacramental use of wine during Prohibition. 40 9 Provisions
for military chaplains have also been allowed, at least when
soldiers are stationed where services of their own denomina-
tions are not available. 410
Professor Ira Lupu cautions that any accommodation other
than one necessary to satisfy the Free Exercise Clause runs the
risk of impoverishing the Establishment Clause by ignoring its
underlying purpose of equality among religions and between
religion and non-religion. 411 Lupu poses a legitimate concern.
The problem is, current Supreme Court jurisprudence very
nearly renders the Free Exercise Clause itself devoid of mean-
ing, at least with respect to seemingly neutral governmental
decisions that impose far heavier burdens on groups with non-
mainstream religious beliefs. The Court itself has on numer-
ous occasions recognized that activities that are not compelled
under Lyng and Smith are allowable under the Establishment
Clause without per se endorsing or establishing a religion.41 2
vice in the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 401
U.S. at 441.
409. Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 726 (1994) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (discussing, with approval, DEPT. OF AIR FORCE, REG. 35-10,
2-28(b)(2) (Apr. 1989) ("Religious head coverings may be worn underneath mili-
tary headgear if they do not interfere with the proper wearing, functioning, or ap-
pearance of the prescribed headgear.... ."); National Prohibition Act, § 3, 41 Stat.
308 ("Liquor for nonbeverage purposes and wine for sacramental purposes may be
manufactured, purchased, sold, bartered, transported, imported, exported, deliv-
ered, furnished and possessed"), repealed by Liquor Law Repeal and Enforcement
Act, § 1, 49 Stat. 872.
410. Katcoffv. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 234 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding provision
for military chaplains where none were otherwise available to enlistees, and ex-
pressing belief that failure to provide a chaplaincy "would deprive the soldier of
his right under the Establishment Clause not to have religion inhibited and of his
right under the Free Exercise Clause to practice his freely chosen religion"); see
Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 296-98 (1963) (Brennan, J., con-
curring) (noting that military and prison chaplains may be acceptable); cf Marsh
v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (upholding provision for legislative chap-
lain as grounded in history and "part of the fabric of our society").
411. Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case
Against Discretionary Accommodation of Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 580-83
(1991); Ira C. Lupu, The Trouble with Accommodation, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
743, 747-51 (1992).
412. McGowen v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-45 (1961); Gillette v. United
States, 401 U.S. 437, 454 (1971); see also Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 18
n.8 (1989) ("[W]e in no way suggest that all benefits conferred exclusively upon
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Governmental entities should not be restricted to accommodat-
ing only those free exercise rights that are legally enforceable:
"it is hardly impermissible for Congress to attempt to accom-
modate free exercise values, in line with 'our happy tradition' of
'avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates of con-
science.' 4
13
It is especially critical that federal land managers preserve
traditional cultural properties from degradation and eradicate
barriers to American Indian access and use of the sites, in rec-
ognition of their historic, political, and legal ties to the lands in
question, and the site-specific nature of their religious prac-
tices. Accommodations that protect cultural resources or allow
access to them are a suitable response to burdens imposed by
federal ownership of sites that had long been utilized by
American Indians as aboriginal lands. These accommodations
also respond to the government's intentional suppression of
tribal religions and the more ubiquitous and equally detrimen-
tal historic circumstances of colonization. In some instances,
Congress has explicitly adopted special provisions to alleviate
burdens to Indian interests in traditional cultural properties
located on federal lands. 414 In others, the land management
agency has protected cultural and religious values through its
land management plans.41 Even if other visitors may at times
be inhibited from using particular areas or resources, accom-
modations for tribal uses and protections for cultural resources
are reasonable means of allocating limited resources in the face
of conflicting demands. The protection of cultural resource
values is an essential element of American Indian culture and
religious groups or upon individuals on account of their religious beliefs are for-
bidden by the Establishment Clause unless they are mandated by the Free Exer-
cise Clause."); Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990) (implying that discretionary accommodations are permissible by remarking
that "to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permit-
ted ... is not to say that it is constitutionally required").
413. Gillette, 401 U.S. at 453 (quoting United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S.
605, 634 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting); Abington Sch. Dist.v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203, 294-99 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (emphasis added)).
414. See supra note 195 (listing statutes).
415. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1449-50
(D. Wyo. 1998) (citing Devils Tower National Monument Climbing Management
Plan); Ancient and New Cultures Clash in Chaco Canyon, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan.
12, 1997, at K4 (reporting that officials closed the "great kiva" at Chaco Culture
National Historic Park, a sacred site to Pueblo and Navajo people, to prevent
desecration by tourists).
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sovereignty and should become an essential element of federal
public lands policy.
Although the Court has cautioned that, "[a]t some point,
[permissible, as opposed to required] accommodation may de-
volve into 'an unlawful fostering of religion,"' it has not defined
that point with any precision.416 The key to a lawful accommo-
dation appears to be the lifting of a burden, and it is tempting
to suggest that this, in and of itself, could serve as the lynchpin
of accommodation analysis, in keeping with the Court's trend
away from multi-factor tests in favor of an approach that con-
siders the overall effect of the program in question. Yet as
simple as such an inquiry might seem, the line between burden
removal and benefit conferral is likely too fine, in many cases,
to draw a meaningful distinction between the two.417 Without
more detailed guidance, governmental entities will be reluctant
to accommodate any activities that have religious connotations,
and courts will be left to make ad hoc, even unprincipled, de-
terminations.
4. A Template for Accommodation of Cultural
Interests on Public Lands
If a governmental action appears to lift a burden on relig-
ion by singling out religious interests for special preferences or
exemptions, certain factors can serve as guideposts for deter-
mining whether that action is a permissible accommodation.
First, the exemption or preference must be made available to
all similarly situated religious and secular recipients in need of
similar treatment. If so, the exemption will likely overcome
constitutional challenges so long as it meets two additional cri-
416. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987) (quoting Hobbie v. Florida Unem-
ployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 145 (1987)); County of Allegheny v.
ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989) (finding the Establishment Clause was violated
by the display of a creche, rejecting arguments that the creche could be justified as
an "accommodation" of religion: "Government efforts to accommodate religion are
permissible when they remove burdens on the free exercise of religion. The dis-
play of a creche in a courthouse does not remove any burden on the free exercise
of Christianity."). Id. at 601 n.51 (citing Amos, 483 U.S. at 348 (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in judgment) (citation omitted)).
417. The difficulty of such line-drawing exercises has been noted in other
contexts. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1024-26 &
n.11-12 (1992) (questioning the efficacy of a takings analysis that turns on
whether government actions prevent public harms or confer public benefits).
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teria-it does not place an undue burden on non-beneficiaries,
and it does not excessively entangle the government with reli-
gious affairs. The first two factors reflect the need to ensure
neutrality and even-handedness in religious matters.418  They
are derived from the general principles of Amos, 41 9 and more
specifically from Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, where the
Court invalidated a sales tax exemption for religious publica-
tions because there was no "concrete need" to accommodate the
religious activity in question and no showing of a legitimate
purpose for alleviating the tax burden on religions.4 0 The third
criterion helps define the point when, in attempting to craft an
appropriate response to religious burdens, government sensi-
tivity becomes government endorsement, as feared in Lemon
and Lynch. 421 Rather than striking any governmental action
that either has a religious purpose, as a strict application of
Lemon might entail, or that seems to have gone "too far" in en-
dorsing a religion, these factors provide guiding principles that
are faithful to the purposes of both religion clauses, while ad-
dressing equal protection concerns under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments.
The first factor entails the most extensive analysis where
accommodations provide special treatment to select groups.
418. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809 (2000) (characterizing neutral-
ity as a "prominent" concern in school aid cases like Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
233 (1997)); Rosenberger v. Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 846 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., concurring) ("Neutrality, in both form and effect, is one hallmark of the Estab-
lishment Clause."). But see Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 868, 880-87 (Souter, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that neutrality should not be the central factor in resolving Estab-
lishment Clause questions, but instead merely one indicia of a permissible
purpose and effect).
419. 483 U.S. at 334; see also Hobbie, 480 U.S. at 145-146 & n.10 (1987)
(concluding that the provision of generally available unemployment benefits to
religious observers who must leave their employment "due to an irreconcilable
conflict between the demands of work and conscience neutrally accommodates re-
ligious beliefs and practices, without endorsement"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 409 (1963) ("[Tlhe extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in
common with Sunday worshipers reflects nothing more than the governmental
obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent
th[e] involvement of religious with secular institutions .... ").
420. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11-15, 18 (1989) ("[Tlhe
state has adduced no evidence that the payment of a sales tax... [would] inhibit
religious activity."); see also McConnell, supra note 404, at 698-708 (discussing
Texas Monthly). Cf. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 601 (1989) (re-
jecting argument that the display of a creche was needed to remove burdens on
the free exercise of Christianity).
421. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679-81 (1984); Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 620-24 (1971).
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Equal protection requires that similarly situated parties be
treated in similar fashion, and forbids decisions based on "race,
religion, or other arbitrary classification."422 It is nothing new
to envelope equal protection considerations within the rubric of
Establishment Clause analysis. The Supreme Court frequently
raises themes of neutrality and evenhandedness in Establish-
ment Clause cases, and has pointed out that "an important in-
dex of secular effect" is whether the governmental benefits are
available to "a broad spectrum of groups."423 Given the "domi-
nation of our politics by citizens raised in the mainstream relig-
ions,"424 accommodations for non-mainstream religions may be
necessary to level the playing field and bring about some
measure of equality. Exemptions from generally applicable
laws for such religions will often be acceptable by virtue of the
fact that "neutral" laws reflect the values of the dominant reli-
422. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). Although the
Equal Protection Clause is found in the Fourteenth Amendment, applicable only
to the States, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment has been construed
to impose equal protection requirements on the federal government. See Akhil
Reed Amar, Constitutional Rights in a Federal System: Rethinking Incorporation
and Reverse Incorporation in Patterson and Gitlow, in BENCHMARKS: GREAT
CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE SUPREME COURT 71, 79-86 (Terry East-
land ed., 1995); Steven G. Calabresi, A Madisonian Interpretation of the Equal
Protection Doctrine, 91 YALE L.J. 1403, 1426-29 (1982); Kenneth L. Karst, The
Fifth Amendment's Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 541, 546-52
(1977). This approach is not universally accepted among constitutional scholars.
See LAURENCE H. TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION
115-16 (1991); Frickey, supra note 76, at 1759-63.
423. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981). In this regard, the Court
has found two factors "especially relevant": (1) the benefit should not "confer any
imprimatur of state approval on religious sects or practices"; and (2) it must be
"available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as religious speakers." Id. See
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (using equal protection analysis in invali-
dating exemption for religious groups from requirement that charitable organiza-
tions register and report on fundraising activities); see also Good News Club v.
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (requiring equal access for religious display); Rosen-
berger, 515 U.S. at 839; Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Sch. Dist., 508 U.S.
384, 393 (1993) (requiring equal access to school facilities when church wished to
show religious oriented films on family values). In Kiryas Joel, 512 U.S. at 696,
the Court agreed that "proper respect for both the Free Exercise and the Estab-
lishment Clause compels the State to pursue a course of 'neutrality' toward relig-
ion. It should favor neither one religion over others nor religious adherents collec-
tively over nonadherents." Accordingly, courts find entanglement where a
religious community receives special governmental authority rather than being
treated "as one of many communities eligible for equal treatment under a general
law." Id. at 696, 703.
424. CARTER, supra note 297, at 126. See Kathleen Sullivan, Religion and
Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 216 (1992).
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gious traditions.425 If the political branches of the government
refuse to accommodate the beliefs and practices of minority re-
ligions, the political processes, where majority beliefs and prac-
tices are most likely to be acknowledged and even prioritized,
will place less familiar religions at a relative disadvantage.426
Indeed, "[without exemptions, some religious groups will likely
be crushed by the weight of majoritarian law and culture."427
Where groups are not similarly situated, there is no reason
to apply strict scrutiny. "The proper inquiry is whether Con-
gress has chosen a rational classification to further a legitimate
end. '428  In other words, accommodations for groups with
425. See CARTER, supra note 297, at 125, 128-29; see also McConnell, supra
note 404, at 721 ("the peculiar circumstances of minority religions and the danger
of religious majoritarianism make it necessary to buttress the political checks
with constitutional protections when the objection is based on adherence to relig-
ion").
426. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890
(1990); ("[L]eaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative
disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that [is
an] unavoidable consequence of democratic government"); CARTER, supra note
297, at 129 (responding to Smith by explaining that the Free Exercise Clause was
crafted precisely for the purpose of countering this "unavoidable consequence");
Sullivan, supra note 424, at 216 ("[N]ot a single religious exemption claim has
ever reached the Supreme Court from a mainstream Christian religious practitio-
ner. Mainstream Christianity does not need judicial help."). But see Ira Lupu,
Uncovering the Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 104, 114-19 (1996)
(pointing out the potential pitfalls of preferences for "minority" religions, and not-
ing that Hasidic Jews, for example, have a fair amount of political clout in New
York).
427. CARTER, supra note 297, at 129 (citing Frederick Mark Gedicks, Public
Life and Hostility to Religion, 78 VA. L. REV. 671, 690 (1992)). The effects on mi-
nority religions go beyond inhibiting the free exercise of religion, serious as that
is. "[M]ajoritarian dominance could radicalize some believers into destabilizing,
antisocial activity, including violence." Id. Whether or not the activities in ques-
tion are truly violent, the representatives of the majority tend to believe they are,
at least in the context of Indian relations. As a result, in some instances, Indian
religious practitioners have been quite literally, physically crushed. For example,
the rise in popularity of the Ghost Dance during the period of dislocation and
hopelessness following the Battle of the Little Bighorn was viewed by the United
States as subversive and threatening; the suppression of that movement resulted
in the massacre of hundreds of Indian people at Wounded Knee. See Dussias, su-
pra note 92, at 796-98.
428. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338-39 (1987); see Joseph Tussman & Jacobus
tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 341, 380-81 (1949)
(concluding the Establishment Clause could be read as a type of Equal Protection
Clause); see also Michael J. Mannheimer, Equal Protection Principles and the Es-
tablishment Clause: Equal Participation in the Community as the Central Link, 69
TEMP. L. REV. 95, 118-19 (1996); Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, The Free Exercise
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unique attributes are acceptable so long as they are tailored to
reflect the relevant differences. The Supreme Court has indi-
cated its approval of a form of affirmative religious action to al-
leviate special burdens on conscientious objectors who wish to
avoid the draft and on military members who wish to wear re-
ligious headgear. 429 Such accommodations satisfy equal protec-
tion and are consistent with both the Establishment and Free
Exercise Clauses, even if not actually compelled under Smith
and Lyng.
American Indian tribes, with their unique political, his-
toric, and cultural attributes, are not situated similarly to
other groups. Under Morton v. Mancari, federal preferences
for tribal members are not discriminatory because they are
based on the special governmental relationship with Indian
tribes. 430 In Mancari, the Court upheld a Bureau of Indian Af-
fairs (BIA) employment policy that benefited "qualified" Indi-
ans, concluding that it was "not even a 'racial' preference...
[but a] criterion reasonably designed to further the cause of In-
dian self-government... directed to participation by the gov-
erned in the governing agency."431 As a result, the Court held
that the policy satisfied equal protection concerns by reasona-
bly effectuating legitimate political goals.432
Mancari provides a reasoned approach to equal protection
issues involving tribal accommodations, but the case is not
without its flaws. Although the Court described the employ-
Boundaries of Permissible Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99
YALE L.J. 1127, 1129-34 (1990); Paulsen, supra note 297, at 324-25.
429. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that exemp-
tions from military conscription for persons opposed to war does not violate the
Establishment Clause or result in de facto discrimination among religions); Bd. of
Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 726 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(discussing, with approval, DEPT. OF AIR FORCE, REG. 35-10, allowing religious
head coverings).
430. 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); see Washington v. Confederated Bands and
Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. 463, 500 (1979) ("It is settled that 'the
unique legal status of Indian tribes under federal law' permits the Federal Govern-
ment to enact legislation singling out tribal Indians, legislation that might otherwise
be constitutionally offensive.") (quoting Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551); see also Regents
of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 304 n.42 (1978) (explaining that the strict
scrutiny test applicable to race-based admission preferences does not apply to
American Indian educational programs, which are "not racial at all").
431. Id. at 553-54. The Court noted that the preference "is granted to Indi-
ans not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as member of quasi-sovereign tribal
entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fash-
ion.... the legal status of the BIA is truly sui generis." Id. at 554.
432. See id. at 554-55.
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ment preference as applicable "only to members of 'federally
recognized' tribes,"433 the BIA's policy also required individuals
to have "one-fourth or more degree Indian blood." 434 Blood
quantum requirements are inexorably race-based, categorizing
beneficiaries by their innate characteristics.435 According to
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,436 all racial classifications,
including affirmative action programs, must satisfy strict scru-
tiny. Decisions based on race may pass Adarand muster, but
only if they serve compelling interests by remediating disad-
vantages imposed by past governmental practices. 437
Aguably, even decisions based solely on tribal membership
could be vulnerable under Adarand. The federal recognition
process turns in part on race-related criteria, and many feder-
ally recognized tribes include blood quantum in their member-
ship qualifications. 438 This practice is, to a large extent, a hold-
over from the 1930s, when federal officials urged that racial
criteria be included in tribal constitutions as a means of limit-
ing expenditures on Indian communities. 439 Of course, just be-
433. Mancari, 417 U.S. at 553 n.24.
434. Id. at 553-54 and n.24. "To be eligible for preference in appointment,
promotion, and training, an individual must be one-fourth or more degree Indian
blood and be a member of a Federally recognized tribe." Id. at 553 n.24 (citing 44
BIA Manual 335, 3.1). The statute that allows the BIA to establish such prefer-
ences goes even further, including among qualified Indians "persons of one-half or
more Indian blood", even if they are not members of federally recognized tribes.
See 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
435. Frickey, supra note 76, at 1762 (discussing Mancari, 417 U.S. 535).
Strict scrutiny applies when distinctions are based on immutable characteristics
of discrete, insular minorities. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464
(1996); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
436. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
437. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 554. Racial preferences must also be narrowly
tailored to achieve the governmental interest. Id. In Adarand, the Court con-
cluded that federal programs designed to alleviate the effects of past discrimina-
tion by providing contracts to minority businesses failed this exacting level of
scrutiny. Id. According to the Court, however, strict scrutiny is not necessarily
"fatal in fact." Id.
438. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7(e) (2001) (requiring, among other things, a tribal
membership roll containing evidence that all members descended from a historic
Indian tribe); see also Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S. 261, 266 (1901) (defin-
ing tribes seeking federal recognition as "bod[ies] of Indians of the same or similar
race, united in community under one leadership or government, and inhabiting a
particular though sometimes ill-defined territory").
439. See Barsh, supra note 91, at 139; see also Russel L. Barsh, The Chal-
lenge of Indigenous Self-Determination, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 277, 301 (2000)
(criticizing the recognition process as perpetuating imperialistic notions of tribal-
ism).
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cause a person meets blood quantum requirements does not
compel them to enroll in a tribe; being a tribal member is not
an immutable characteristic of one's race. At base, tribal
status and the United States' relationship with federally rec-
ognized tribes are predominately political rather than racial,
and strict scrutiny should not apply.
Although racially sensitive affirmative action programs
have fallen out of vogue,44° the rational basis test of Mancari
has continuing force for federal actions that affect the unique
interests of federally recognized tribes, such as self-governance
and access to tribal lands and resources." 1 Where the activity,
resource, or area in question is the subject of a federal Indian
treaty, Supreme Court precedent plainly provides that gov-
ernmental actions to effectuate treaty rights do not violate
equal protection because such actions are rationally-even
compellingly-related to the government's legal and political
commitments. 442 As for those sites or resources that are not
addressed in treaties, accommodations that protect cultural
properties or facilitate traditional uses by members of federally
recognized tribes should be upheld as rational, even if there is
no direct showing that the measure is necessary to alleviate
440. Compare Adarand, 515 U.S. at 554, and City of Richmond v. J.A. Cro-
son Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (finding that a city's requirement that prime contrac-
tors subcontract a percentage of their construction contracts to minority busi-
nesses failed strict scrutiny), with Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)
(upholding requirement that ten percent of federal funds for public works projects
be used to procure services from minority-owned businesses as a properly tailored
remedy to cure the effects of prior discrimination), and Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part) (indicating that a public entity may be presumed to
have "a legitimate and substantial interest in ameliorating, or eliminating where
feasible, the disabling effects of identified discrimination"). Interestingly, the
very same Justices who take a restrictive stance on racial affirmative action,
Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas, support religious accommodation. See Lupu, su-
pra note 297, at 113 (noting dichotomy).
441. Williams v. Babbitt, 115 F.3d 657, 664 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that,
under Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), special protections for Indian land,
political institutions, and culture are constitutionally acceptable but questioning
whether preferences for Native Alaskan livestock herding, a non-traditional activ-
ity, would satisfy equal protection).
442. Washington v. Wash. Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 673-74 (1979)
(holding that treaty language securing a "right of taking fish.., in common with
all citizens of the Territory" secured the right to harvest an equitable share, and
expressly rejecting argument that treaties that provide fishing rights to Indians
that were not also available to non-Indians violate equal protection principles).
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burdens imposed by particular governmental actions at that
site.
443
Several circuit courts, following Mancari, have approved ac-
commodations for American Indian tribes. In Rupert v. United
States Fish & Wildlife Service, the First Circuit upheld a law
that allowed members of federally recognized tribes, but not
other persons, to use eagle feathers for religious purposes, find-
ing that this "denominational preference" had a rational rela-
tionship to the legitimate government interest in tribal culture.4"
In Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, the Fifth Circuit ex-
tended the Mancari rationale even further, approving an exemp-
tion for Native American Church members from criminal liability
for the possession of peyote, noting that the "government cannot
at once fulfill its constitutional role as protector of tribal Native
Americans and apply conventional separatist understandings of
the establishment clause to that same relationship."" 5
On the other hand, if the accommodation is for non-
federally recognized tribes or other groups asserting interests
in the public lands, it will likely have to satisfy strict scrutiny
under Adarand.446  Government actions that promote tradi-
443. Bonnichsen v. United States Dept. of the Army, 969 F. Supp. 628 (D.
Or. 1997). Determining whether sites or resources are of "traditional" interest to
a tribe may be difficult, given the sensitive and confidential nature of information
about ceremonial practices and beliefs. Agencies should be guided by federal pro-
visions for identifying traditional cultural properties and cultural items through
ethnographic studies, geographic and historic data, treaties, and tribal oral histo-
ries. See supra Parts II.A. and B. (discussing the NHPA and NAGPRA provi-
sions).
444. 957 F.2d 32, 35-36 (1st Cir. 1992).
445. Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1217 (5th
Cir. 1991). Although the exemption did not explicitly require it, the court assumed
that Native American Church membership was limited to members of federally rec-
ognized tribes, and cited both Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and Larson v.
Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1981), to justify the application of rational basis review. Id. at
1214-16; cf Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 878 F.2d 1457 (D.C. Cir.
1989), (rejecting Ethiopian Zion priest's establishment and equal protection chal-
lenges to peyote exemption, concluding that priest's petition for marijuana exemption
was lawfully denied given distinctions between the two substances). But see United
States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333, 1340 (D.N.M. 1991) (invoking free exercise and
equal protection to dismiss indictment for importing peyote against non-Indian
member of Native American Church because it offends "the very heart of the First
Amendment" to exclude persons from a religious sect due to their race); Kennedy v.
Bureau of Narcotics, 459 F.2d 415 (9th Cir. 1972) (finding that the peyote exemption
violated due process, as it was unrelated to the regulation's purpose of protecting
public health).
446. 515 U.S. 200 (1994). The distinction between federally and non-
federally recognized tribes and tribes can result in exclusionary and sometimes
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tional, historic connections to an area advance legitimate inter-
ests in the site's historic and cultural attributes. To the extent
that the government acts to alleviate government-imposed ob-
stacles to the practices at issue, its interests will generally be
compelling as well as secular, and strict scrutiny should be sat-
isfied so long as the accommodation is narrowly tailored to re-
dress the particular burden or obstacle.
Once the first factor of the accommodation analysis is re-
solved, the remaining considerations-requiring no undue bur-
den on others and no excessive entanglement--come into play.
The second criterion calls for a balancing test to determine
whether an accommodation results in an exorbitant burden on
non-beneficiaries. The level of burden that would be consid-
ered "undue" has not been specified by the courts with any pre-
cision, but it appears that the burden must not be grossly dis-
proportionate to the benefit to religious interests. 447 In other
words, if non-beneficiaries experience substantial hardships
while the benefit to religious interests is minimal, the accom-
modation may not stand." 8  In Estate of Caldor, for example,
the Court invalidated an "absolute and unqualified" require-
ment that employers adjust the work schedule of employees
who wished to observe the Sabbath because there were no ex-
ceptions for employers who would incur "substantial economic
burdens."" 9 There, the significance of the burden on non-
irrational line-drawing. For example, in the Establishment Clause context, the
children of a member who practices traditional ceremonies at a sacred site may
not be accommodated to as great an extent if they themselves are not members,
even if their parent has a strong desire to pass spiritual knowledge along to them.
Yet a proposal to extend access to sacred sites for all American Indians regardless
of tribal affiliation was defeated in 1994, largely due to equal protection concerns.
See Winslow, supra note 94, at 1339 (discussing the demise of the Native Ameri-
can Cultural Protection and Free Exercise of Religion Act, S. 2269, 103rd Cong.,
(1994)). These concerns were perhaps overrated, in that, in cases like the exam-
ple above, a federal land manager should be able to accommodate the children's
practices even though strict scrutiny applies, given their historic and cultural as-
sociations with the site.
447. Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15, 18 n.8 (questioning accom-
modations that "markedly" or "substantially" affect non-beneficiaries).
448. Id.; Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985); see
also McConnell, supra note 404, at 703 (concluding that accommodations that
impose costs on non-beneficiaries "disproportionate to the alleviation of a burden
on religious practice could be a form of favoritism for religion," and noting that
Caldor "suggests an upper bound on the accommodation principle").
449. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 710. The Court observed that other employees
could be seriously disadvantaged as well: "[e]mployees who have earned the privi-
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beneficiaries and the government's failure to consider whether
other alternatives might alleviate hardships without under-
mining the program's objectives caused the accommodation to
fail Establishment Clause analysis. 410
Conversely, if the accommodation removes a significant
government-imposed deterrent from the free exercise of relig-
ion, it will likely be upheld, even if non-beneficiaries experience
hardship. 451 The Title VII exemption at issue in Amos "pre-
vented potentially serious encroachments on protected reli-
gious freedoms," and was therefore legitimate even though it
would have an adverse effect on persons holding or seeking
employment.452 Allowing access to sacred sites and cultural re-
sources on public lands and protecting the resources from de-
struction provide substantial benefits to tribes as an important
step toward removing government-imposed deterrents on tribal
religious practices. Even if non-beneficiaries are burdened, in
most cases, their burdens are not likely to be undue or dispro-
portionate.
Finally, as in traditional LemonlAgostini analysis, federal
actions that remove impediments to the use and preservation
of sacred sites must avoid excessive entanglement with religion
to ensure that the government does not end up controlling the
religious activity and that the religious group or practitioner
lege through seniority to have weekend days off may be forced to surrender this
privilege to the Sabbath observer.... ." Id. at 710 n.9.
450. Id. at 710 (noting that the statute in question provided Sabbatarians
with a day off regardless of whether the employer had made other reasonable
proposals to accommodate their needs). In Katkoff v. March, 755 F.2d 223, 235
(2d Cir. 1985), the court stated that "the test of permissibility [for providing mili-
tary chaplains] is whether, after considering practical alternatives, the chaplaincy
program is relevant to and reasonably necessary for the Army's conduct of our na-
tional defense." It rejected plaintiffs' arguments that a civilian program could
provide the same services in all instances, but remanded for a determination
whether military chaplains are "reasonably necessary" in cities like Washington,
D.C., where private services may be readily available. Id. at 236.
451. See Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 15 ("when government directs a subsidy
exclusively to religious organizations that is not required by the Free Exercise
Clause and that either burdens non-beneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably
be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of
religion,... it 'provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organiza-
tions' and cannot but 'conve [y] a message of endorsement' to slighted members of
the community") (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 348 (1987) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring in judgment)) (emphasis added).
452. See id. at 19 n.8 (citing Amos, 483 U.S. 348 (O'Connor, J., concurring in
judgment)).
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does not assume governmental powers over non-adherents.
Accommodations should simply let religious practices occur un-
inhibited by government: "A law is not unconstitutional simply
because it allows churches to advance religion, which is their
very purpose."453
In Badoni v. Higginson, the Tenth Circuit surmised that, if
the Park Service were to exclude non-Indian visitors from
Rainbow Bridge National Monument at the behest of Navajo
tribal members, or allow religious practitioners to control the
use of the area, it could unlawfully entangle the agency with
religious affairs. 454 As Badoni was a Free Exercise case, the
court's dictum holds scant precedential weight for Establish-
ment Clause challenges. The Supreme Court's subsequent
opinion in Lyng, which gave its blessing to the "many ameliora-
tive measures" adopted to alleviate adverse effects on sacred
sites,455 and in Mancari,45 6 further dispel the concerns voiced in
Badoni. Accommodations for tribes should only be found to en-
tangle the government with religion if practitioners are given
absolute power to control the use of the public lands or to uni-
laterally veto lawful activities of the land management agency
or other visitors. Short of such "fusion," tribal accommodations
will not unduly involve or entangle the government with relig-
ion.457
453. Amos, 483 U.S. at 337 (emphasis added). "It cannot be seriously con-
tended that [the religious exemption from Title VII] impermissibly entangles church
and state; the statute effectuates a more complete separation of the two and avoids
the kind of intrusive inquiry into religious belief that the District Court engaged in
this case." Id. at 339.
454. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (10th Cir. 1980). Tribal mem-
bers alleged that the construction of Glen Canyon dam and impoundment of Lake
Powell had inundated many of their sacred shrines and diminished the integrity
of Rainbow Bridge, a sacred site, by allowing it to be accessed by greater numbers
of tourists. Id.
455. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455
(1987) (noting that the Forest Service had chosen the route furthest from spiritual
sites, and taken additional steps to minimize visible and audible intrusions;
"[niothing in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity
to the religious needs of any citizen").
456. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551-52 (1974).
457. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126-27 (1982); Bd. of Educ. of
Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 695-96 (1994).
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5. Resolving Contemporary Conflicts over
Accommodation
The National Park Service's provisions for cultural inter-
ests at Devils Tower, Rainbow Bridge, and Wupatki National
Monuments accommodate the unique interests of federally rec-
ognized tribes without imposing undue burdens or entangling
government with religion. In the Devils Tower case, the dis-
trict court applied an amalgamation of the Lemon lAgostini en-
dorsement test and accommodation analysis to the amended
Climbing Management Plan to assure itself that the Estab-
lishment Clause was satisfied.48 It found that the voluntary
climbing provision of the amended Plan had a secular purpose
of accommodating, not promoting, Indian religious practices by
removing barriers imposed by government ownership of the
site. It also concluded that, as amended, the Plan did not en-
dorse or advance religion, nor did it excessively entangle the
NPS with tribal worship. 459 However, it cautioned, "If the NPS
is, in effect, depriving individuals of their legitimate use of the
monument in order to enforce the tribes' rights to worship, it
has stepped beyond permissible accommodation and into the
realm of promoting religion."4 60
The court reached the correct result, but by requiring the
Plan to meet both the Lemon lAgostini test and accommodation
analysis, and by prohibiting any burden on other users of the
public lands, it imposed an unnecessarily rigorous form of scru-
tiny.461 If the Tenth Circuit had reached the merits of the
Climbing Plan, it could have clarified the proper role of ac-
commodation analysis-as an alternative to Lemon lAgostini,
rather than an additional hurdle. The voluntary climbing pro-
vision easily qualifies as a lawful accommodation, as it allevi-
458. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448, 1454-56
(1998).
459. Id. at 1455-56. As for entanglement, the court determined that tribes
"are not solely religious organizations, but also represent a common heritage and
culture." Id. at 1456. In addition, it found that, by simply providing an atmos-
phere more conducive to worship, the government's involvement in religion was
limited to a mere custodial function. Id.
460. Id. at 1455. Relying on Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 179 (1980),
the court stated that the "[elxercise of First Amendment freedoms may not be as-
serted to deprive the public of its normal use of an area." Id.
461. The court remarked, "[t]he principle that the government may accom-
modate the free exercise of religion does not supersede the fundamental limita-
tions imposed by the Establishment Clause." Id. at 1455.
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ates burdens on site-specific tribal practices imposed by gov-
ernmental control of land that once belonged to the tribes,
while imposing no undue burden on non-Indian visitors and no
entanglement.
The district court's unduly restrictive stance resulted in a
preliminary injunction against the mandatory closure provision
adopted in the original Plan.462 A mandatory closure arguably
extends farther than is necessary to remediate governmental
burdens on Indian religions, as climbers on the butte do not
physically prevent ceremonies from taking place at the base of
the butte. Actual obstruction of cultural practices, however, is
not an absolute necessity to support an accommodation. 463
Where the government's ownership of the area poses obstacles,
both physical and psychological, to American Indian access and
use of an area that had once been tribal lands, accommodations
are justified. Tribal elders testified about the historic impor-
tance of the area, as well as the disturbing aural and visual ef-
fects of the use of pitons and bolts on the butte and of climbers
yelling to each other, occasionally using vulgar language. 4
64
The elders also stated that children visiting Devils Tower had
difficulty understanding traditional tribal values that instill
respect for the natural setting when climbers were ascending
and conquering the Tower.465 Educational programs and tradi-
tional ceremonies at the Tower and throughout the Black Hills,
according to tribal elders, are critical to maintaining both indi-
vidual and tribal integrity in a dualistic world, helping sustain
the people in the face of conflicting pressures imposed by main-
stream society. 466
462. Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, No. 96-CV-063-D, slip op. (D.
Wyo. June 8, 1996) (order granting preliminary injunction).
463. Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 11-15, 18 (1989); Corp. of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 334 (1987).
464. Transcript of Preliminary Injunction Hearing, Bear Lodge Multiple Use
Ass'n, 96-CV-063-D (May 13, 1996); Defendants' Witness List and Summary of
Testimony for Preliminary Injunction Hearing at 11, Bear Lodge Multiple Use
Ass'n, 96-CV-063-D (May 13, 1996) (testimony of Johnson Holy Rock).
465. In Light of Reverence, Bullfrog Films (2001) (depicting cultural and edu-
cational events, including a 500 mile run to four points in the Black Hills, culminat-
ing at Devils Tower, and Indian peoples' views on the discordant effect of visible,
audible climbers while attempting to teach traditional customs and values).
466. Id. (interviewing Johnson Holy Rock); Statement of Steven C. Emery,
Cheyenne River Sioux Indian Tribe, Transcript of Hearing on the Merits at 100,
Bear Lodge Multiple Use Ass'n v. Babbitt, 2 F. Supp. 2d 1448 (D. Wyo. 1998) (No.
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A mandatory climbing closure to alleviate conflicts while
tribal activities take place would be a reasonable accommoda-
tion, no less so than the accommodation upheld in Amos. 467
Such a closure would not excessively entangle the NPS in reli-
gious affairs, but would instead lessen government involve-
ment in the individual worship and ceremonial practices of
tribal members. However, a ban that spans an entire month,
when traditional practices only occur for a week or two, may be
excessive in light of the burden imposed on other park visi-
tors.468 Likewise, the closure provisions of the original Plan,
which banned commercial but not casual climbing, imposed a
relatively heavy burden on commercial guides without provid-
ing proportional benefits to tribal interests. Commercial
climbers and their clients do not appear to cause any greater
impediments to tribal ceremonies than casual, recreational
climbers. As such, the commercial/non-commercial distinction
in the original Plan may not have been a reasonable accommo-
dation, as more appropriately tailored alternatives are avail-
able.
Like the revised Climbing Management Plan, the NPS's
resolution of visitor use conflicts at Rainbow Bridge and its
proposal for allocating resources at Wupatki National Monu-
ments are appropriate accommodations. The Natural Arch So-
ciety's constitutional claims against the Management Plan for
Rainbow Bridge are clearly playing off the Tenth Circuit's dicta
in Badoni,469 which also involved Rainbow Bridge. The Man-
agement Plan is a reasonable means of protecting the fragile
resources at the Monument, while accommodating closely asso-
ciated cultural interests of federally recognized tribes. Indeed,
the NPS could in all likelihood take additional measures to ac-
commodate traditional uses at Rainbow Bridge, if reasonably
necessary to mitigate the loss of so many sacred sites due to the
flooding of Glen Canyon. 470 Similarly, the eaglet collection pro-
96-CV-063-D) (discussing efforts to address alcoholism, educational issues and po-
litical survival).
467. Amos, 483 U.S. at 335 (upholding Title VII exemption for religious enti-
ties).
468. Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985).
469. See Complaint, Natural Bridge and Arch Society v. Nat'l Park Service
(No. 2000CV-0191J) (D. Utah filed Mar. 3, 2000). For discussion of Badoni, see
supra notes 454-455 and accompanying text.
470. See Texas Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 15 (1989); Caldor, 472 U.S.
at 710.
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posal at Wupatki National Monument reflects the distinctive
connection between the Hopi and the area without dispropor-
tionately burdening other visitors or entangling the NPS with
religious affairs.4 1'
The BLM's denial of Glamis's proposed mining plan is also
an appropriate accommodation of the California Tribes' cul-
tural, historic, and political interests. It alleviates burdens im-
posed by government ownership of the site and by the extant
impairment of the Tribes' ability to use sacred sites in the area
caused by the BLM's approval of nearby mining operations.
472
Although the decision imposes a hardship on other users of the
public lands, particularly Glamis Corporation, as the Advisory
Council noted, there are no other available alternatives that
would avoid destroying the cultural resources at the site and
associated practices.47 3 The denial of the plan in no way pro-
vides tribal religious leaders with governmental powers over
other parties. Thus, the decision is an appropriate means-and
perhaps the only means-of meeting the requirements of the
NHPA, FLPMA, and the CDCA Act, and of accommodating
tribal interests while protecting critical resources from the
physical, aural, and audible degradation caused by mining.
CONCLUSION
The nation's public lands and natural resources hold tre-
mendous significance to many Americans and to American cul-
ture and heritage. Our collective history, literature, and art
have promoted a connectivity to the land that is unique among
developed nations. This sentiment, as expressed in the law
during the course of the country's development and westward
expansion, also served as an instrument of imperialism and, ul-
timately, colonization of the indigenous populations. American
471. See Rupert v. United States Fish & Wildlife Serv., 957 F.2d 32 (1st Cir.
1992).
472. See discussion supra Part III.B. (discussing the mining proposal and its
effects).
473. See id. If the BLM stands by the decision, Glamis may attempt to seek
compensation for the loss of its property interests by raising Fifth Amendment
takings claims, likely in the Court of Federal Claims rather than district court.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (1994). See generally Michael Graf, Application of Tak-
ings Law to the Regulation of Unpatented Mining Claims, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 57
(1997) (concluding that reasonable limitations on "conditional" rights of perfected,
but unpatented, mining claimants do not violate the Fifth Amendment).
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Indians' claims to the protection and use of public lands and
resources are politically and culturally distinct, and their in-
terests are entitled to special consideration by federal land
managers. The use of a particular site on public lands may be
critical to a tribe's identity and its very survival as a commu-
nity and a sovereign political unit, having consequences that
simply are not shared with other interested individuals and
groups. No other group has experienced overt and extended
suppression of their religious and traditional cultural practices
by the United States government. No other group has been
forcibly removed from their native lands and yet retained
rights to off-reservation resources, many of which are situated
on what are now public lands. No other group has sustained a
sovereign existence within the United States, with a right to
establish and maintain its own government and to control its
own destiny as a community.
The cultural resource protection statutes, along with the
public lands laws, provide ample grounds for protecting cultur-
ally important sites and accommodating traditional cultural
practices. Although accommodation is generally not compelled
by the Free Exercise Clause in the wake of the Lyng and Smith
cases, it may be required when linked with other fundamental
constitutional rights, such as free speech, or with Indian treaty
provisions. Even where accommodations are not required by
law, exemptions or preferences for tribal use of cultural re-
sources generally will not offend either Establishment Clause
or equal protection principles. Alleviating the burdens imposed
by past governmental practices and removing obstacles for
tribes with historic ties to land now owned and managed by
federal agencies are particularly apt governmental roles. Ac-
commodations of cultural interests on public lands may ad-
vance the religious interests of Indian practitioners, but such
actions and policies have much broader, constitutionally ac-
ceptable purposes and effects, as evidenced by numerous trea-
ties, federal statutes, and executive policies reflecting the gov-
ernment's historic and political relationship with tribes.
There can be no rigid formula for defining what is reason-
able in any given case, but accommodations that are tailored to
reflect the historic and cultural affiliation with a site or re-
source, and are responsive to long-term public needs and any
physical impacts to the resource, should withstand constitu-
tional and statutory challenges. Where use of a cultural re-
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source interferes with conservation goals, short-term use must
give way to long-term considerations, unless specific treaty
provisions mandate access in a particular case. In the end, the
federal agency must make the hard choices, and cannot allow
uses that substantially impair the resources or delegate com-
plete control or veto power to religious entities. Where tribal
cultural interests are implicated, tribes must be full consulting
partners throughout the decision-making process, and all
available means for accommodating cultural uses and protect-
ing the resources must be considered and embraced to the
greatest extent possible.
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